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Abstract 
 
 
Over the past decade there has been extensive reform in local government accounting 
in Australia. The traditional fund accounting system was replaced in 1993 by 
Australian Accounting Standard AAS27: ‘Financial Reporting by Local 
Governments’ (AAS27) which mandated the preparation of private sector style 
financial reports for local government. These reforms were founded on the perceived 
shortcomings of the fund system of accounting which included insufficient measures 
of economy and efficiency, a too narrow a focus on stewardship and the provision of 
inadequate information for decision-making.  
 
The reforms were the product of the established due process of accounting standard 
setting in Australia. Due process is a legal concept that can be traced back to the 
Magna Carta and which developed over time through the common law. It generally 
connotes fair participation and fair trial, premised upon an attitude of fairness between 
individuals and between individuals and government. Whether the output of the due 
process, AAS27, is capable of delivering the purported benefits of the reform in local 
government accounting has not been tested. 
 
The objective of this research was twofold. First, it sought to evaluate the extent to 
which the due process provided an appropriate consultative framework and 
mechanism for the development of local government accounting regulation. Second, 
the extent to which the outcome of the due process delivered the purported benefits of 
improved financial reporting by local government. 
 
It was concluded that the consultative process, the due process, had little involvement 
in the development of AAS27 and provided an image of public accountability and 
accessibility in name only. Evidence examined indicated that the inclusion of 
infrastructure assets and their subsequent depreciation had made local government 
financial reports less comparable, more volatile, and led to questioning of the benefits 
of including asset movements and their consequent depreciation. 
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Chapter 1 
 
1.1 Structure/Organisation of the Study and Research Questions 
 
History reverberates with ideas regenerated from past experiences. Concepts of 
reform and the processes through which they are achieved are very rarely the 
construct of a contemporary idea. Rather their outcome is the product of a movement, 
which encapsulates their beginning and being. Reform of local government financial 
reporting is no different. Consequently, this research finds form only from within the 
historic boundaries from which the reform emanated and is sequentially and 
historically organised. 
 
The research is concerned with the local government financial reporting reforms of 
1993 which arose for a range of political and economic reasons. The research 
questions this thesis examines are: 
 
1. Did the due process leading to the reforms provide an appropriate framework 
and mechanism for the development of local government financial reporting? 
 
2. Did the changes in accounting practice encapsulated in AAS27 deliver the 
proposed improvements in local government financial reporting? 
 
1.2 This Thesis Considers: 
 
 The extent to which the due process, as applied by the Australian Accounting 
Standards Board (AASB), aligns with the construct of due process, which has 
developed over time through the concept of natural justice which entails 
democratic participation and the natural justice maxims, audi alteram partem, [to 
hear the other side; no person should be judged without a hearing] and nemo iudex 
in re sua, [every judge must be free from bias].  
 
 The nature of the AASB’s due process in light of normative rule making models 
which suggest the need for participant involvement in the making of rules and that 
such rules be framed with reference to the common good. 
 
 The ongoing debate about the nature of accountability within the public sector and 
the manner in which significant change has been wrought upon the public sector 
by the imposition of commercial accounting principles and New Public 
Management (NPM) techniques.  
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 How accountability in the context of the NPM is applied within the public sector 
and the extent to which the attributes of economy, efficiency and effectiveness are 
achieved through current local government financial reporting statements. 
 
 The circumstances that resulted in the promulgation of the private sector 
accounting model of financial reporting on local government.  
 
 How the private sector accounting model was used to legitimise the reform 
process and whether the idealism espoused by proponents for the change met the 
realism of its effect and outcomes.  
 
 The role played by the Australian accounting profession in endorsing government 
perceptions of public sector inefficiency and accountability.  
 
 The institutional arrangements for the development and control of accounting 
standard setting in Australia. 
 
 The accounting profession’s rationale for involvement in the public sector and 
how it legitimised its involvement in public sector accounting standard setting and 
how it used its involvement with the Public Sector Accounting Standards Board 
(PSASB) to push for the application of common standards for both the public and 
private sectors.  
 
 How the accounting profession invoked the authority of a conceptual framework 
to justify the need for common standards and the impact of the conceptual 
framework on the development of AAS27. 
 
 Trends in the financial position of local government in Victoria over the past two 
decades in terms of debt and investment levels along with revenues and expenses 
to discern any shift to smaller government.  
 
 The impact on the financial statements of the major accounting reform agenda of 
AAS27 in recognising infrastructure and heritage assets within the financial 
accounts to determine whether these inclusions have improved financial reporting 
and made for improved decision-making. 
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1.3 Importance of the Study 
 
This study enquires into the accounting standard setting system in Australia and 
questions the appropriateness of its core democratic participatory vehicle, the due 
process. In doing so it highlights issues associated with self-regulating authorities and 
their policy making practices. The study is pertinent to the extent it reviews a major 
paradigm shift within the Australian public sector and more specifically local 
government financial reporting. Spanning the course of three decades it examines the 
reasons for such a paradigm shift, the major actors involved, the actual changes made 
and the effectiveness of those changes.  
 
It is believed these findings will: 
 
 Augment the growing body of evidence available for a review of the 
appropriateness of applying the private sector accounting model of financial 
reporting to local government. 
 
 Augment the existing body of literature pertaining to the appropriateness of the 
due process as the appropriate vehicle for democratic participation in the 
accounting standard setting process applied in Australia. 
 
 Augment the store of knowledge pertinent to the interaction and self-interest of 
the actors within the process of standard setting in Australia. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
 
Historically, accounting research has been premised upon an understanding of 
accounting as a science and investigated using scientific evaluation techniques 
belonging to the physical sciences.1 The most notable of these techniques have 
employed concepts of induction and deduction which rely upon observation of real 
world phenomena which have several inherent flaws, not the least being problems 
associated with observation itself. More recent research has focused on the social 
construct of accounting and questions the appropriateness of the scientific method 
when applied to social sciences.  
                                                 
1  Kaplan, A., (1964), The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioural Science, Aylesbury: 
Chandler Publishing.  
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Supporting arguments suggest that it is not possible to understand completely the 
nature of accounting simply by observing accounting practice and that accounting is 
premised upon conventions rather than any irrefutable laws.2 Consequently, to 
successfully explain concepts such as due process, public policy and accounting 
standards it is important to develop a methodology which will incorporate social 
behavioural factors within any model of scientific inquiry used. In this respect, this 
research will be essentially ex-post facto research, which incorporates survey and 
archival data.  
 
Generally it is a descriptive study premised upon interpretive/hermeneutic constructs 
which consider that the social world can only be understood from the standpoint of 
the individual actors and that their actions cannot be observed in the same way as 
natural objects. This means that the research does not seek to reinterpret the actions 
and experiences of the actors, but rather to give a deeper, more extensive, more 
systematic representation of the events involved. 
 
The analysis utilises several information sources, with the foremost being a form of 
content analysis, which incorporates the objective description of previous historical 
studies. A survey instrument was applied to provide further evidence. Such a type of 
content analysis is usually carried out when the researcher’s accessibility to the 
subject is a problem and only document form data is available.  
 
The methodology employed recognises an acceptance of the extreme difficulty in 
attaining complete objectivity, especially in construing meaning from events that are 
historically predicated and making sense of those events pursuant to their outcomes. It 
therefore encompasses recognition that inquiry is always value laden, and that such 
values inevitably influence the framing, bounding and focusing of research.3  
 
 
 
                                                 
2  Hussey, J. and R. Hussey, (1997), Business Research. A Practical Guide for Undergraduate and 
Graduate Students, Bristol: Macmillan Business.  
3  Cassell, C. and G. Symon, (1995), Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research: A Practical 
Guide, London: Sage. 
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1.5 Limitations of the Study 
 
This study contains a number of limitations that will to some extent impact upon its 
conclusions. 
 
Barron’s Law Dictionary portrays due process not as a technical conception nor 
mechanical instrument, like most legal rules, but rather a process whose fixed content 
is unrelated to time, place and circumstance. It is not a yardstick, but rather 
compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions, and stout confidence in 
the strength of democratic faith while also being, “a delicate process of adjustment 
inescapably involving the exercise of judgement.”4 This study attempts to take such 
an inexact concept as due process and evaluate its application within the Australian 
accounting standard setting arena, which at its best is somewhat subjective.  
 
The study is limited to an ex-post facto aggregated analysis of a subset of local 
government financial documents, from which both historical data and comparative 
council data has been extrapolated to determine trends. Given the complexity and 
intricacy of valuing infrastructure assets and the extended transitional period 
requirements found within AAS27, the volatility of many of the trends and outcomes 
detailed is likely to be more pronounced in this study, due to its proximity to the 
changes. 
 
The Kennett State Government reform of local government in the mid-1990s through 
amalgamation, privatisation, debt reduction, compulsory competitive tendering, rate 
decreases and rate capping, has had a significant effect on local government financial 
reporting and consequently must affect any analysis of the impact of AAS27 on those 
same financial reports. 
 
The passage of time may also limit the findings of this study given the extent to which 
the conceptual framework and existing requirements of AAS27 remain applicable to 
the selection of accounting methods. 
 
                                                 
4      Gifis, S., (1996), Barron’s Law Dictionary, 4ed, New York: Barron’s Educational Services Inc, 
p.159. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Theory of Due Process 
 
 
2.1 The Concept of Due Process 
 
It is a firmly established principle of English law that no person should be condemned 
“unheard and that this principle is not confined strictly to legal tribunals, but extends 
to every tribunal or body of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters 
involving civil consequences to individuals.”5 This is evident in the development of 
English law, which has been predicated on a concept of natural justice where the 
opportunity to be heard is the subject matter of the rules of natural justice.  
 
Because the rules of natural justice are a means to an end and not an end in 
themselves “the requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of 
the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the 
subject matter that is being dealt with and so forth.”6 Philosophical tradition has 
prevailingly identified a relationship between justice and equality which presupposes 
equality as the formal element in justice.  
 
These concepts of justice and equality can be dated to antiquity where Aristotle 
proposed that justice consists in treating equals equally and unequals unequally. The 
ancient Greeks saw the obligation to hear both sides of a case and to give an accused 
person a chance to exculpate himself as the most notable feature of natural justice. 
The Athenian judicial oath, for instance, contained a promise to listen equally to both 
prosecutor and defendant. 
 
The latter Roman lawyer and statesman, Seneca, stated of natural justice that, 
“whoever shall have given judgment, leaving one of the parties unheard, will not have 
acted justly, even if his judgment in fact does justice.”7  
 
                                                 
5  Flick, G.A., (1984), Natural Justice: Principles and Practical Application, 2ed, Sydney: 
Butterworths, p.26. 
6  Jackson, P., (1979), Natural Justice, 2ed, London: Northumberland Press, p.6. 
7  Kelly, J.M., (1992), A Short History of Western Legal Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p.76. 
See:  Seneca referred in Medea  (195) to the injustice of reaching a decision without a full hearing, 
quoted in Boswell’s Case (1606) 6 Co. Rep. 48B, 52. 
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This notion of equality as a formal attribute of justice is of real significance. Not only 
does it require that laws be administered impartially and that like cases be treated 
alike, but it also demands that the action of public officials who exercise authority 
“should not be capricious or arbitrary, but based on principle.”8 The exclusion of 
arbitrariness is more fundamental to the concept of justice than equality alone. It 
encompasses the interconnected notions of objectivity, rationality, impartiality, 
consistency and equality. In dispute settling it also incorporates the notion of 
neutrality. It is not enough merely to treat the parties in a like or equal fashion, but 
rather that rules of fair procedure be established which equalise and maintain the 
parity of the parties. Treating persons equally badly is not necessarily giving them 
justice. They should not only have the opportunity to state their case but also have a 
fair or adequate opportunity to do so. 
 
Being a product of the common law, the rules of natural justice are both flexible and 
capable of adaptation to accommodate whatever set of factual circumstances is in 
issue. In a general sense they apply whenever the rights, property or legitimate 
expectations of an individual are affected. 
 
Golding identifies nine elements that underpin natural justice and its nexus with the 
settling of disputes or cases between interested parties: 9 
 
Neutrality 
 
 No person shall be a judge in his or her own case. 
 
 The dispute settler should have no private interest in the outcome. 
 
 The dispute settler should not be biased in favour of or against a party. 
 
 
Persuasive Conflict 
 
 Each party should be given a fair notice of the proceedings. 
 
 The dispute settler should hear the argument and evidence of both sides. 
 
 The dispute settler should hear a party only in the presence of the other party. 
 
 Each party should be given a fair opportunity to respond to the arguments and 
evidence of the other party. 
 
Settlement 
 
 The terms of the settlement should be supportable by reasons. 
 
 The reasons should refer to the arguments and evidence presented. 
 
                                                 
8  Golding, M.P., (1987), Philosophy of Law, London: Prentice-Hall, Chap. 6, p.120. 
9  ibid.: p.122. 
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Whatever the uncertainty inherent within the phrase natural justice, it connotes, above 
all, the maxims audi alteram partem [to hear the other side; no person should be 
judged without a hearing] and nemo iudex in re sua [every judge must be free from 
bias].10 In the modern world international tribunals have recognised these as “general 
principles of law common to civilized communities.”11 They have been enshrined in 
Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 14 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
 
2.2 Nemo iudex in re sua 
 
The maxim nemo iudex in re sua means that nobody should judge his or her own case. 
By extension, however, it is often modified to entail the notion that a judge must be 
impartial or free from bias. Thomas Hobbes in his masterpiece, Leviathan, noted that, 
“if a man be trusted to judge between man and man, it is a precept of the law of nature 
that he deal equally between them.”12  
 
The importance of the principle that a judge should be impartial could hardly be more 
clearly illustrated than by the dictum in Day v Savadge, (1614) Hob 85.87, “Even an 
Act of Parliament made against natural equity as to make a man judge in his own 
cause is void.”13 
 
From the time of the Year Books, English law has recognised the importance of both 
a hearing and an impartial judge. From these concepts developed a notion of due 
process that was originally founded on the due administration of justice. Due process 
was first introduced into the common law through the Magna Carta, in clause 39 of 
the 1215 Charter, which provided that no one was to be imprisoned, disinherited, put 
to death or put out of land or tenement without being first brought to answer in due 
process of the law.  
                                                 
10  Jackson, op.cit.: p.6. 
11  ibid.: p.7. 
12  ibid.: p.26. 
13  ibid.: p.29. 
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The Statute of 1350 (Edw.3) referred to the Magna Carta and went on to provide that 
no one should be condemned except, “in due manner, or by process … at common 
law.”14 Four years later the Statute of 1354 (Edw.3) provided, “That no man … 
without being brought in answer by due process of the law.”15 Both the Magna Carta 
and the Statute of 1354 were quoted in the Petition of Right in 1628, which used the 
phrase, “due process of law.”16 The phrase, due process of law, was later expressly 
introduced into American jurisprudence in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, 
which provides that, “nor [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of the law.”17 
 
The concept of due process as historically conceived had both procedural and 
substantive elements with procedural due process or fairness being a subordinate to 
the substantive. “There is little point in devising standards or rules of fair procedure 
unless following them results in just decisions and outcomes. If the substantive law is 
unjust, it does not seem to matter much whether the procedural rules are fair or not.”18 
 
2.3 Procedural Due Process 
 
The procedural element referred to certain procedures that came to be regarded as 
necessary for a fair trial, and was later extended in modified form to administrative 
purposes. Galligan suggests that the “early growth of the common law was 
characterised not through abstract reflection on what the substantive rules ought to be, 
but by practical judgments about procedures.”19   
 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the substantive part of the due process, that no 
action should be taken against a person without the authority of the law, had been 
subsumed in the very idea of the rule of law, but the procedural aspects of due process 
had become enshrined in the procedures of courts. “No matter how defective those 
procedures might appear ... they were due process.”20  
                                                 
14  ibid.: p.10. 
15  ibid.: pp.10-11. 
16  ibid.: p.11. 
17  Galligan, D.J., (1996), Due Process and Fair Procedures, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.188. 
18  Golding, op.cit.: p.120. 
19  Galligan, op.cit.: p.168. 
20  ibid.: p.179. 
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“By and large the substantive ends of the law were not in doubt; they were to do 
justice, but justice was beyond human understanding and control; man’s task, 
therefore, was to provide as best he could the mechanisms of justice, the courts, and 
their procedures … the channels of justice.”21  
 
In terms of the latter, justice, goes the old adage, should not only be done, it should 
also be seen to be done. Golding argues that, “standards of … fairness are to some 
extent context-dependent … on the kind of the dispute settling taking place.”22 
Contextually such an approach raises two pertinent questions.  
 
First, is the importance of fairness in procedure more than one of merely giving the 
impression of justice? Golding suggests that it is insufficient to only equalise the 
parties, as “treating persons equally badly is not necessarily giving them justice.”23 
Rather, the parties should have, besides an equal opportunity to state their side, a fair 
or adequate opportunity to do so in a rational and objective manner. Importantly the 
adherence to standards of procedural fairness should promote the settlement of 
disputes, rather than merely bringing them to an end.  
 
Second, does the existence of law presuppose satisfaction of natural law 
requirements? If the substantive law is unjust, does it matter if the procedural rules are 
fair or not? Many recent writers have held that justice in the administration of laws 
merely consists in applying the laws correctly. 
 
Generally, whenever a question arises about how a person should be treated, where 
rights or interests are affected, or about the allocation of burdens and benefits, fairness 
becomes an issue. Galligan suggests that while “Fairness is often linked to ideas about 
giving a person what is due, but it goes further and rests on the general principle that a 
person is treated fairly if he is treated in a way on which he has a justifiable claim.”24  
 
                                                 
21  ibid.: p.168. 
22  Golding, op.cit.: p.107. 
23  ibid.: p.121. 
24  Galligan, op.cit.: p.52. 
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Hart believed the general principle latent in the application of “justice is that 
individuals are entitled in respect of each other to a certain relative position of 
equality or inequality … Hence, justice is traditionally thought of as maintaining or 
restoring a balance or proportion.”25 Commonly understood as procedural fairness, 
Hart’s view finds meaning generally through three constructs: 
 
 Legal procedures are fair procedures to the extent that they lead to or constitute 
fair treatment of the person or person affected. 
 
 Within each type of legal process, there are authoritative standards based on the 
tiers of values relevant to that process, which constitute the standards of fair 
treatment so that a person treated in accordance with them is treated fairly. 
 
 The basis for such treatment being fair treatment is the promise of society as a 
whole to each of its members that they will be treated in that way. 
 
Modern legal interpretation generally defines natural justice in terms of procedural 
fairness premised upon rules relating to hearing, bias and evidence. First, under the 
hearing rule there is an implied right to be given a fair hearing, along with the 
opportunity to present one’s case. The decision maker must afford a person whose 
interests will be adversely affected by a decision an opportunity to present his or her 
case and is construed upon the maxim audi alteram partem, [to hear the other side; no 
person should be judged without a hearing]. It is a fundamental principle of 
procedural fairness that both sides to a dispute are given the opportunity to understand 
and answer any case against them. The adversarial process of dispute resolution 
requires that each party be given this opportunity.  
 
Second, there is an implied right to have the decision made by an unbiased or 
disinterested decision maker, where the decision maker must not have an interest in 
the outcome or an appearance of bias in the decision. Third, under the no evidence 
rule, there is an implied right to have the decision based on logically probative 
evidence. 
 
Embedded within a denial of natural justice is the implied right or ground for review 
against an administrative decision. At common law, denial of such natural justice 
allows a review in circumstances where the administrative decision might affect a 
person’s rights, interests or legitimate expectations. 
 
                                                 
25  Hart, H.L.A., (1991), The Concept of Law, 2ed, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.159. 
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This concept of legitimate expectation finds form in the reasonable expectations that, 
“a legal right or liberty will be obtained or renewed, or will not be unfairly withdrawn 
without a hearing.”26 These legitimate expectations are embellished within the 
concepts of legal and individual rights. Legal rights are those pertaining to an interest, 
claim or privilege to something that is recognised and protected by a rule of either 
customary, domestic or international law. Individual rights pertain to the idea that 
every person should have an equal right to the most extensive system of fundamental 
rights and freedoms, compatible with a system of similar rights and freedoms for 
every other person. 
 
While the ideal of justice would demand that individuals have the same entitlement to 
justice in the hearing of their disputes as to be governed by substantively just laws, 
institutional design distinguishes fair procedure to the extent both are weighed against 
each other. Consequently an individual’s claim for a fair hearing may be overridden 
by the desire to reach a just resolution. 
 
In light of this, the law has not promulgated a strict definition or fixed meaning of due 
process that can be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of any formula. The 
extent to which due process must be afforded a person is the consideration of sets of 
circumstances which begin with a determination of the substantive function of the 
law, which is then weighted against private interest effects.  
 
Barron’s Law Dictionary portrays due process not as a technical conception nor 
mechanical instrument, like most legal rules, but rather a process whose fixed content 
is unrelated to time, place and circumstance, which must be respected in periods of 
both calm and trouble. Its expression is said to find form, through its enforcement by 
law, that provides, “that feeling of just treatment, … and profound attitude of fairness 
between man and man, and more particularly between individual and government,”27 
which has evolved through centuries of Anglo-Saxon constitutional history and 
civilisation.  
 
                                                 
26  South Australia Auditor-General, (2003), Electricity Business Disposal Process in South Australia, 
Supplementary Report of the Auditor-General, South Australia: Government Printer, p.38. 
27  Gifis, op.cit.: p.159. 
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Importantly, it is not a yardstick, but rather compounded of history, reason, the past 
course of decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of democratic faith, while 
also being “a delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of 
judgment.”28 
 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
 Due process in law can be thought of as providing insights into the equity of fair 
dealings between individuals and between individuals and government and finds 
relevance through time between the relationship of fair participation and just 
treatment. Its pertinence to this thesis rests with its nexus to participant involvement 
in the accounting standard setting environment in Australia. It is only through the 
observance of the main attributes of due process, audi alteram partem [to hear the 
other side; no person should be judged without a hearing] and nemo iudex in re sua 
[every judge must be free from bias] that the due process as applied within the 
accounting standard setting can be evaluated. More important is the fact that it 
resonates as part of a reform mechanism and consequently needs to be considered in 
that context. Therefore, while the issue of due process is at the heart of this research, it 
finds form from within the historic boundaries from which, in this case, reform of 
local government financial reporting emanated. This study has been sequentially 
organised to illuminate the historic antecedents of the reform agenda and places 
discussion of due process as applied in accounting standard setting in the context of 
the total reform, rather than in isolation.  
  
                                                 
28  ibid. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Accountability and Public Sector Reform 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Much of the public sector reform process was concerned with the ongoing debate 
about the nature of accountability within the public sector and the manner in which 
significant change has been wrought upon the public sector by the imposition of 
commercial accounting principles and NPM techniques. The thrust of this part of the 
inquiry is to examine how the private sector accounting model was used to legitimise 
the reform process and then to consider the more intricate consequences of applying 
the private sector accounting model. Proponents argued that improved accountability 
should result as the private sector accounting model introduced the ability to measure 
performance. Consequently, there should be improvements in the effectiveness on 
how inputs are used to create outputs or how identified goals are achieved.  
 
The major argument put forward for the use of the private sector accounting model 
was that it made institutional boundaries less opaque and the public sector more 
accountable through the creation of varying patterns of influence and control within 
organisations. “Different patterns of local behaviour come to be seen, compared and 
more readily labelled as conforming to, or deviating from, the dictates of the 
centre.”29 Ideally, performance measurement and assessment could more easily be 
monitored and readily restrained through the new calculative visibility created by 
accounting systems and the preferences of the centre more easily applied to the local.  
 
In a more practical sense, accounting provides evidence of an organisation’s 
legitimacy. The procedural aspects of accounting through accounts, plans, budgets 
and practices demonstrate an organisation’s commitment to rational economic actions 
and efficient management.  
                                                 
29   Hopwood, A., (1984), “Accounting and the pursuit of efficiency”, In The Public Sector: 
Contemporary Readings in Accounting and Auditing, Guthrie, J., Parker, L. and D. Shand, (eds), 
Marrickville: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990, p.418. 
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Hopwood, however, has suggested that the basis of this organisational legitimacy may 
provide an opportunity and freedom for an organisation to be unaccountable through 
appeals to the legitimate actions garnered by accounting, which may enable the 
internal affairs of the organisation to be actually less connected to external 
accountability.30 
 
Normanton found that accountability was not the same thing through time and that it 
had developed with the changing structure of the state and its representative 
hierarchical structures. More particularly, he identified a relationship between 
accountability and secrecy; that there was an “historical connection between 
administrative secrecy and the hierarchical state.”31 “Administrators who are able to 
work in full secrecy have more power than those who are duly answerable for their 
actions. Secrecy increases power and diminishes responsibility, and a crisis of 
accountability arises when secrecy is allowed to prevail over an accountable status 
upheld by law.”32 Evans suggests that “governments have to be forced to be 
accountable; they resist accountability” 33 and if they have the power to do so they 
will avoid accountability by removing accountability mechanisms. It is contended 
here that the introduction of the private sector accounting model has made observation 
of accountability less transparent. 
 
As will be shown later, accounting regulation has been a function of the profession-
state partnership, “characterized by a combination of conflict and co-operation, but an 
enduring and institutionalized relationship between the state and the accounting 
profession”34 which has led to private sector accounting standards being issued in the 
name of the PSASB which has subsequently been merged with the AASB.  
                                                 
30 ibid.: p.419. 
31    Normanton, E., (1966), The Accountability and Audit of Governments, New York: Manchester       
University Press, p.3. 
32     ibid.: p.409. 
33    Evans, H., (1999), The Senate and Parliamentary Accountability, Discussion Paper No. 25, 
Canberra: ANU, p.4. 
34    Karan, R., (2003), “Selective Commercialisation of Public Sector Accounting and Its 
Consequences for Public Accountability”, Australian Accounting Review, Vol.31, No.3, pp.15-23, 
Unpublished supporting paper, p.25. 
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Ryan suggests that not only are the three present public sector standards35 products of 
this profession-state relationship but also products of “a highly integrated and durable 
policy network between the accountants in the central agencies of Treasuries and 
Departments of Finance and the PSASB”36 that resulted from a project both initiated 
and funded by the state. Ryan further emphasises that in such relationships it has been 
observed that, “shared language, values, attitudes and beliefs of policy actors shape 
policy content and reflect the ideas of those with vested interests.”37  
 
3.2 Contracting Accountability 
 
Funnell and Cooper have discerned that ultimately, accountability cannot be escaped 
in liberal democratic governments. 
 
Someone somewhere in the government, either a politician or a public servant, will 
be expected to answer for the actions of government, take responsibility and, if 
necessary, suffer the consequences which this may involve. As occupiers of the apex 
of the political pyramid, politicians are in a good place to direct responsibility and 
accountability to less powerful public servants. Some politicians may try to evade 
their accountability obligations when their political future is put in jeopardy. A more 
attractive option, which removes much of the need for excuses and convoluted, 
undignified efforts to deflect blame, is to contract to the private sector as many 
accountability obligations as possible. 38 
 
By shifting responsibility to the private sector, governments have been able to reduce 
their political exposure and distance themselves from problems, with the defence in 
the event of problems that they are neither accountable nor should be held 
responsible. Karan has found that the shifting of such responsibility to the private 
sector has “been in the interest of public sector managers and politicians.”39 
 
It is not of little importance that the “impetus for classifying information about 
commercial dealings as commercial in confidence has come from the government 
rather than the private sector.”40  
 
                                                 
35    AAS27: Financial Reporting by Local Governments. AAS29: Financial Reporting by Government 
Departments. AAS31: Financial Reporting by Government.   
36    Ryan, C., (1999), “Australian Public Sector Financial Reporting: A Case of Cooperative Policy 
Formulation”, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Vol.12, No. 5, p.576. 
37     ibid.: p.577. 
38     Funnell, W. and K. Cooper, (1998), Public Sector Accounting and Accountability in Australia, 
Sydney: UNSW Press, p.296. 
39    Karan, op.cit.: p.26. 
40    ibid. See: Public Accounts and Estimates Committee Victoria cited in Barton, A., (2001), 
Commercial-In-Confidence Outsourcing Contracts and Accountability in Public Sector Activities, 
Paper present at Asia Pacific Interdisciplinary Research in Accounting Conference, July, 
University of Adelaide. 
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A highly attractive feature of contracting with the private sector for the government is 
the ability to keep the conditions of the agreements secret on the pretext that they 
contain commercially sensitive information which will place the private contractor at 
a commercial disadvantage should the details which they have provided to secure the 
contract be made public.41 
 
In light of these accusations, this thesis now examines the historical confines through 
which such a course has been legitimised and in so doing illuminates the new 
accountability with its greater output orientation, and the role accounting plays in the 
creation of the significant by giving selective visibility to organisational outcomes and 
actions. 
 
3.3  Reform and Public Choice Theory 
  
Public sector management reforms have been heavily predicated on the concept of 
economic rationalism where resource allocation decisions are predominantly made on 
the basis of financial cost/benefit analysis. Added to this was the particularly potent 
influence of public choice advocates of the time, who espoused free market 
economics premised on individual self-interest and competition. Orchard noted of the 
public choice perspective that, “government and bureaucracy in Western democracies 
suffer from gross inefficiency and waste because they are narrowly focused on 
serving the economic interests of particular groups.” 42  
 
Public choice theory recognises that understanding the role of government requires a 
realisation that most economic and social activity is self-interested and that political 
actors, through their self-interest, aim to perpetuate a system that allows them the 
ability and power to influence their own destiny.  
 
Barton suggests that the major thrust of public choice theory was to curtail the role of 
government, which had traditionally comprised:43 
 
 Provision of government or public goods 
 
 Efficient and effective management of government resources so as to minimise 
the cost of providing public services 
 
                                                 
41    Funnell and Cooper, op.cit.: pp.296-297. 
42  Orchard, L., (1998), “Managerialism, Economic Rationalism and Public Sector Reform in 
Australia: Connections, Divergences, Alternatives”, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 
Vol. 57, March, p.21. 
43    Barton, A., (2001), Review of Accrual Budget Documentation, Submission to Round Table Public 
Hearing for the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, June, pp.3-4. 
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 Social justice programs to bring about a more equitable distribution of income 
and wealth 
 
 Macroeconomic management of the economy 
 
 Intergenerational equity to ensure that each generation pays for the public 
services 
 
 
Public choice theory is generally viewed as aligning the role of government to a larger 
focus on the former two roles; the provision of public goods and efficiency in the use 
of resources with less weight placed on the latter three roles. This new focus of 
government entailed turning to private markets, which included mechanisms such as 
privatisation, contracting out and introducing market like approaches. Parker and 
Gould, in critiquing public choice theory, suggest it does not “allow for the 
complexities of the modern public sector environment and its unique role in meeting 
the needs of multiple constituencies.”44 Specifically, that “public sector management 
has unique political, ethical, constitutional and social dimensions that differentiate it 
from the private sector.” 45 
 
3.4  Neo-Liberalism and New Public Management 
 
The focus of the need for change, which is dealt with in detail in Section 4.3, was the 
direct result of the neo-liberalist philosophy that developed over the past thirty years, 
which encompassed theoretical justifications for minimalist government intervention 
and influence with markets. Neo-liberalism is based on the principle that government 
should have little involvement in managing the economy and that the economy will 
flourish best through unrestricted freedom for individuals and businesses.  
 
In attempting to turn ideology into practice, New Right policies promoted the 
adoption of a neo-Taylorist scientific management approach to public sector 
management structures, which emphasised accountability through incentives 
determined by performance indicators. Often described as mechanistic and 
anachronistic, it presented an increasingly technical perception of management, which 
appeared to distance itself from politics, while at the same time being less and less 
open to public scrutiny. 
                                                 
44     Parker, L. and G. Gould, (1999), “Changing public sector accountability; critiquing new 
directions”, Accounting Forum, Vol. 23, No. 2, June, p.115. 
45  ibid. 
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In hindsight, it is perhaps pertinent to note that by the mid-1990s, neo-Taylorist 
management structures were being described as, “bureaucratic, inflexible, conformist, 
and principally concerned with control and cost cutting.”46 However, there are 
disagreements about whether, “variations in types of management practice correspond 
to macro changes in the political economy and industrial structure.”47 
 
These changes in the control and management of public sector organisations led to the 
development of a broad set of policies housed under the title New Public 
Management. NPM policies were promoted on the grounds that the public sector was 
organised on wrong principles and in need of re-invention and institutional renewal. 
Osborne and Gaebler suggested of large centralised bureaucracies, “They are like 
luxury ocean liners in an age of supersonic jets: big, cumbersome, expensive, and 
extremely difficult to turn around.”48  
 
Caution and conservatism are held out to be outdated preoccupations of public sector 
management, to be replaced by flexibility and initiative. This has required of public 
sector managers a performance orientation and a pro-active, anticipatory management 
approach. The greater decision-making authority and flexibility accorded to managers 
has been accompanied by a required results orientation. Thus accountability for 
processes, equity and access have given way in a large measure to accountability for 
outcomes, preferably measured in quantitative and particularly financial terms. Arguably 
service objectives and policy achievements rank below the measurement and evaluation 
of financial results of programs’ full costs and liabilities.49 
 
NPM has been widely characterised as a marketised approach undertaken by 
government in its provision of services, which embraces the role of government as 
being a facilitator of public services, rather than a direct or sole provider.50 The focus 
of the private sector accounting model on performance has not only complemented 
the outputs focus of the NPM ethos, but has also assisted in the commercialisation of 
the public sector culture by transforming custodians of resources and administrators 
into managers accountable to customers.51 
 
                                                 
46  Exworthy, M. and S. Halford, (1999),“Conflict, Compromise and Collaboration”, In Professionals 
and the New Managerialism in the Public Sector, Philadelphia: Open University Press, p.6. 
47  ibid.: p.24. 
48    Osborne, D. and T. Gaebler, (1993), Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is         
Transforming the Public Sector, New York: Penguin, p.12.        
49  Parker and Gould, op.cit.: p.111. 
50  ibid. 
51    Funnell and Cooper, op.cit.: p.ix.          
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The significant thrust of NPM reform was twofold. First, it sought to lessen the 
differences between the private and public sectors. Second, it sought to shift the 
emphasis towards performance accountability away from the accountability for 
process that had historically existed.52 On the former issue of differences between the 
private and public sectors, present Prime Minister John Howard was quite clear:    
 
The differences between public and private in the area of management responsibility 
and accountability can be seriously overstated. The management responsibilities and 
accountabilities that are appropriate to the public sector differ in very few respects 
from management responsibilities and accountabilities in the private sector. The key 
difference between public and private sector management practices is that the public 
sector does not have a bottom-line on which to measure and assess overall corporate 
and business performance.53 
 
Various authors have discerned several significant differences between each sector 
although much of the debate has focused on the following major differences and the 
magnitude of these differences.      
     
 Traditional private sector management generally operates on the presumption 
that individual choice drives the shape and operation of the market in which the 
consumer is pre-eminent. The private sector model of management attempts to 
meet needs through the operation and discipline of the market.54 
 
 Traditional public sector management reacts to government policy as a 
reflection of collective choice and focuses upon citizens as a group rather than 
upon the rights of individual consumers.55 
 
 The public sector model of management is oriented towards principles of social 
justice and equity, restricting the operation of competition to commercial 
activities.56  
 
 NPM emphasises efficiency and effectiveness in securing desired outputs, 
whereas traditional public sector management has placed greater emphasis upon 
access to services, equity of client treatment, processual propriety, and 
compliance with regulations in the management of public resources.57 
 
                                                 
52  Hood, C., (1997), “Which Contract State? Four Perspectives on Over-Outsourcing for Public 
Services”,  Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 56, No.3, pp.120-131. 
53    Howard, J., (1991), “Program Evaluation”, Decision Making in the Australian Government – 
Program Evaluation, Uhr, J., (ed), Canberra: ANU, p.122. 
54     Parker and Gould, op.cit.: pp.113-114. 
55     ibid.  
56     ibid. 
57     ibid. 
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Guthrie and Parker saw the latter shift towards performance accountability as a 
refocusing of public sector administration away “from a focus on the control of inputs 
to the pursuits of outputs [and] accounting systems oriented towards output 
performance measurement”58 with a focus on the bottom-line. Hughes, in comparing 
the forms of accountability between the sectors, argues that the public sector has 
“more forms of accountability, its agenda is set largely by the political leadership 
rather than by senior management reacting to a market, its decisions are frequently 
coercive and based upon legislation, and its size and diversity of activities and 
constituents served is greater.”59 Karan suggests that by “reducing the primary focus 
to economic results, the reform has … allowed a substantial dilution and narrowing of 
public accountability.”60   
 
Parker and Gould have elucidated the following general criticisms of NPM, which 
will impact upon the nature and level of public sector accountability:61 
 
 
 A cost focused approach to controlling efficiency can undermine the 
effectiveness, representivity and responsiveness of public sector organisations. 
 
 The introduction of private sector models can subvert the openness and 
responsiveness of government: for example, reduced disclosure of government 
contractual dealings with business on the grounds of competitive confidentiality. 
 
 An emphasis upon quantitative financial performance indicators can focus 
manager and policy maker attention upon variables that are readily measured 
but not necessarily significant. 
 
 Private sector models of outcomes measurement tend to privilege single index 
measures that aggregate vital information concerning multiple constituent 
factors for which public sector organisations may have a specific remit. 
 
                                                 
58  Guthrie, J. and L. D. Parker, (1998), “Managerialism and Marketisation, in Financial Management 
change in Australia”, In Global Warning; Debating International Developments in New Public 
Financial Management, O. Olson, J. Guthrie, and C. Humphrey, (eds), Oslo: Cappelen Akademisk 
Forlag, pp.55-56. 
59    Hughes, O., (1992), “Public Management or Public Administration?”, Australian Journal of Public 
       Administration, 51(3), pp.286-296, In Parker, L. and G. Gould, (1999), “Changing public sector 
accountability; critiquing new directions”, Accounting Forum, Vol. 23, No. 2, June, p.114. 
60    Karan, op.cit.: p.7. 
61    Parker and Gould, op.cit.: p.115. 
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Overwhelmingly, the thrust of the NPM was to mould management practices in the 
shape of the private sector. Funnell and Cooper suggest that, “at the heart of the 
reforms has been a move away from an obsessive concern with accountability for 
inputs to a keener focus on outputs and outcomes.”62 “The emphasis in the use of 
public sector resources changed from a concern with legalistic conceptions of 
stewardship, to a need to ensure that services were provided in the most efficient and 
effective manner.”63 As governments reconfigured their role and reinterpreted the 
importance of the state according to the principles of neo-liberalism a coincident shift 
in the understandings of accountability and the relevant technologies of accountability 
emerged. “In addition to ushering in a revolution in public sector management, the 
effect of these changes has been to alter long-accepted understandings of the 
accountability of governments.”64 Section 3.5 delineates the nature of accountability 
and its nexus to NPM given that accountability has shifted significantly away from 
one of stewardship of resources, to accountability for outcomes and outputs. 
 
3.5  Accountability  
 
Accountability is somewhat difficult to define, although in general terms it can be 
seen that to be accountable means “there is an obligation to answer for one’s actions 
and decisions which arises when authority to act on behalf of an individual or body is 
transferred to another.”65 Inherent within this definition is a differentiation between 
the notions of accountability and responsibility. Hoskin saw responsibility 
encompassing, “how you have conserved and used the things with which you have 
been charged,”66 while accountability is expanded to include an additional 
requirement of evaluating the level of performance. “Accountability ranges more 
freely over space and time, focusing as much on future potential as on past 
accomplishment, connecting and consolidating performance reports to plans and 
forecasts.” 67 
  
                                                 
62     Funnell and Cooper , op.cit.: p.81. 
63     ibid. 
64     ibid.: p.7. 
65     ibid.: p.30. 
66     Hoskin, K., (1996), “The ‘awful idea of accountability’: inscribing people into the measurement of 
objects”, In Accountability; power, ethos and the technologies of managing, Munro, R. and  J. 
Mouritsen, (eds), London: International Thomson Business Press, p.265. 
67     ibid. 
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Roberts and Scapens saw accountability as the “giving and demanding of reasons for 
conduct in which people are required to explain and take responsibility for their 
actions.”68 Lavaggi argued that accountability arose as a consequence of market 
failure. 69 Patton delineated it as the applied outcome of an accounting reporting 
function.70 Fuller and Roffey portrayed accountability as “fundamental to our system 
of government” and subject to political persuasion.71 In this respect, Sinclair argued 
that accountability depended on the “ideologies, motifs and language of our times and 
to have discipline-specific meanings.”72 
 
Former NSW Premier and later Federal politician Nick Greiner said of accountability 
that it “involves the fundamentals of honesty, openness, adequate disclosure and 
careful, effective application of resources.”73  
 
 
By increasing community knowledge of the government’s financial affairs, the 
financial statements are further evidence of the government’s determination to 
improve its accountability. It is only through knowing the facts that the community 
and government can make rational decisions about spending, staffing, investment, 
taxation, pricing, borrowing and debt. Improved public accountability is the best way 
of ensuring both economic efficiency and, just as importantly, social sensitivity.74 
 
Mulgan suggests that accountability is bound within the relationship between 
subordinate and superior in which “the superior is expected to have an interest in 
assessing and improving the quality of the performance offered by the subordinate.”75 
The accountable are “subject to … oversight.”76  
                                                 
68    Parker and Gould, op.cit.: p.116, See: Roberts, J. and R. Scapens, (1985), “Accounting systems and 
systems of accountability-understanding accounting practices in their organisational contexts”, 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 10(4), pp.443-456. 
69    Lavaggi, R., (1995), “Accountability and the internal market”, Financial Accountability and 
Management, 11(4), pp.283-296. 
70    Patton, J., (1992), “Accountability and governmental financial reporting”, Financial Accountability 
and Management, 8(3), pp.165-180. 
71     Fuller, D. and B. Roffey, (1993), “Improving public sector accountability and strategic decision-         
making”, Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp.149-163, In Parker, L. 
and G. Gould, (1999), “Changing public sector accountability; critiquing new directions”, 
Accounting Forum, Vol. 23, No. 2, June, p.116. 
72     Sinclair, A., (1995), “The chameleon of accountability: forms and discourses”, Accounting 
Organisations and Society, 20(2/3), p.221. 
73    Greiner, N., (1990), “Accountability in Government Organisations”, In The Public Sector: 
Contemporary Readings in Accounting and Auditing, Guthrie, J., Parker, L. and D. Shand, (eds), 
Marrickville: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990, p.31. 
74     ibid.: p.33. 
75     Mulgan, R., (1997), “The Processes of Public Accountability”, Australian Journal of Public         
Administration, Vol. 56, No. 1, p.27.  
76    Thynne, I. and J. Goldring, (1987) Accountability and Control: Government Officials and the         
Exercise of Power, Sydney: Law Book Company, p.8. 
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Uhr suggests that such an oversight function will entail performance assessment with 
the results attained utilised as a basis for giving direction to those who are 
accountable.77  
 
Mulgan identified four stages pertaining to the overall process of accountability:78 
 
Duty of the subordinate (accountable) 
 The reporting or accounting function  
 
Rights accruing to the superior 
 Information seeking or investigation 
 
 Assessment or verification 
 
 Direction or control 
 
Parker and Gould suggest, “the elements of giving information and the evaluation of 
that information so that praise or blame can be applied are synonymous with 
accountability.”79  
 
In an accounting sense this process of accountability is utilised to facilitate managerial 
control, to assist in the formulation of policies of service delivery and revenue raising 
and to assist in the overall economic management and the formulation of social 
policy.80 
 
Funnell and Cooper identify public sector accountability as now being premised upon 
a continuum stretching through the constructs of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness that permeate NPM, which can be seen in Figure 3.1 on page 32.81 
Private sector management practices have adopted the concepts of economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery, through the utilisation of quasi-
markets where the government pays for services but does not necessarily provide 
them and through the contracting out of services. Such arrangements have included 
the privatisation of formerly publicly owned organisations and the corporatisation of 
public sector commercial entities.  
                                                 
77     Uhr, J., (1993), “Redesigning Accountability”, Australian Quarterly, 65, Winter, pp.1-16. 
78   Mulgan, op.cit.: p.28.  
79     Parker and Gould, op.cit.: pp.117-118. 
80     Ma, R. and R. Mathews, (1992), “Financial Reporting by Government Departments: ED55 – A 
dissenting view”, Australian Journal of Corporate Law, 3(1), pp.67-88. 
81     Funnell and Cooper, op.cit.: p.33. 
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Figure 3.1 Sophistication of Accountability 
IMAGE REMOVED DUE  TO COPYRIGHT 
Source: Funnell, W. and K. Cooper, (1998), Public Sector Accounting and Accountability in Australia, 
Sydney: UNSW Press. p.33.   
 
3.5a Economy 
 
Economy is concerned predominantly with the cost and quality of inputs with the 
main emphasis placed on balancing how much to spend against issues of quality 
within a lowest cost arena. Recent managerial reforms have demanded greater 
economy as public sector organisations have come under increasing pressure to do 
more with less. Minimalist governments have overwhelmingly identified economy 
with cost cutting, with much of the debate focused on how much to spend and what to 
spend it on. 
 
3.5b Efficiency 
 
Whereas economy relates to the level of process accountability, efficiency is more 
complex in that it is used as a measure of the relationship between inputs and the 
results or outcomes of using those inputs. Organisations are said to be more efficient 
if: 
 They produce greater outputs for the same level of inputs. 
 
 They use fewer inputs to achieve the same level of outputs. 
 
 They increase outputs at a greater rate than any increase in inputs. 
 
According to Funnell and Cooper, “efficiency, like economy, has been grouped in 
public sector reforms under management accountability” with measurement of 
effectiveness quantified through the relationship between inputs and outputs.82 While 
most inputs are predicated in financial terms, subsequent measurement may prove 
more difficult within the public sector as a consequence of differences between 
outputs and outcomes. Outputs are fundamentally the tangible results of using 
financial inputs, whereas outcomes are not so easily measurably identified and usually 
only measured or assessed using qualitative processes. They also suggest that “equity 
considerations easily can be excluded in the assessment of the worth and efficiency of 
programs and policies,” given the circumscribed way in which efficiency is 
formulated within this context.83   
                                                 
82      ibid.: p.37. 
83      ibid.: p.36. 
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3.5c Effectiveness 
 
Effectiveness relates to the desired effect or outcome as a result of using inputs to 
create outputs. It is the achievement of identified goals that vary through time, due to 
the demand for continued efficiency. To be effective through and over time requires 
attention paid to operational efficiency. 
 
3.5d Effectiveness and Accountability 
 
What is most observable within the discussion on accountability is a clearly 
delineated narrowing of its application. This can be seen by examining those attributes 
Funnell and Cooper have identified with the new effectiveness performance 
accountability:  
 
 Clear identification of those who are accountable 
 
 Expected achievement of agreed goals 
 
 Agreement on the means of evaluating performance 
 
 The means and ability to assess performance 
 
 Power to punish or to reward 
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Under the traditional public sector accounting regime, effectiveness was largely 
unconsidered and at best limited to a focus on inputs with the dominant concern being 
control and compliance. For a large public sector, stewardship of resources and 
accountability for the processes that utilised those resources was required. Under a 
smaller public sector regime, with fewer available resources and wishing to provide, 
or at least be seen to be providing, the same level of services, it was natural that the 
focus would shift away from the level of inputs. Scrutiny of inputs would raise 
questions of policy direction, whereas a shifting focus to performance measures on 
outputs would demand public sector entities to do more with less or else be derided as 
being ineffective. 
 
In line with this shift was the requirement of a measuring system capable of 
evaluating and assessing performance. Accounting has been the chosen instrument. 
Chambers has suggested that an “instrument is a device for making clear and precise 
some feature of objects and events.”84 Consequently, a general discourse on the nature 
of accounting and its nexus with accountability is provided to elucidate the socio-
political nature of accounting within the organisational context and to ascertain the 
ability of the accounting system to deliver an appropriate measurement of 
performance.  
 
3.6 Accounting and Accountability 
 
By making visible and disciplining performance, accounting has often been viewed as 
providing the backdrop for accountability so that it can be demanded, policed and 
enforced. Accounting and its subsequent financial reporting has been utilised to 
tighten the interrelationships between various public sector parts. 
 
They have been used as a means of restraint: to constrain expenditures, actions and 
policies. The selective visibility created by organizational accounting has served to 
further the salience of imposed patterns of standardization and uniformity. The 
information which they produce is used to monitor and evaluate the actions of others, 
and more frequent plans, budgets and reports can facilitate centralized control.85 
 
                                                 
84      Chambers, R., (1987), Accounting as Financial Instrumentation, Paper presented at Waseda  
         University, Tokyo, p.5;  Chambers, R., (1992),  Accounting as Financial Instrumentation,  
         Economia Aziendale, Vol. XI, 3, p.441. 
85      Hopwood, op.cit.: p.410. 
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Bahmueller argues that, “accounting records provide a way of freezing the decisions 
of the past.”86 In this respect, Hopwood suggests that, “what was problematic and 
debated can become lost within the accounting archive”87 with facts created out of 
disagreement and dissent. “The significance of the ability of accounting to forge a 
domain of the factual in this way can be seen in the patterns of both relative and 
absolute performance of many public sector bodies.”88  By providing “a partial record 
of organisational choices and actions,”89 accounting can be seen as a “means of 
judiciously selecting the time-scale for comment and debate.”90 “Organisational 
accounts both reflect and, in turn, influence the emphases that are given in public 
debates. Consequently, the economic has undoubtedly been made more visible than 
the social and the political, in many spheres of public life.” 91  
 
Gregory suggests that: 
 
A preoccupation with accountability creates strong incentives for managers and 
operators to collaborate in constructing a body of ‘artifactual’ knowledge, which is a 
crafted product of dubious veracity. This is a consequence of the drive to maximize 
measurable outputs and so enhance the appearance of organizational effectiveness. 
This knowledge becomes, in effect, the agency’s own officially constructed ‘reality’, 
self-sustaining and largely beyond intelligent, reflective revision.92 
 
There is little doubt that the nature, development and presentation of accounting 
information have implications for organisational structures and policies made by those 
organisations. 
 
Particular forms of accounts have been used to buffer certain organisations from the 
dictates of government policy and intervention. ‘Losses’, for instance, have served as 
a pretext for price increases which have provided subsequent investment autonomy 
sometimes on a very large scale; profits, similarly, have been used as evidence of 
both the granting of greater autonomy and its positive achievements … Accountings 
have been used as a means of restraint: to constrain expenditures, actions and 
policies. The selective visibility created by organisational accounting has served to 
further the salience of imposed patterns of standardisation and uniformity. 93 
          
                                                 
86      Bahmueller, C., (1981), “The National Charity Company: Jeremy Bentham’s Silent Revolution”, 
USA: University of California Press, p.193. In The Public Sector: Contemporary Readings in 
Accounting and Auditing, Guthrie, J., Parker, L. and D. Shand, (eds), Marrickville: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1990, p.409. 
87      Hopwood, op.cit.: p.409. 
88      ibid. 
89      ibid. 
90      ibid. 
91      ibid. 
92      Gregory, R., (1995), “Accountability, Responsibility and Corruption: Managing the Public 
Production Process”, In The State Under Contract, Boston, J., (ed). Wellington: Bridgit Williams 
Books, p.63. 
93      Hopwood, op.cit.: p.410. 
 36
One line of thought concerning this is premised upon the concept of newly poor 
behaviour,94 which identifies an increase in visibility and investment in economic 
calculation by organisations during periods of restraint. Mechanisms employed 
include greater emphasis on financial information, costs and the calculation of 
economic decision-making. Budgets, plans and financial standards become generally 
more detailed and the overall direction of the organisation becomes more inwardly 
focused on the economic. Hopwood suggests that accountants and accounting “have 
consistently expanded their sphere of influence” during periods of economic restraint 
or difficulty.95  
 
This newly found strategic interest in accounting has embellished rhetoric of 
economy, efficiency and value for money, albeit not without its critics. 
 
For, although the ideas appeal to the comparison of inputs and outputs, and financial 
resources with their consequences, the delineation of those inputs, outputs, resources 
and consequences remains both a practically and conceptually difficult endeavour - 
not least in organisation and economic record-keeping, and where outputs and 
consequences repeatedly arise in organisations different from those initiating the 
developments.  
 
In fact, very little is known about not only the practice of the new public accounting 
but also the wider impacts which might stem from such an intensification of 
economic visibility in the public domain. To date, accounting for efficiency and 
value for money have been advanced in the name of their presumed potential, rather 
than their practical possibility or actual consequences.96 
          
Gregory also suggests that, “neither outputs or outcomes are measurable, so 
managerial control is problematic.” 97 In this respect, Hopwood has identified several 
spheres through which accounting practice permeates the organisational environment. 
 
3.6a  Accounting as technique 
 
A major criticism of accounting is that the ascertainment of costs and financial 
decision-useful data is premised upon a number of choices, assumptions and practices 
that are concocted into ambiguous relationships that often include assessments of 
efficiencies and value for money pursuant to the message being presented. 
                                                 
94      Olofsson, C. and P. Svalander, (1975), “The Medical Services Change over to a Poor 
Environment”, Sweden: University of Linkoping, In The Public Sector: Contemporary Readings 
in Accounting and Auditing, Guthrie, J., Parker, L. and D. Shand, (eds), Marrickville: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1990, p.411. 
95      Hopwood, op.cit.: p.411. 
96      Hopwood, op.cit.: p.414. 
97      Gregory, op.cit.: p.64. 
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Discretion as to what are the relevant inputs is rarely unproblematic and 
straightforward and in many cases may bear only a loose relationship to the 
organisational emphasis required for any particular organisational proposal. 
 
3.6b    Accounting and the creation of the significant 
 
Accounting gives a selective visibility to organisational outcomes and actions and 
plays a very important role in influencing what comes to be seen as possible, 
problematic, desirable and significant. While direct observation can play a vital role in 
determining what is seen and valued, neither interested parties outside nor 
organisational participants can ever know the whole extent of organisational life.  
 
In organisational hierarchies where organisational boundaries and geographical 
distance restrict what is directly visible, observation is often superseded and 
supplemented by that which is recorded. Accounting information then becomes an 
integral source of what is known about an organisation and what is expected of it. 
Therefore those who can influence what enters into the organisational accounts attain 
a powerful and influential role within the organisation. Karan argues that “public 
accountability can only be further diluted if the agent is able to develop or influence 
the development of the technology (i.e. the accounting system).”98  
 
Over a plethora of organisational disturbances and options, some will be seen as more 
or less problematic. Some of these disturbances or options will appeal more readily to 
supportive information and facts than others, while some will find it easier to relate to 
the information provided through the accounting system. In many ways, not only can 
the emphasis given to different aspects of the organisation be changed, but also 
different values can more readily enter into decision processes and appeals can be 
made to different legitimacies for action.  
 
                                                 
98      Karan, op.cit.: pp.7-8. 
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In light of this, Hopwood suggests that, “the economic, for instance, can be given 
more attention than the social. The internal workings of the organisation can be 
emphasised rather than its external context. The immediate can be given priority 
rather than the longer-term.”99 By shaping the realm of the visible, accounting plays a 
significant role in what is considered significant and the directions of change that are 
considered desirable within an organisation. “Both the organisational landscapes of 
the present and the future are in part, at least, a creation of the accountings that are 
given of them.”100 
             
3.6c  Accounting, technical practice and the realm of politics 
                    
Accounting has the potential to create seemingly precise and specific quantitative 
facts that delineate what is costly, beneficial and of value. By doing so, calculative 
priority can be given to the economic rather than the social. “Costs, consequences and 
benefits can come to be divided into the defined and known.”101  
 
Accounting can create varying directions of organisational and social functioning 
through its ability to emphasise the particular. Consequently, accounting, through the 
manner in which it highlights only selected paths and takes account of selective 
consequences, shapes organisational reality. 
 
Depending on the extent to which they appeal to the domain of the newly factual, 
different legitimacies can come to be attached to arguments and viewpoints. Quite 
specific calculative procedures for decision-making and resource allocation can come 
to be used in contexts where underlying disagreements remain. By appealing to the 
technical expertise that accounting lends itself to, imperatives for organisational 
action can lead to the domination of political debate with any problems of political 
priority resolved by reference to the technical. “Rather than debating and arguing, we 
must appeal to those with expertise in the technical … Planning, decision-making, 
resource allocation and the evaluation of performance must come to be seen in 
management terms.” 102 
 
                                                 
99      Hopwood, op.cit.: p.416. 
100     ibid. 
101     ibid.: p.417. 
102     ibid.: pp.417-418. 
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3.6d  Accounting and the routinisation of concern 
 
Over time, accounting tends to emphasise the routine and the procedural to the 
detriment of the strategic and the managerial.103 Simmonds has argued that this 
emphasis is overly directed towards the short-term and consequently constrains an 
organisation’s strategic vision and posture.104 In this sense, accounting practices have 
come to be independently valued and as such serve to detach accounting from the 
organisation in which it functions. For example, budgets may become more important 
than budgeting, plans over planning and costing rather than the ascertainment of costs. 
“A routine emphasis on accounting as procedure and technique can, at times, 
supersede accounting’s initial concern for the issues in the name of which it was 
introduced and reformed.”105 Traditionally, accounting has focused on the form over 
the substance and, consequently, a proliferation of routine techniques has created 
rigidity in the quantity and quality of information provided. 
 
3.6e  Accounting and its use               
 
The consequences of accounting create meaning within the specific contexts in which 
it operates. Within an organisation, accounting often takes effect through the uses that 
are made of it and the ways in which it intertwines with other organisational and 
social roles. Hopwood suggests “accounting does not necessarily have a close and 
automatic relationship with the aims in the name of which it is introduced and 
changed.”106 
 
For one thing, the aims that are expressed on behalf of accounting are general and 
often ambiguous. Stemming from political and managerial rhetoric, they are rarely 
expressed in terms of the specific operational and pragmatic questions which 
accounting must address before it can give rise to its technical procedures and 
practices.107 
 
                                                 
103   Kaplan, R., (1983), “Measuring manufacturing performance: A new challenge for management            
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Readings in Accounting and Auditing, Guthrie, J., Parker, L. and D. Shand, (eds), Marrickville: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990, p.420. 
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Accounting and Auditing, Guthrie, J., Parker, L. and D. Shand, (eds), Marrickville: Harcourt Brace 
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105   Hopwood, op.cit.: p.419. 
106   ibid.: p.421. 
107   ibid. 
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In this respect, accounting practices tend to become enmeshed in broader 
organisational concerns and their application may blur distinctions between the 
specific and the general. For instance, the ambiguous construct of accounting numbers 
may be used against other ambiguous accountings and can help create interior 
organisational barriers that can protect against and disrupt legitimate claims.  
 
In the context of the preceding discussion, accounting as instrumentation in 
performance measurement is at best subjective. By giving selective visibility, it can 
create significance and lend calculative priority to different legitimacies. Such 
‘artifactual’ knowledge is “a crafted product of dubious veracity.”108 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
Barton identified the nature of financial information sought by the differing roles of 
government and suggested that although there is a need for both accrual and cash 
accounting systems, cash budget information is predominantly more useful in terms of 
policy formulation within the roles of provision of government or public goods, social 
justice programs, macroeconomic management of the economy and intergenerational 
equity, whereas the role of the efficient and effective management of total resources 
requires the use of full accrual accounting.109 
 
Armed with the purpose of rolling back government and a contracting out orientation, 
the paradigm shift in public sector management philosophy required government to 
legitimise such actions. What better within the change process, than to rely on the 
profession of accountancy to solve the moral deficit associated with public uncertainty 
about shifting public goods into private markets! Dominelli and Hoogvelt suggest that 
accountants had, because of their expertise, become “the key players in the transition 
to government by the market or contract government.”110  
 
                                                 
108     Gregory, op.cit.: p.63. 
109     Barton, op.cit.: pp.3-4. 
110     Dominelli, L. and A. Hoogvelt, (1996), “Globalisation, the privatisation of welfare, and the 
changing role of professional academics in Britain”, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, No. 7, 
p.192. 
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While this study does not focus directly on how privatisation and contracting out has 
shifted and hidden government responsibility behind a veil of confidentiality, it 
identifies that the new accountability applied to the public sector, under the guise of 
improved reporting and its consequent more efficient outcomes, has enabled central 
government to shift both responsibility, and in the case of failure, measured in 
accounting terms, blame to the subordinate.  
 
By appealing to supposedly less opaque private market values, and promises of 
greater accountability and increased community knowledge of public sector financial 
affairs, central government has directed public attention more succinctly towards the 
subordinate. With its performance measurement orientation, the private sector 
accounting model would give a clearer identification of those who are accountable, 
their agreed goals and means of measuring their performance. 
 
In a military context such redirection would not suffice to allay responsibility and 
accountability unless the nature and mode of communication, and choice of action, 
were left for interpretation by the subordinate.  
 
The traditional Westminster notion of public accountability has been built upon the 
fiduciary considerations of probity and legality premised upon accountability within 
the public sector directed towards those at the top and assumed to be in control. The 
nature of fund accounting, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter Four, as 
applied within the public sector was accompanied by stringent and detailed 
accountability reports on how public monies had been spent. It is suggested in this 
study that the shifting of responsibility and blame towards the subordinate required a 
sullied mode of reporting which blurred a clear path of upward accountability and left 
the choice of action in the domain of the subordinate. Moreover, the use of the private 
sector accounting model has been used to measure blame for the subordinate while at 
the same time covertly, because of its overly financial focus, blur the directions of 
accountability. 
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It is somewhat analogous to an opaque bottle filled with water in which the bottle 
represents the government and the water the public sector. To the outside observer, 
the opaqueness would make the inner less observable. Transparency like 
accountability can be viewed at different levels. What better choice than to make the 
bottle look less opaque through increased accountability and murk the water inside 
through the accounting system, so that any bad taste from the water will be blamed on 
the inner although in appearance the public could see what they were drinking and 
hence not blame the bottle, the government.  
 
Chapter Four delineates why and how this was achieved by specifically examining the 
circumstances which resulted in the imposition of the private sector accounting model 
of financial reporting on local government. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Accounting Reform in Local Government 
 
4.1 Local Government – Briefly 
 
Over the past decade there has been extensive organisational reform in local 
government in Victoria. These reforms have included amalgamation, the introduction 
of compulsory competitive tendering, new auditing requirements, requirements for 
corporate plans, annual reports, management plans and labour market reforms. Added 
to these changes, their traditional accounting system, built on the service objectives of 
non-profit organisations and based on the custodianship of assets and accountability 
of public funds, was replaced by the private sector accrual accounting financial 
reporting system premised on concepts of profit maximisation and wealth creation. 
 
Until the early 1990s, local governments in Australia used a fund system of 
accounting. The primary objective emphasised the custodianship and safeguarding of 
assets which was facilitated by an accounting system that ensured that funds were 
only expended for the purposes specified, with due propriety, and within the limits 
prescribed by legislature.  
 
The fund system treated pools of resources used for the carrying out of specific 
activities as separate reporting segments. Each council would separately report the 
position of revenue and expenses for water, garbage, sewerage and other activities for 
which resources had been deployed. Pressures for change focused on the over 
emphasis placed on accountability and weaknesses associated with the inadequate 
provision of information facilitating managerial control and overall economic 
management. Local government financial reports were seen as providing insufficient 
consideration of the objectives of financial reporting; relevance, reliability, 
comparability, understandability, along with being difficult to interpret given their 
excessive detail.  
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4.2 The Reform – Briefly 
 
To overcome these weaknesses the system was reformed by the introduction of the 
private sector accounting model through AAS27 in 1991.111 The dominant view of 
financial reporting within the private sector was that it facilitated economic decision-
making by providing decision-useful information through the accounting system. For 
instance, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) claimed that, “the basic 
objective of financial statements is to provide information useful to making economic 
decisions … for predicting, comparing, and evaluating enterprise activity … and in 
judging management’s ability to utilise enterprise resources.”112  
 
Improved financial reporting was very much premised upon the benefits purported to 
flow from the use of an accrual accounting system. First, the use of accrual 
accounting would measure performance and financial position in ways similar to 
those in the private sector, which would then allow useful inter sector comparisons. 
Second, it would provide a better picture of the public sector’s assets and liabilities 
than was possible under the fund accounting system. The general premise is that 
accrual accounting offers a more informative and comprehensive reporting system by 
including the reporting of assets, liabilities, revenues, expenses, and net equity. 
 
AAS27 was based upon the premise that information should be useful for making and 
evaluating decisions about the allocation of scarce resources along with enhancing 
accountability. Its focus was to meet the information requirements of users of local 
government financial reports by providing decision-useful information prepared on 
relevant, reliable, understandable and comparable data presented in a timely and cost 
effective manner. It would provide efficiency and economy in the decision-making 
process and facilitate better managerial control and overall economic management 
along with a more transparent accountability. 
 
                                                 
111  Australian Accounting Research Foundation, [AARF], (1991), Financial Reporting by Local 
Governments, Melbourne: Victorian Printing Pty Ltd, Note: Prepared by the Public Sector 
Accounting Standards Board [PSASB] for the AARF. 
112  Financial Accounting Standards Board, [FASB], (1978), Statement of Financial Accounting 
Concepts No.1, Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business Enterprises, Stamford Connecticut: 
FASB, November. 
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4.3 The Economic Climate Preceding the Reform: The New Right, Limited 
Government and the Australian Experience  
 
Having briefly considered the construct of local government financial reporting 
reform, this chapter will now consider the historical antecedents that preceded the 
application of the private sector accounting model of financial reporting to local 
government. It looks at the paradigm shift from Keynesian economic principles to the 
New Right, monetarism philosophy of limited government, which sought economic 
liberty or unregulated capitalism through lesser government intervention and smaller 
public sector spending which was characterised by the Thatcherist privatisation 
phenomenon of the late 1970s and 1980s. This chapter also examines the historical 
antecedents that characterised macro-economic public sector reform and its Australian 
consequence.  
 
Following the Second World War, the size of government in Australia grew 
significantly as a result of “rising community expectations about the role of 
government, favourable macroeconomic circumstances, rising urban population 
growth fuelled by the immigration policies of the 1950s and 1960s and reformist 
government administrations.”113 Over this time there was a commitment by 
government to sustained macro-economic management based on the Keynesian 
macro-economic policies of full employment and its affiliated welfare-state 
mechanisms.  
 
Until the 1970s, personal and business taxation receipts were sufficient to meet the 
total welfare spending of all Australian governments.114 After 1970, State Government 
welfare expenditure in areas such as infrastructure, education, health and housing 
failed to meet demand as total welfare spending exceeded incoming tax revenue. 
Public sector employment grew along with a number of diverse types of government 
enterprises such as statutory bodies and various other agencies.  
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By the mid-1970s, the “Australian state [had] mutated into a large, loosely linked, 
diverse, multi-bureaucratic phenomenon”115 with total public sector outlays 
representing 38 per cent of Gross Domestic Product. In Victoria alone, the Public 
Bodies Review Committee’s 6th Report to the parliament in 1982 identified in excess 
of 9300 public bodies, of which many had powers to make by-laws.116  Not only was 
there a plethora of detailed economic, trade and customs regulations but most were 
“excessively detailed, often contradictory, written in incomprehensible language, 
often sixty years old, and frequently out of print.”117  
 
The Australian political landscape of the boom years had provided the populace with 
a regime of social democratic programs, which ensured minimum standards of 
support for all its citizens. Major welfare programs and a policy of full employment 
were regarded as having significantly and permanently altered the character of 
capitalism. By guaranteeing welfare and combating unemployment, the maintenance 
of social democracy required a steady expansion of public responsibilities, which 
entailed a progressive enlargement of the public sector. This was changed by the 
events of the 1970s where the low-inflation, low-unemployment Keynesian order that 
the industrialised world had enjoyed since 1945 began to break down. 
 
Poor agricultural harvests together with a squeeze on international liquidity resulting 
from America’s Vietnam War effort had been exacerbated by the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate regime in 1971/1972. Explosive price rises in 
commodities, especially oil, shortly thereafter brought with them increasingly higher 
rates of inflation and levels of unemployment. Albeit coincidental in timing, general 
elections in several major countries saw governments elected with similar policy 
stances. By mid-1974 Australia had entered a recessionary economic climate, which 
was illuminated only by “brief and unfulfilled periods of recovery”118 over the 
following decade.  
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As a result of several internal economic policy decisions, Australia’s economic 
prosperity declined further than that of its industrial partners. An investment downturn 
following the mining boom of the 1960s, mismanagement of the exchange rate in the 
early 1970s, a 25 per cent tariff cut in 1973, a wages explosion in 1974, excessive 
growth in the money supply and expansion of the public sector had placed 
considerable strain on the Australian economy. Over this period, annual increases in 
Gross Domestic Product averaged just 2.2 per cent compared to 5 per cent in the 
preceding decade; inflation spiralled from 4 per cent in 1970 to around 17 per cent in 
1975 and unemployment jumped to over 10 per cent.119 
 
The recession of 1974/1975 made it politically dangerous to be an advocate of 
restrictive monetary policy to reduce inflation, which had been at the forefront of 
Keynesian economic theory. What most countries faced in the 1970s was a growth in 
the number of problems that did not seem capable of being solved by ordinary 
political means. The advent of recession saw an increased onslaught on social 
democracy by conservative forces, which sought to discredit the techniques and 
institutional mechanisms of government that had wrought significant redistributions 
of wealth since the war. 
 
Karan suggests that the overgrown public sector that had developed as a result of 
rising community expectations about the role of government, favourable 
macroeconomic circumstances and reformist government administrations since the 
Second World War had, “set up tension with global corporate power emanating from 
the unrestrained growth of transnational corporations.”120 Likewise, Schwartz 
believed that the changes transcended political ideology and were the outcome of “the 
changing balance of interest and class configuration in the societies concerned.”121  
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Ideologically, this new conservatism sought to replace the fabric of social democratic 
collectivism, which was considered enforced and guaranteed through public agencies, 
with the more traditional property ownership and participation in market philosophies 
that had permeated and enshrined their rights to wealth over the preceding century. 
The stagflation, no-growth combined with high inflation, of the 1970s provided a 
backdrop for a New Right or neo-liberal ideology to develop which encapsulated the 
economic theories of Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek. In this respect, 
British Prime Minister of the time, Margaret Thatcher objected to what she termed the 
nanny state and the dependency culture that had enveloped society and people’s 
attitudes. 
 
This New Right philosophy entailed a commitment to non-interventionist and limited 
government that sought economic liberty or unregulated capitalism. Ideologically, this 
entailed a fundamental rejection of Keynesian economic management practices and 
viewed the free market as the only alternative. Advocates for the free market argued 
that it represented a just mechanism through which talents and abilities could be 
rewarded. Moreover, it nurtured self-reliance. It was assumed to be of benefit to 
everyone, as self-motivated wealth creators would carry the poor in their wake via the 
trickling down of wealth that would improve everyone’s standard of living.122  
 
Inherent within the belief in small government was a commitment to reduce public 
expenditure because it was seen as being wasteful, inefficient, misdirected, abused, 
unaccountable and discouraging to incentives and investment.  
 
Friedman argued that government discretionary fine-tuning of the economy, as had 
been proposed by Keynesians, was destabilising and ought to be replaced with iron 
rules of policy. Specifically, Friedman saw the need for only a limited non- 
interventionist government role in the economy where supply-side policies coupled 
with monetary policy would reduce unemployment and enable the economy to grow 
in a non-inflationary way. 
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By the late 1970s, the monetarist views of Friedman had sparked off strong academic 
debate. Right wing governments throughout the world saw these policies as a means 
of attacking state expenditure and intervention and helping them to justify their 
particular brand of laissez-faire economics. Von Hayek showed that attempts to 
replace or control the market created a knowledge problem, concluding that only by 
far reaching decentralisation in a market system with competition was it possible to 
make full use of knowledge and information. 
 
Proponents of the New Right believed that the major cause of the economic malaise 
was the scale and scope of the public sector, which was driven by a ratchet affect that 
was endemic within a political process in which administrators and politicians 
introduced new public sector programs to appease their constituents. They argued that 
social democratic policies had created a climate where the social and public order had 
been undermined, and that such policies had led to a “morass of inflation, mass 
unemployment, excessive taxation and a swollen public sector.”123 Through increased 
intervention, government authority had been progressively weakened by sectional 
interests and strengthening union power. “To preserve a free society and a free 
economy the authority of the state had to be restored.”124 These views found full 
fruition in Britain under Thatcherism where Keynesian demand management was 
completely abandoned as the political right took up the monetarist views of Friedman.  
 
Being manifestly capitalistic and free market oriented, monetarists believed in the 
importance of individual choice, the benefit of private enterprise and the virtue of the 
market place and vehemently opposed the interventionist or ownership role of the 
state. 
 
In Australia, as the recession deepened and stimulation of private development 
became paramount, government was perceived as being too big, too interventionist, 
unnecessarily obstructionist and entailing too much red tape, to aid economic 
development. The purpose and function of the public sector underwent significant 
scrutiny as a consequence of the economic realities of the time with part of the blame 
being placed on the rapid expansion of the public sector.  
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Many critics argued that the public sector had an adverse affect on economic growth 
by crowding out and displacing private sector activity by reducing incentives and 
absorbing resources that could have been used more productively by the private sector 
and consequently could have contributed more to the achievement of particular 
economic objectives.125 
 
 
Research evidence lends little support for a clearly defined nexus between economic 
performance and the size and rate of growth of government. “No simple 
generalisation about superiority of private sector performance can be maintained. … 
There is no systematic evidence that public enterprises are less cost effective than 
private firms.”126 However, a move to some degree of deregulation seemed 
appropriate to most people. 
 
These concerns spawned a number of inquiries into government operations: the Bland 
Inquiry in Victoria and Corbett Inquiry in South Australia during 1973-1975; the 
Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration (RCAGA) in 1976 and 
the Wilenski Inquiry in New South Wales in 1977. “Together these reports came to a 
near identical definition of the problem with the Australian Public Sector – it had 
become too big, complex, unaccountable and was difficult to control using traditional 
centralised management strategies.”127 
 
Their conclusions were damning and “constituted a serious indictment of Australian 
Public Administration.”128 The Corbett Inquiry recommended greater financial 
visibility given a lack of accountability. The Wilenski Inquiry recommended 
improvements in budget information systems, suggesting that existing corporate plans 
were motherhood statements to the detriment of providing useful management 
information, while the Bland Inquiry saw government agencies and statutory bodies 
lacking direction and coordination.  
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The RCAGA expressed concern about both the adequacy and consistency of public 
sector financial reporting and their standards of accountability. It noted that it had 
received numerous expressions of concern about the perceived size, aloofness, 
inefficiency, lack of accountability and excessive centralisation of government.  
 
The RCAGA also concluded that the traditional centralised mechanism of government 
control was inadequate and strongly recommended in favour of both devolution and 
decentralisation of government. It suggested greater vigilance would be required with 
any increased devolution of powers and autonomy to public officials. In this respect, 
the RCAGA argued that the effectiveness of any decentralisation was dependent upon 
effective downward communication, which meant that increased reliance would need 
to be placed upon the annual reports produced by government.129   
 
A later report in 1978 by the Commonwealth Senate Standing Committee on Finance 
and Government Operations recommended the standardisation of annual reports. 
Government agencies should have a standard reporting system that encompass a 
consistent commercial form, which would help facilitate performance comparisons 
with each other and also with outside private sector entities. 
 
Private sector business concepts and principles that delivered a “supposedly superior 
effectiveness and accountability”130 were being seen as an appropriate vehicle through 
which to drive change within the public sector. Rarely substantiated but repeatedly 
advanced, as if self-evident, private sector management was perceived as efficient but 
public sector management inefficient. Many politicians, “increasingly subscribed to 
the notion that the public sector’s life could be cured by an infusion of private sector 
management expertise, after which the ailing public sector organisation would find 
new blood in its veins, fresh air in its lungs, and rise like Lazarus to new heights of 
efficiency and productiveness.”131  
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The economic instability of the 1970s coupled with rapid technological change, 
economic and communication globalisation and changing workforce participation 
patterns of the 1980s made governments extremely attentive to how they managed 
change. 
 
The continuance of these conditions brought with it stringent pressures to maintain 
international competitiveness which demanded productivity improvements from all 
government activities. Fiscal stringency came face to face with expanding community 
expectations of governmental and public sector roles. By the 1980s the push to 
deregulate and downsize government had gripped much of the Western world. Aside 
from removing impediments to entry, deregulation invoked the larger issue of the 
privatisation or transfer of assets or activities from the public to the private sector.  
 
Thatcherism in Britain sought to substitute market forces for state action wherever 
possible and in so doing privatised a wide range of public industries, which also 
included core public sector activities such as health, education, law and order. By the 
mid-1980s, privatisation was a new term in world government and by the end of the 
decade more than fifty countries, on almost every continent, had set in motion 
privatisation programs.132 In Britain alone, share ownership had doubled by 1989 and 
revenue from privatisation had exceeded twenty billion pounds with some eighteen 
major enterprises and more than three quarters of a million houses sold. Foreign 
governments sent administrative and legal teams to Britain to study how it was done. 
Between 1985 and 1993, governments in one hundred countries earned some $328 
billion from the sale of public enterprises.133  
 
Privatisation was not a new concept. As far back as 1776, Adam Smith had proposed 
the sale of government properties to stimulate economic recovery in Europe. Peter 
Drucker’s 1960’s book, The Age of Discontinuity, was also somewhat significant in 
planting the seeds of privatisation by arguing the case that “the purpose of 
government was to govern, a role that made it unfit to perform certain tasks better left 
to business.”134   
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By 1979, Thatcher’s promise to “roll back the frontiers of state”135 had signalled 
privatisation as the most significant policy in reducing the size of government. 
Privatisation, however, was not without criticism. The British experience suggests that 
the major flaw in the process was its “amazing lack of accountability.”136 Criticism 
also entailed the following: 
 
(a) The failure of government to ensure competition in industries where privatisation 
occurs, thereby appearing to convert public monopolies into private monopolies; (b) 
the creation of inadequate regulatory frameworks in such monopolistic or 
oligopolistic industries, especially in relation to the fulfilment of social obligations on 
the part of privatised industries; (c) failure on the part of the government adequately 
to safeguard national interests from foreign influences in the privatisation drive; (d) 
‘selling the family silver’ – the argument that revenue from sales of public assets 
should not be apportioned to consolidated revenue but should be earmarked for future 
generations and future public uses; (e) the standard of services after sale or 
contracting out. 137 
 
So far had these free market principles developed that by 1989 Prime Minister 
Thatcher flippantly remarked, “that there was no such thing as society.”138  Thatcher, 
much like Adam Smith had argued two hundred years previously, saw society as 
nothing other than a loose collection of self-interested individuals who interacted 
together for no other purpose than to protect both their persons and their property 
rights. Similarly, Reaganism in the Unites States sought to reinvigorate the US 
economy by reducing government regulation of business and by reducing the size and 
cost of the federal government. Thoreau’s maxim, “that government is best which 
governs less”139 defined well the nature of the times. 
 
It is interesting that while the official case argued for the free play of market forces 
and the encouragement of competition to develop popular capitalism, the underlying 
agenda may well have included “an attempt to change people’s voting habits by 
converting them into capitalists.”140 For example, the UK government’s sale of public 
assets such as British Telecom resulted in just fewer than one million new 
shareholders.141 1987 British Treasury figures reveal share ownership to have 
“increased markedly to 20% of British households.”142  
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Overall, reducing the size and role of the public sector was seen as significant within a 
prevailing political and economic climate which sought to discipline governments to 
produce greater output from fewer resources. Aligned with this push to reduce public 
sector spending to achieve macro-economic goals was an emerging awareness of the 
critical importance of financial performance information to enable both parliaments 
and management to evaluate organisational performance. Underpinning these forces 
for change were the more general concerns of efficiency and effectiveness. 
Government and the public sector were seen to not only control and administer a 
significant portion of the nation’s economic resources but to also exercise substantial 
social and economic power.  
 
In the resultant tug for resource allocation, a much heavier emphasis was placed upon 
accountability and the efficient and effective distribution of resources. Reporting 
practices capable of providing information useful for economic decision-making 
along with providing an evaluation of accountability were sought. Fuelling this 
momentum, in the early 1980s, was the release of several influential reports.  
 
In 1981, the Victorian Public Bodies Review Committee recommended the use of 
private sector accounting standards in the public sector. In 1983, the New South 
Wales Public Accounts Committee noted that “almost no attempt had been made by 
parliament to scrutinise the activities of these authorities”143 and that their annual 
reports to parliament were “often characterised by lateness, lack of consistent 
accounting treatment and failure to disclose important information about their 
objectives and their achievements.”144  The Commonwealth Parliament’s Joint 
Committee of Public Accounts, Report 199 published in 1982 recommended that 
resources be devoted towards the construction of a theoretical framework for financial 
reporting by the public sector and that an accounting standards review committee be 
established to examine government accounting and reporting standards and to make 
recommendations for improvement.145 
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Local government was also seen to suffer from the same management problems that 
faced many large government agencies: “inter-departmental rivalry, lack of co-
operation, lack of delegation for decision-making responsibility and a lack of 
corporate spirit.”146   The Baines Report of 1979 in Victoria noted that “the majority of 
councils have adopted no special mechanisms for formulating plans and objectives, 
determining priorities and allocating resources. Only 20% have a policy committee, a 
forward plan, a corporate plan or some other means of considering policy 
objectives.”147 The 1984 Advisory Council for Inter-Government Relations Report 
No. 7: ‘Responsibilities and Resources of Australian Local Government’148 noted that 
several inquiries into local government management practices had identified 
inefficient management practices, inefficient use of committees and budgetary 
decision-making procedures that were not always appropriate.  
 
4.4 Local Government Accounting Reform 
 
To deliver the reforms of lesser and smaller government sought as a consequence of 
the paradigm shift to the New Right and Thatcherist policies in the late 1970s and 
1980s, laissez-faire, market-oriented governments saw the private sector accounting 
model of financial reporting as the appropriate vehicle to drive both the change, and to 
deliver improved accountability and performance from the public sector. Section 4.5 
examines the role the accounting profession played in endorsing government 
perceptions of public sector inefficiency and accountability, specifically local 
government financial reporting, and how these problems could be remedied by the 
application of the private sector accounting model.  
 
4.5 The Accounting Profession and the Problems with Local Government 
Financial Reporting 
 
While much of the initial push was directed towards public sector authorities, the 
financial reporting mechanisms of local government also drew attention. Local 
government had always perceived itself as a form of organisation with its own 
separate identity, somewhat independent and apart from the other arms of 
government.  
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This individuality was nowhere more evident than in the nature and format of the 
financial reports it published. For example, J. O’Donnell, NSW Auditor-General 
during 1983, noted the fund accounting nature of local government as being: 
 
… of an apocryphal inheritance. Essentially it reflects the influence of non-
accountants. Over the centuries, politicians, lawyers and bureaucrats have figured 
predominantly in its evolution. For them, legal compliance and accountability were 
the main considerations … What has emerged is more a system of public financial 
administration, rather than a system of government accounting which discloses a 
meaningful form of financial performance and position of the executive as a 
collective entity. 149 
 
Gaudion likewise criticised the nature of fund accounting, noting that “for just about 
all purposes, fund accounting provides data of dubious quality and without detailed 
specialised knowledge the information content can be severely misleading.”150   
 
Calder also criticised the traditional budgetary system employed by local government 
on similar grounds, arguing:  
 
That it provided no evaluation measures or mechanisms by which the effectiveness 
and efficiency of existing services can be gauged and very often, will entrench 
inefficient services and discourage the introduction of new technology. 151 
 
Similar criticism by Williams alluded to the fact that for the most part programs 
tended to continue from year to year because, “that is always what has been done.”152 
Budgets were prepared on the basis of last year’s figure adjusted for a little bit of 
growth and inflation and were rarely evaluated.  
 
Despite some slight tinkering with accrual accounting in Victoria, the financial 
statements prepared by local government largely reflected the separate fund nature of 
their activities, for example water and sewerage. They were prepared primarily for the 
research and statistical purposes of their respective State Local Government 
Departments and to confirm legal compliance of their activities.  
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Shand noted that such reports:  
Contain voluminous detail of financial transactions by different funds but very little 
meaningful information on the financial position and the results of the local 
government unit as a consolidated entity. Local government financial reporting 
illustrates an almost total disregard for accountability to citizens and ratepayers and 
an unacceptable level of detailed legal prescription of reporting requirements.153 
 
As a member of the PSASB leading to the development of Exposure Draft 50: 
‘Financial Reporting by Local Governments’, (ED50) Shand concluded, “I hope we 
can persuade those in local government that it is time they lifted their game.”154 
Maloy, likewise, was critical of the outcomes available as a result of the narrowly 
defined spectrum of local government financial reporting. “Unfortunately in local 
government, stewardship is mainly seen in its restrictive sense and the notion is 
limited to the accounting function and the provision of reports without a consideration 
of why these reports are prepared.”155  
 
Concern over the absence of public sector accounting standards was not an 
exclusively Australian phenomenon. The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 
noted that:  
 
 
The absence of generally accepted accounting principles and financial reporting 
standards makes it difficult for elected representatives, informed members of the 
public and even legislative auditors to fully understand the content of government 
financial reports and to determine whether they are receiving the accountability 
information they need.156 
 
In 1983, the PSASB was formulated as a body within the Australian Accounting 
Research Foundation (AARF) and its objective was to promote the development of 
meaningful financial statements for the public sector based upon a consistent set of 
standards. By the mid-1980s, Canada, the United States of America, the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand along with Australia had established either boards or 
committees concerned with the development of accounting standards for the public 
sector. 
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Change in local government was being fuelled by the development of a conceptual 
framework for financial reporting in the private and public sectors and specifically by 
the release of two key documents that addressed the reform of accounting practice in 
this field. The first of these publications, issued in 1985, was Accounting Theory 
Monograph No. 5: ‘Financial Reporting in the Public Sector: A Framework for 
Analysis and Identification of Issues’ (Monograph 5) prepared by Paul Sutcliffe of the 
AARF for the PSASB. It confirmed the PSASB’s commitment to accrual accounting 
as having “widespread relevance throughout the public sector.”157  
 
Agars believed that “this monograph and the many comments from interested persons 
led to the adoption by the PSASB of the tentative building blocks of a conceptual 
framework.”158 Monograph 5 expressed “doubts about whether the same accounting 
procedures were appropriate for both the private and public sectors.”159  The preamble 
to the monograph stated: 
 
While the application of existing Statements of Accounting Standards to the public 
sector has been suggested, the PSASB is of the view that such application should not 
proceed without recognition of the heterogeneous nature of public sector entities and 
a clear evaluation of the differences between the objectives and operating 
environments of public and private sector entities.160 
 
Of initial concern to the PSASB was an absence of clearly defined standards relating 
to the definition and measurement of assets and liabilities. Monograph 5 identified 
some twenty-seven issues about the role of public sector standards, types of users and 
their information needs.  
 
By the issue of Monograph 5, the concept of common standards had been advocated 
and publicly embraced by the Australian accounting profession. Literature of the day 
suggested a “view in some quarters that public sector financial reporting is in a 
shambles and that all that is needed to rectify it is to adopt the lean and efficient 
financial reporting model of the private sector.”161  
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Shand, a member of the PSASB, questioned the belief that public sector financial 
reporting could be improved immediately with the application of the private sector 
model of accrual accounting. He argued, instead, that standards developed for the 
public sector should be considered in light of both the existing deficiencies with the 
private sector accounting model and a full understanding of the differences between 
the two systems.162   
 
While Monograph 5 was silent on any detailed analysis for such an approach, 
reference to the preamble alludes to recognition of this direction.  
 
While some issues facing preparers of financial reports in the public sector may be 
unique to their operating environment, many other issues are common to both the 
public and private sectors. Accordingly, a consistent approach to the structuring of 
accounting concepts and the development of accounting standards in both the public 
and private sectors is not only practical but highly desirable. However, the nature 
and/or explanation of these concepts may, in some circumstances, differ, or require 
reinterpretation, to reflect the differences between the private and public sectors.163  
 
In 1987, the AARF and the PSASB issued a jointly produced series of proposed 
statements of accounting concepts, ED42A, 42B, 42C and 42D that were intended to 
provide a conceptual framework for financial reporting. Walker argues that these 
documents provided the rationale for common standards and provided the required 
impetus for the accounting profession to successfully lobby the NCSC in 1988 to 
proceed with the implementation of those proposals.164 
 
In 1987, the PSASB instigated a research project through the AARF to prepare a 
discussion paper with an objective to “identify and consider issues relevant to the 
preparation of financial reports intended to disclose information about local 
government which is useful for decision-making and accountability purposes.”165 The 
result, Discussion Paper No. 12: ‘Financial Reporting by Local Governments’, 
(Discussion Paper 12) issued in 1988 was the second key document to address reform 
of accounting practice in local government. Discussion Paper No. 12 took a two-
pronged approach to the question of standard setting within the public sector.  
                                                 
162  ibid. 
163  See: Accounting Theory Monograph 5. p.vii. 
164  Walker, op.cit.: p.252. 
165  See: Discussion Paper No.12. p.1.  
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First, it identified a difference in the stewardship and accountability of local 
government to its funds providers as opposed to other members of the community, 
suggesting that while local government financial reports may provide relevant and 
reliable information to particular users, the question of relevance to the broader 
spectrum of users was somewhat ignored.  
 
Second, it identified homogeneity between the private and public sectors in terms of 
the nature of their resource utilisation in that the control of substantial resources 
brought with it a consequent responsibility for the efficient and effective utilisation of 
those resources in the community’s interests. This concept of homogeneity was 
broadly based, in that it allowed recognition of the separate characteristics of both the 
private and public sectors. Consequently, developed accounting standards would 
require some tailoring given the different nature of information to be disclosed, 
notwithstanding that the broader accounting principles and concepts would be applied 
consistently between the sectors.  
 
Whereas Monograph 5 had succinctly expressed that there were “sufficient unique 
and different features which make the public sector worth considering separately,”166 
Discussion Paper 12 had adopted a more modest stance.  
 
In this respect, it would appear that the release of the exposure drafts in 1987 had 
provided the PSASB with satisfactory definitions of assets and liabilities from which 
problems of identification could be resolved. Discussion Paper 12 was somewhat 
damning in its criticisms concerning the relevance and understandability of local 
government financial reports.  
 
First, it questioned the function local government reports served. It was argued that 
the reports were overly weighted to reflect dollar accountability and reporting 
compliance with regulation to the detriment of the provision of useful economic 
decision-making information.   
 
                                                 
166  Shand, op.cit.: p.144. 
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Second, it questioned the nature and value of information disclosed in local 
government reports. There was often a failure within the financial statements to detail 
all information on assets and liabilities; hence an incomplete picture was presented. 
Duce167 and Maloy168 both noted that in those states that applied a cash basis of 
reporting, no information was available for the costs of services provided. 
Consequently, the financial statements were seen as inadequately disclosing 
information useful for determining the effectiveness and efficiency of operations.  
 
Third, it questioned the comparability and consistency of local government reports 
and the usefulness of such reports for resource allocation decisions. Given a lack of 
harmonisation of financial statement preparation and format between Australian states 
together with a general lack of disclosure as to the accounting policies employed, 
problems of comparability were significant.  
 
Overall, Discussion Paper 12 proposed that the financial reporting requirements of all 
local governments should be harmonised, arguing that Australian local government 
had not adopted a common approach for accounting for similar transactions and 
events.169 It was followed in November 1989 by the release of ED50 issued by the 
AARF under the auspices of the PSASB. ED50 set out proposed standards for the 
form and content of general purpose financial reports of local governments so that 
they would, “provide information that is both relevant and reliable to users for making 
and evaluating decisions on the allocation of scarce resources, and assist users in 
assessing the accountability of local governments.”170 
 
The concerns raised in Discussion Paper 12 were reiterated within the Brief Guide to 
ED50 issued by the AARF when seeking comment on ED50. 
 
                                                 
167  Duce, M.R., (1984), Developments in Annual Reporting (Raising the Standards), Paper presented 
to the Annual Conference of the Local Government Accountants Association of Queensland, 
November, In Financial Reporting by Local Governments, Discussion Paper No. 12, AARF, 1988, 
p.8. 
168  Maloy, N., (1979), Local Government Financial Management, Butterworths, Sydney, In Financial 
Reporting by Local Governments, Discussion Paper No. 12, AARF, 1988, p.8. 
 
169  See: Discussion Paper No.12. p.87. 
170  Australian Accounting Research Foundation, [AARF], (1989), ED50: Financial Reporting by 
Local Governments, Melbourne: Victorian Printing Pty Ltd, November, p.2. 
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The PSASB ... is aware that many persons, including users, preparers and regulators, 
are concerned about the adequacy and comparability of financial reports prepared by 
local governments in Australia. Local government financial reports prepared 
consistent with relevant regulations have been criticised as being excessively detailed 
and ... too fragmented to enable users to assess readily the financial position, 
performance, financing and investing, and compliance of local governments. 171 
 
With the release of ED50, the AARF had crystallised the objectives of financial 
reporting as reflected in Statement of Accounting Concepts 1: ‘Definition of the 
Reporting Entity’ (SAC1) and Exposure Draft 42A: ‘The Objective of Financial 
Reporting’ within future local government financial reporting. By emphasising 
decision-usefulness as the main focus of financial reporting it had redefined the scope 
of local government reporting to incorporate the broader community, thereby making 
local government appear more accountable due to the wider application of its 
financial reports.  
 
Notwithstanding the purpose of these documents being the implementation of 
commercial accounting reporting practices by local government, which were 
subsequently codified within AAS27 issued in July 1991, they were also significantly 
influenced and affected by the paradigm shift occurring within the Australian 
accounting standard setting environment as the PSASB, working in conjunction with 
the AARF, sought to develop and implement its conceptual framework program.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
In the Australian context, government reform of the public sector was aided by an 
accounting profession which saw the public sector as a new frontier for substantial 
income generating activity. Documentary evidence suggests that the accounting 
profession played an important role in endorsing government perceptions of public 
sector inefficiency and accountability, specifically local government financial 
reporting, and how these problems could be remedied by the application of the private 
sector accounting model. 
 
On a broad scale, the agreed goals underlying accounting reform within local 
government were two pronged in that the reforms were aimed at improved financial 
reporting and delivering smaller government. The former aim of improved financial 
reporting is fundamental to this research and is examined in Chapter Seven. 
                                                 
171  ibid. 
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Appendix 4a considers the latter issue of the reform in delivering smaller government. 
Reducing the size and role of the public sector was seen as significant within a 
prevailing political and economic climate which sought to discipline governments to 
produce greater output from fewer resources. Improved accountability, as discussed in 
Chapter Three, also added to a more effective utilisation of resources. The provision 
of fewer resources to local government without a commensurate drop in service 
delivery was seen to indicate improved accountability.  
 
Appendix 4a in examining trends in the financial position of local government in 
Victoria over the past two decades discerns a shift to smaller government. However, 
to couple these trends with a more effective management of fewer resources is 
distorted due to greater resources being drawn to the local government sector from the 
private sector through avenues such as the ‘user pays’ system.  
 
Having investigated the reasons for accounting reform in local government, Chapter 
Five examines the nature of accounting standard setting in Australia that provided the 
road map for the development of AAS27. 
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Appendix 4a 
 
Delivering Smaller Government 
 
 
4a.1 Smaller Government 
 
In Victoria, reform of local government undertaken by the Kennett State Government 
had a significant impact on the operation and size of local government and occurred at 
the same time that local government councils were implementing AAS27.  
Figure 4a.1 Upheaval Caused by Amalgamation 
IMAGE REMOVED DUE TO COPYRIGHT 
Cartoon by Mark Knight, 9 April 1994, published in the Herald Sun, commenting on the upheaval 
caused by the proposal to amalgamate many municipal councils. 
 
Gerritsen 172 has described the Victorian model of reform as having the interrelated 
features of a reduction in the size of the public sector through contracting out, sales of 
public assets and splitting service delivery functions and subjecting them to 
competition in the market place and possible replacement by private sector suppliers. 
 
It is generally accepted that the Victorian reforms of local government were modelled 
upon those implemented by the Thatcher and Major governments in the United 
Kingdom. They were also probably influenced by the New Zealand reforms of 1989. 
The British (and New Zealand) reforms reflected a desire to reduce the supposed 
inefficiency of local government, both by increasing its scale through amalgamations 
and by introducing new ‘market-like’ forms of delivering local government services. 
…  The Victorian reforms of 1994 grew out of - and were a variant of - an 
intellectual movement that has been characterised as the ‘new public management’ 
(NPM).173 
These reforms came to fruition in 1994/1995 when the number of councils in the state 
was reduced from two hundred and ten to seventy-eight. (Refer Appendix 4b) 
 
It is readily apparent that very small local governments that have an inadequate 
revenue base can be neither effective (in terms of delivering the services desired by 
their constituents) nor efficient (in terms of expending only a small proportion of 
expenditure on the administration of those outlays rather than on services). 
Consequently, around the world the issue of local government’s scale arises. In 
Australia, the solution to the scale ‘problem’ has mostly been seen to be in 
amalgamating local governments. 174 
 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering was phased in over three years requiring councils 
to contract out up to 50 per cent of their budget. Substantial assets were sold off 
                                                 
172   Gerritsen, R., (1998), “The Victorian Reforms in National and International Perspective”, In Local 
Government Reform in Victoria, Galligan, B., (ed), Melbourne: State Library of Victoria, p.224.  
173   ibid.: p.223. 
174   ibid.: p.224. 
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through privatisation with a significant consequent reduction in the level of long-term 
debt held by councils. Councils as economic entitlements for their former electricity 
assets received sale proceeds of $537m. Roger Hallam, Minister for Local 
Government in Victoria over the period 1992-1996, announced in October 1995 that 
councils had reduced rates by $263m and debt by $170m.175  
 
Utilising the Australian Bureau of Statistics: Victorian Local Government Finance 
figures over the period 1983/1984 - 1999/2000 several observations can be made.  
 
The following tables and figures are designed to elucidate an overall picture of the 
changing structure and size of local government in relation to its significant revenues, 
expenditures, financial, and capital positions. 
 
Table 4a.1 Surplus/Deficit Councils: 1984 - 2000 
 
Year No % Amount No % Amount
$000s $000s
84/85 55 26% 41,192$         155 74% 44,900$         
85/86 55 26% 56,705$         155 74% 57,428$         
87/88 46 22% 53,268$         164 78% 72,878$         
90/91 120 57% 123,518$       90 43% 59,123$         
92/93 149 71% 139,333$       61 29% 113,750$       
97/98 46 59% 125,844$       32 41% 146,494$       
99/20 39 50% 181,743$       39 50% 65,708$         
SURPLUS DEFICIT
 
 
Note: Utilising the Australian Bureau of Statistics: Victorian Local Government Finance – 
Total Revenue less Total Outlays. 
Figure 4a.2 identifies a substantial swing away from councils reporting deficits, from 
a high 78 per cent of councils in 1987/1988 to a low 29 per cent of councils in 
1992/1993. This has since drifted back to 50 per cent surplus/deficit by 1999/2000. 
 
                                                 
175   Hallam R., (1998), “The Politics of Change”, In Local Government Reform in Victoria, Galligan, 
B., (ed), Melbourne: State Library of Victoria, p.120. 
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Figure 4a.2 Surplus/Deficit Councils: 1984 - 2000  
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Figure 4a.3 indicates that in relative dollar terms there is a widening of the surplus/ 
deficit gap with councils reporting significantly greater surpluses than historically. 
 
Figure 4a.3  ($000s) Surplus/Deficit Gap: 1984 - 2000 
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As will be shown below, while more councils are reporting surpluses and larger 
surpluses are being reported, this has not translated into increased investment 
holdings, nor resulted in reduced long-term debt levels below that which resulted from 
the large injections of cash from the privatisation schemes of the mid-1990s. 
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Generally, such a position would be the result of either increased revenue or reduced 
expenditure or a combination of both. A comparison of total revenue to expenditure 
on roads, streets and bridges reveals a 119 per cent increase in total revenue compared 
to a 73 per cent increase on expenditure on roads, streets and bridges over the period 
1983 - 2000. The bulk of this increase in revenue can be seen through a 238 per cent 
increase over the same time in charges, fees and fines. A large reduction in long-term 
debt along with significant reductions in interest rates has also provided significant 
savings for councils. Section 4a.4 below details an overview of the changing face of 
local government revenues and expenditures. 
 
It would not be unfair to also suggest that the large number of councils reporting 
deficits during the 1980’s provided a soft target for criticism of inefficiency, poor 
management and reporting techniques. In the federal economic sphere, a shift towards 
balanced budgets or surpluses was seen to be economically correct and idealistically 
portrayed sound financial responsibility and accountability. Prudent council 
management would suggest the reporting of surpluses would indicate fiscal 
responsibility and it should not be surprising that this mind shift coincided with the 
introduction of AAS27, which was the outcome of the reform process aimed to fix the 
aforementioned criticisms. This new financial responsibility was nowhere more 
pronounced than in Victoria where the Kennett State Government, elected in 1992, 
instigated special legislation to replace councillors with commissioners and 
introduced performance based contracts for senior council staff.  
 
Interestingly, Figure 4a.2 above indicates that deficit councils had risen from a low of 
29 per cent in 1992, at the height of AAS27 reform, to around 50 per cent by the year 
2000, although the extent in financial dollar terms as shown in Figure 4a.3 indicates a 
much lower overall deficit level. Figure 4a.3 also indicates the level of deficit to not 
be far removed from its historical 1984/1985 level. 
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4a.2 Long-Term Debt 
 
Table 4a.2 and Figure 4a.4 indicate a reduction of around 33 per cent or $426 million 
in investment holdings while long-term debt has increased by around 20 per cent or 
$105 million over the 1995/1996 - 1999/2000 periods although over the longer period 
long-term debt has actually fallen 21 per cent as can be seen in Figure 4a.5.  
 
Table 4a.2  Trends in Investments and Long-Term Debt: 1995 - 2000 
 
Financial Investments Long-Term Debt
$000 $000
95/96 1,281,598$                      535,046$                      
96/97 958,257$                         500,482$                      
97/98 937,607$                         494,537$                      
98/99 882,657$                         614,735$                      
99/00 855,662$                         639,576$                     
All Victorian Councils
 
 
Figure 4a.4 Trends in Investments and Long-Term Debt: 1995 - 2000 
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Over the 1980 and 1990 decades there is an evident decline in long-term debt held by 
councils. Much of this decline in debt levels can be attributed to three factors: 
 
 Significant drops in interest rates, approximately 22 per cent from 1992/1993 to 
1997/1998 
 
 Income of $537m received in 1995/1996 from the sale of Municipal Electricity 
Utilities  
 
 Reduced recurrent and capital spending 
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For ease of explanation of the following tables and figures, Figures 4a.5, 4a.8, 4a.10, 
4a.12, 4a.15, 4a.17 and 4a.23 highlight actual revenue and expenditure over the period 
1983/1984 to 1999/2000. Tables 4a.3, 4a.5, 4a.6, 4a.7, 4a.9, 4a.10 and 4a.11 along 
with Figures 4a.6, 4a.9, 4a.11, 4a.13, 4a.16, 4a.18 and 4a.24 compare actual figures 
with 1983/1984 - 1992/1993 least square regressed data extrapolated and projected 
over the 1995/1996 - 1999/2000 years. Statistics were not available for 1993/1994 due 
to difficulties associated with amalgamation.  
 
Figure 4a.5  Long-Term Debt: 1983 - 2000 
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Table 4a.3 Long-Term Debt: 1995 - 2000 (against 1983 - 1992 regressed) 
YEAR ACTUAL PROJECTED 1999-2000 1983-1984
95/96 535,046$       1,046,203$    639,576$       814,342$       
96/97 500,482$       1,073,225$    
97/98 494,537$       1,100,246$    
98/99 614,735$       1,127,268$    
99/20 639,576$       1,154,289$    
-21%
DecreaseAll figures in $000s
 
 
Figure 4a.6 Long -Term Debt: 1995 - 2000 (against 1983 - 1992 regressed) 
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4a.3 Revenue 
 
Table 4a.4 reveals that the revenue base of local government has undergone 
significant change with a downward movement in grants by government and rate 
revenue, as a percentage of total revenue, with increases occurring within other 
revenue such as charges, fees and fines. 
 
Table 4a.4 Changes in Key Revenues/Expenditures: 1983/1984 and 1999/2000 
 1983/1984 
$000s 
% of 
Total 
Revenue 
1999/2000 
$000s 
% of 
Total 
Revenue 
Increase
% 
Total Revenue $1,525,891  $3,337,669  119% 
Rates $596,971 44% $1,427,256 43% 139% 
Charges, Fees and Fines $174,170 13% $681,787 20% 291% 
Government Grants $271,940 20% $613,084 18% 125% 
Other Revenues $177,403 13% $343,747 10% 94% 
Expenditure on Roads, 
Streets and Bridges 
$337,795  $629,517  86% 
 
Local government revenue comes from four main sources. The majority of funding 
comes from municipal rates and charges, followed by commonwealth and state 
government grants and the net operating balance form council businesses. Figure 4a.7 
shows the breakdown of the major revenue sources for all Australian local 
government councils. 
 
Figure 4a.7  Australian Local Government Revenues: 1998/1999 
 
 
Data source: Commonwealth Grants Commission (2001). 
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Figure 4a.8 Total Revenue: 1983 - 2000 
 
 
83/84 1,525,891$    
84/85 1,719,911$    
85/86 1,879,932$    
86/87 2,017,642$    
87/88 2,145,148$    
88/89 2,437,438$    
89/90 2,589,967$    
90/91 2,723,034$    
91/92 2,808,806$    
92/93 3,030,793$    
93/94 3,040,892$    
94/95 -$               
95/96 2,880,959$    
96/97 2,567,509$    
97/98 2,963,994$    
98/99 3,190,986$    
99/20 3,337,669$    
$-
$500,000
$1,000,000
$1,500,000
$2,000,000
$2,500,000
$3,000,000
$3,500,000
$4,000,000
83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/20
Year
A
m
ou
nt
 ($
00
0s
)
 
 
Table 4a.5 Total Revenue: 1995 - 2000 (against 1983 - 1992 regressed) 
YEAR ACTUAL PROJECTED 1999-2000 1983-1984
95/96 2,880,959$    3,467,453$    3,337,669$    1,525,891$    
96/97 2,567,509$    3,626,187$    
97/98 2,963,994$    3,784,921$    
98/99 3,190,986$    3,943,656$    
99/20 3,337,669$    4,102,390$    
119%
IncreaseAll figures in $000s
 
 
Figure 4a.9 Total Revenue: 1995 - 2000 (against 1983 - 1992 regressed) 
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Figure 4a.10 Rates: 1983 - 2000 
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Victorian local government has gone from having the highest to having the lowest, 
rates per capita in Australia with the exception of the Northern Territory. This has 
been directly attributable to the 20 per cent reduction in rate revenue imposed on 
councils by the Kennett State Government and subsequent rate capping.  
 
Table 4a.6 Rates: 1995 - 2000 (against 1983 - 1992 regressed) 
YEAR ACTUAL PROJECTED 1999-2000 1983-1984
95/96 1,205,472$      1,688,182$      1,427,256$    652,545$       
96/97 912,218$         1,776,285$      
97/98 1,248,809$      1,864,388$      
98/99 1,330,076$      1,952,491$      Percentage of Total Revenue
99/20 1,427,256$      2,040,593$      1999-2000 1983-1984
43% 43%
119%
IncreaseAll figures in $000s
 
 
Figure 4a.11 Rates: 1995 - 2000 (against 1983 - 1992 regressed) 
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Figure 4a.12 Charges Fees and Fines: 1983 - 2000 
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Charges, fees and fines have been the largest growth area for funding in local 
government, growing from 13 per cent of total revenue in 1983/1984 to around 20 per 
cent by 1999/2000. By 1999/2000 incomes from rates and charges, fees and fines 
accounted for more than 60 per cent of all revenue in1999/2000. 
 
Table 4a.7 Charges, Fees and Fines: 1995 - 2000 (against 1983 - 1992 
                        regressed) 
YEAR ACTUAL PROJECTED 1999-2000 1983-1984
95/96 489,063$       601,442$       681,787$       202,000$       
96/97 528,505$       634,326$       
97/98 607,599$       667,209$       
98/99 632,341$       700,092$       Percentage of Total Revenue
99/20 681,787$       732,976$       1999-2000 1983-1984
20% 13%
238%
IncreaseAll figures in $000s
 
 
Figure 4a.13 Charges, Fees and Fines: 1995 - 2000 (against 1983 - 1992 
                        regressed) 
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The principle source of grants to local government is the commonwealth government. 
Since 1974-75, the commonwealth has provided financial assistance grants to local 
government in an attempt to provide all councils with similar levels of fiscal capacity. 
The commonwealth provides this funding to the states to pass on to the local 
government bodies in their respective jurisdictions in accordance with the 
recommendations of their local government grants commissions. Commonwealth 
funding for local government consists of four categories: general purpose, specific 
purpose, local roads and ‘roads to recovery’. 
 
Figure 4a.14 Commonwealth Funding for Australian Local Government: 
1997/1998 
General purpose
Local roads
Roads to recovery
Specific purpose
53%
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7%
 
Data source: Commonwealth Grants Commission (2001). 
 
Table 4a.8 Grants Growth: 1984 - 1991 and 1996 - 2000 
 
 
1984/1985 1985/1986 1986/1987 1987/1988 1988/1989 1989/1990 1990/1991
Victorian Grants Commission 6.0% 10.3% 9.6% 10.3% 4.6% 2.6% 2.9%
Government Grants - Other 5.7% 4.9% 0.1% 4% 2.8% 6.2% 13.5%
1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Victorian Grants Commission 4.1% -1.8% 2.1% 3.2%
Government Grants - Other 4.9% -10% 2.0% 4.3%  
 
While Figure 4a.15 below shows that total grants to local government have risen over 
the total period in dollar terms, the level of growth in grants has been curtailed 
specifically within the last five years as can be seen in Table 4a.8 above. 
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Figure 4a.15 Total Government Grants: 1983 - 2000 
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The large increase in 1992/1993 was due to the Local Capital Works Program. Table 
4a.8 delineates that total grants growth from 1996/1997 to 1999/2000 was negligible.  
 
 
Table 4a.9 Total Government Grants: 1995 - 2000 (against 1983 - 1992 
                        regressed) 
YEAR ACTUAL PROJECTED 1999-2000 1983-1984
95/96 588,956$       647,364$       613,084$       319,416$       
96/97 615,765$       676,810$       
97/98 578,887$       706,257$       
98/99 590,978$       735,703$       Percentage of Total Revenue
99/20 613,084$       765,149$       1999-2000 1983-1984
18% 21%
92%
IncreaseAll figures in $000s
 
Figure 4a.16 Total Government Grants: 1995 - 2000 (against 1983 - 1992 
                        regressed) 
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Figure 4a.17 Other Revenues: 1983 - 2000 
 
Other revenues include contributions and donations, reimbursements for maintenance 
and capital works undertaken on behalf of other public bodies and contributions from 
property owners for works undertaken. 
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Table 4a.10 Other Revenues: 1995 - 2000 (against 1983 - 1992 regressed) 
 
 
YEAR ACTUAL PROJECTED 1999-2000 1983-1984
95/96 305,574$       265,270$          343,747$       205,494$       
96/97 198,398$       271,325$          
97/98 244,380$       277,381$          
98/99 297,956$       283,436$          Percentage of Total Revenue
99/20 343,747$       289,491$          1999-2000 1983-1984
10% 13%
67%
IncreaseAll figures in $000s
 
 
Figure 4a.18 Other Revenues: 1995 - 2000 (against 1983 - 1992 regressed) 
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The increase in other revenues represents a significant growth area in local 
government, which can generally be attributed to the more entrepreneurial nature of 
local councils. 
 
4a.4 Changing Pattern of Services 
 
On a broad scale, the general thrust of change within local government in terms of 
revenue has been towards the ‘user pays’ principle with charges, fees and fines and 
other revenue now constituting a much larger share of total revenue. In respect of 
expenditure, it could be argued that there has been a shift in relative terms towards 
services that can produce ‘user pays’ outcomes and a down sizing of those services 
where expenditures do not create a significant nexus with income. Figures 4a.19, 
4a.20, 4a.21 and 4a.22 illustrate how significant these shifts have been. 
 
Revenue 
 
Figure 4a.19 Changing Pattern of Local Government Revenue: 1998 - 2000 
 
 
Figure 4a.20 Changing Pattern of Local Government Revenue: 1991/1992 
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Expenditure 
 
Figure 4a.21 Changing Pattern of Local Government Outlays: 1998 - 2000 
 
Figure 4a.22 Changing Pattern of Local Government Outlays: 1991/1992 
 
Notwithstanding that these changes in services are the result of changing community 
expectations and requirements, it could also be suggested that the changing thrust of 
local government expenditure is towards those services that are variable in nature and 
more easily adjusted for with shifts in government policy as opposed to the more 
traditional expenditures that demanded a fixed commitment. For example, expenditure 
comparisons between 1991/1992 and 1999/2000 outlays, as shown above in Figures 
4a.21 and 4a.22, indicate a significant relative proportional decrease in the spending 
in the area of transport and communication, which incorporates roads, streets and 
bridges compared to spending on community amenities, education, health, welfare, 
housing recreation and culture which are much more amiable to the ‘user pays’ 
notion. Figures 4a.23, 4a.24 and Table 4a.11 detail spending on roads streets and 
bridges and indicate the actual growth in expenditures in this area. 
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Figure 4a.23 Expenditure on Roads, Streets and Bridges: 1983 - 2000 
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Table 4a.11 Expenditure on Roads, Streets and Bridges: 1995 - 2000 (against 
                        1983 - 1992 regressed) 
YEAR ACTUAL PROJECTED 1999-2000 1983-1984
95/96 523,611$       635,258$       629,517$       364,764$       
96/97 562,154$       657,634$       
97/98 586,957$       680,011$       
98/99 591,387$       702,388$       
99/20 629,517$       724,764$       
73%
IncreaseAll figures in $000s
 
 
Figure 4a.24 Expenditure on Roads, Streets and Bridges: 1995 - 2000 (against 
                        1983 - 1992 regressed) 
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Overall, how and where this places local government finances is a somewhat 
unknown variable. The growth in all major revenues and expenditures projected from 
the financials over the 1980s has been curtailed except for other revenues. There have 
been significant shifts in the types of services offered by local government with a 
clearly visible connection to the principle of ‘user pays’. More councils are reporting 
surpluses with the quantum of those surpluses greater than ever before, albeit overall 
investment holdings have decreased. It is suggested that the criticisms that resulted in 
the AAS27 reforms and the Kennett State Government amalgamations, coupled with 
the paradigm shift of governments towards balanced budgets and surpluses, which 
saw deficit units as inefficient and ineffective, may have influenced the local 
government psyche.  
 
In terms of achieving the objective of smaller government through improved 
accountability, the evidence does support a reduction in government inputs. However, 
to couple these trends with a more effective management of fewer resources is 
distorted due to greater resources being drawn to the local government sector from the 
private sector through avenues such as the ‘user pays’ system. The previous fund 
system of accounting enabled inputs to be more clearly identified with their outputs. 
For example, funds allocated by government and raised by rates for sewerage could 
be clearly identified to enable the effective utilisation of those inputs and to assess 
performance in that area. The present reporting regime adopts a more holistic 
operational perspective, where there is not such a clear nexus between the receipt of 
funds and their actual allocation.   
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Appendix 4b 
 
Amalgamation of Victorian Local Government 
 
Figure 4b.1 Council Boundaries following Amalgamation 
 
 
 
Table 4b.1 Constituents of the New Victorian Local Government 
 
NEW COMPONENT NEW COMPONENT 
    
ALPINE 
(S) 
BEECHWORTH (S) PART C 
BRIGHT (S) 
MYRTLEFORD (S) 
OMEO (S) PART B 
YACANDANDAH (S) PART C   
BULOKE 
(S) 
 
BIRCHIP (S) 
CHARLTON (S) 
DONALD (S) PART A 
KARA KARA (S) PART B 
WYCHEPROOF (S)          
ARARAT 
(RC) 
ARARAT (C)          
ARARAT (S) PART A 
STAWELL (S) PART B          
CAMPASPE 
(C) 
 
COHUNA (S) PART B 
DEAKIN (S) 
ECHUCA (C) 
GORDON (S) PART B 
KYABRAM (T) 
ROCHESTER (S) 
RODNEY (S) 
WARANGA (S) PART A          
BALLARAT 
(C) 
BALLARAT (C) 
BALLARAT (S) 
BUNGAREE (S) PART A 
BUNINYONG (S) PART A 
GRENVILLE (S) PART A 
SEBASTOPOL (B)          
CARDINIA 
(S) 
CRANBOURNE (C) PART D 
PAKENHAM (S) 
SHERBRQOKE (S) PART C 
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NEW COMPONENT NEW COMPONENT 
    
BANYULE 
(C) 
 
 
DIAMOND VALLEY (S) 
PART A          
ELTHAM (S) PART B 
HEIDELBERG (S) PART A 
CASEY 
(C) 
BERWICK (C) PART A          
CRANBOURNE (C) PART A        
KNOX (C) PART B          
BASS COAST (S) BASS (S) 
CRANBOURNE (C) PART E     
 
KORUMBURRA (S) PART B 
PHILLIP ISLAND (S) 
WONTHAGGI (B) 
WOORAYL (S) PART B              
CENTRAL 
GOLDFIELDS       
(S) 
BET BET (S) PART A 
 
MARYBOROUGH (C) 
TALBOT & CLUNES (S) PART 
A 
TULLAROOP (S) PART A          
BAW BAW 
(S) 
BULN BULN (S) 
NARRACAN (S) PART A 
UPPER YARRA (S) PART B 
WARRAGUL (RC)          
COLAC-OTWAY 
(S) 
 
COLAC (C) 
COLAC (S) PART A 
HEYTESBURY (S) PART B 
OTWAY (S) PART A          
BAYSIDE  
(C) 
 
BRIGHTON (C) 
MOORABBIN (C) PART C 
MORDIALLOC (C) PART B 
SANDRINGHAM (C) 
          
CORANGAMITE 
(S) 
CAMPERDOWN (T) 
HAMPDEN (S) PART A 
HEYTESBURY (S) PART A 
MORTLAIKE (S) PART B 
OTWAY (S) PART B 
WARRNAMBOOL (S) PART B     
BOROONDARA 
(C) 
CAMBERWELL (C) 
HAWTHORN (C) 
KEW (C)          
DAREBIN  
(C) 
COBURG (C) PART B 
DIAMOND VALLEY (S) PART 
B 
HEIDELBERG (C) PART B 
NORTHCOTE (C) 
PRESTON (C)          
BRIMBANK 
(C) 
KEILOR (C) PART A 
SUNSHINE (C) PART A          
GREATER 
GEELONG  
(C)2 
 
BELLARINE (C) 
COR1O (S) 
GEELONG (C) 
GEELONG WEST (C) 
NEWTOWN (C) 
SOUTH BARWON (C)          
DELATITE 
(S) 
BENALLA (C) 
BENALLA (S) PART A 
MANSFIELD (S) 
VIOLET TOWN (S) PART B        
GREATER        
SHEPPARTON (C) 
 
EUROA (S) PART C         
GOULBURN (S) PART B8 
RODNEY (S) PART A 
SHEPPARTON (C)  
SHEPPARTON (S)  
TUNGAMAH (S) PART B 
VOILET TOWN (S) PART C 
WARANGA (S) PART B          
EAST 
GIPPSLAND 
(C) 
BAIRNSDALE (C) 
BAIRNS DALE (S) PART A 
OMEO (S) PART A 
ORBOST (S) 
ROSEDALE (S) PART C 
TAMBO (S)          
HEPBURN  
(S) 
          
CRESWICK (S) 
DAYLESFORD & GLENLYON 
(S) 
KYNETON (S) PART B 
TALBOT & CLUNES (S) PART 
B          
FRANKSTON 
(C) 
          
CRANBOURNE (C) PART C 
FRANKSTON (C) PART A 
SPRINGVALE (C) PART C         
HINDMARSH (S) DIMBOOLA (S) 
LOWAN (S)        
GANNAWARRA 
(S)          
COHUNA (S) PART A 
KERANG (B) 
KERANG (S) PART A          
HOBSONS BAY 
(C)2 
          
WILLAMSTOWN (C) 
          
GLEN EIRA  
(C) 
          
CAULFIELD (C) 
MOORABBIN (C) PART B         
HORSHAM 
(RC) 
 
ARAPILES (S) PART A 
HORSHAM (C) 
KOWREE (S) PART B 
WIMMERA (S) PART A          
GLENELG 
 (S) 
          
GLENELG (S) PART A 
HEYWOOD (S) PART A 
PORTLAND (C)          
HUME 
(C) 
          
BROADMEADOWS (C) PART 
A 
BULLA (S) PART A 
KEILOR (C) PART C 
WITTLESEA (C) PART C 
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NEW COMPONENT NEW COMPONENT 
    
GOLDEN 
PLAINS  
(S) 
          
BANNOCKBURN (S) 
BUNINYONG (S) PART C 
GRENVILLE (S) PART B 
LEIGH (S)          
INDIGO 
(S) 
          
BEECHWORTH (S) PART A 
CHILTERN (S) PART A 
RUTHERGLEN (S) 
YACKANDANDAH (S) PART 
A      
GREATER 
BENDIGO  
(C) 
          
BENDIGO (C) 
EAGLEHAWK (B) 
HUNTLY (S) 
McIVOR (S) PART A 
MARONG (C) PART A 
METCALFE (S) PART B 
STRATHSFIELDSAYE (S)         
KINGSTON 
(C) 
          
CHELSEA (C) 
MOORABBIN (C) PART A 
MORDIALLOC (C) PART A 
OAKLEIGH (C) PART B 
SPRINGVALE (C) PART B          
GREATER        
DANDENONG 
(C) 
          
BERWICK (C) PART B 
CRANBOURNE (C) PART B 
DANDENONG (C) 
SPRINGVALE (C) PART A         
MITCHELL 
(S) 
 
BROADFORD (S) PART A 
KILMORE (S) 
McIVOR (S) PART B 
PYALONG (S) 
SEYMOUR (RC) PART A 
          
     KNOX  
(C) 
          
KNOX (C) PART A 
SHERBROOKE (S) PART B 
          
MOIRA  
(S) 
          
COBRAM (S) 
NATHALIA (S) 
NUMURKAH (S) 
TUNGAMAH (S) PART A 
YARRAWONGA (S) PART A       
LATROBE  
(S) 
          
MOE (C) 
MORWELL (C) 
NARRACAN (S) PART B 
ROSEDALE (S) PART B 
TRARALGON (C) 
TRARALGON (S)          
MONASH 
 (C) 
          
OAKLEIGH (C) PART A 
WAVERLEY (C) 
          
LODDON  
(S) 
          
BET BET (S) PART B 
EAST LODDON (S) 
GORDON (S) PART A 
KORONG (S) 
MALDON (S) PART B 
MARONG (C) PART B 
TULLAROOP (S) PART B         
MOONEE 
VALLEY  
(C) 
          
ESSENDON (C) 
KEILOR (C) PART B 
          
MACEDON 
RANGES  
(S) 
          
GISBORNE (S) 
KYNETON (S) PART A 
NEWHAM & WOODEND (S) 
ROMSEY (S) 
          
MOORABOOL (S) 
          
BACCHUS MARSH (S) 
BALLAN (S) 
BUNGAREE (S) PART B 
BUNINYONG (S) PART B 
WERRIBEE (C) PART C 
          
MANNINGHAM 
(C) 
          
DONCASTER & 
TEMPLESTOWE (C) PART A 
LILLYDALE (S) PART B 
          
MORELAND  
(C) 
          
BROADMEADOWS (C) PART 
B 
BRUNSWICK (C) 
COBURG (C) 
          
MARIBYRNONG 
(C) 
          
FOOTSCRAY (C) 
SUNSHINE (C) PART B 
          
MORNINGTON 
PENINSULA 
 (S) 
          
CRANBOURNE (C) PART F 
FLINDERS (S) 
FRANKSTON (C) PART B 
HASTINGS (S) 
MORNINGTON (S) 
          
MAROONDAH 
(C) 
          
CROYDON (C) 
DONCASTER & 
TEMPLESTOWE (C) PART B 
LILLYDALE (S) PART C 
RINGWOOD (C)          
MOUNT 
ALEXANDER (S) 
          
CASTLEMAINE (C) 
MALDON (S) PART A 
METCALFE (S) PART A 
NEWSTEAD (S)          
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MELBOURNE 
(C) 
          
MELBOURNE (C) 
          
MOYNE (S) 
          
BELFAST (S) 
DUNDAS (S) PART B 
HAMPDEN (S) PART B 
MINHAMITE (S) 
MORTLAKE (S) PART A 
MOUNT ROUSE (S) PART B 
PORT FAIRY (B) 
WARRNAMBOOL (S) PART A    
MELTON  
(S) 
          
BULLA (S) PART B 
MELTON (S) 
WERRIBEE (C) PART B 
          
STONNINGTON 
(C) 
          
MALVERN (C) 
PRAHRAN (C) 
MILDURA  
(RC) 
                  
MILDURA (C) 
MILDURA (S) 
WALPEUP (S) 
          
STRATHBOGIE 
(S) 
          
EUROA (S) PART A 
GOULBURN (S) PART A 
McIVOR (S) PART C 
SEYMOUR (RC) PART B 
VIOLET TOWN (S) PART A 
MURRINDINDI 
(S) 
          
ALEXANDRA (S) 
BROADFORD (S) PART B 
ELTHAM (S) PART C 
EUROA (S) PART B 
HEALESVILLE (S) PART C 
WHITTLESEA (C) PART D 
YEA (S)           
SURF COAST (S) 
          
BARRABOOL (S) 
COLAC (S) 
WINCHELSEA (S) 
NILLUMBIK  
(S) 
          
DIAMOND VALLEY (S)        
PART C 
ELTHAM (S) PART A 
HEALESVILLE (S) PART B 
WHITTLESEA (C) PART B   
SWAN HILL 
(RC) 
KERANG (S) PART B 
SWAN HILL (C) 
SWAN HILL (S) 
NORTHERN       
GRAMPIANS  
(S) 
          
ARARAT (S) PART B 
AVOCA (S) PART B 
DONALD (S) PART B 
DUNMUNKLE (S) PART A 
KARA KARA (S) PART A 
ST ARNAUD (T) 
STAWELL (C) 
STAWELL (S) PART A 
WIMMERA (S) PART C 
TOWONG 
(S) 
TALLANGATTA (S) 
UPPER MURRAY (S)   
 
PORT PHILLIP 
(C) 
PORT MELBOURNE (C) 
PRAHRAN (C) PART B 
ST KILDA (C) 
SOUTH MELBOURNE (C) 
WANGARATTA 
(RC) 
BEECHWORTH (S) PART B 
BENALLA (S) PART B 
OXLEY (S) PART A 
WANGARATTA (C) 
WANGARA1TA (S) 
YARRAWONGA (S) PART B 
PYRANEES 
(S) 
AVOCA (S) PART A 
LEXTON (S) 
RIPON (S)  
WARRNAMBOOL 
(C) 
WARRNAMBOOL (C) 
WARRNAMBOOL (S PART C      
          
 
QUEENSCLIFFE 
(B) 
QUEENSCLIFFE (B) 
          
          
 
WELLINGTON 
(S) 
ALBERTON (S) 
AVON (S) 
BAIRNSDALE (S) PART B 
MAFFRA (S) 
ROSEDALE (S) PART A 
SALE (C) 
          
          
 
SOUTH 
GIPPSLAND 
(S) 
KORUMBURRA (S) PART A 
MIRBOO (S) 
SOUTH GIPPSLAND (S) 
WOORAYL (S) PART A 
WEST WIMMERA 
(S) 
ARAPILES (S) PART B 
GLENELG (S) PART B 
KANIVA (S) 
KOWREE (S) PART A 
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SOUTHERN 
GRAMPIANS 
(S) 
DUNDAS (S) PART A 
HAMILTON (C) 
HEYWOOD (S) PART B 
KOWREE (S) PART C 
MOUNT ROUSE (S) PART A 
WANNON (S) 
 
WHITEHORSE 
(C) 
BOX HILL (C) 
NUNAWADING (C) 
WODONGA 
(RC) 
CHILTERN (S) PART B 
WODONGA (C) 
YACKANDANDAH (S) PART 
B 
          
WHITTLESEA 
(C) 
WHITTLESEA (C) PART A 
WYNDHAM 
(C) 
WERRIBEE (C) PART A 
          
YARRA 
(C) 
COLLINGWOOD (C) 
FITZROY (C) 
NORTHCOTE (C) PART B 
RICHMOND (C)          
YARRA 
RANGES (S)    
HEALESVILLE (S) PART A 
LILLYDALE (S) PART A 
SHERBROOKE (S) PART A 
UPPER YARRA (S) PART A       
YARRIAMBIACK 
(S) 
DUNMUNKLE (S) PART A 
KARKAROOC (S) 
WARRACKNABEAL (S) 
WIMMERA (S) PART B          
 
 
Figure 4b.2 Pre-Structure Metropolitan Melbourne 
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Figure 4b.3 Post-Structure Metropolitan Melbourne 
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Chapter 5 
 
Accounting Standard Setting in Australia 
 
 
5.1 Institutional Arrangements for Accounting Standard Setting in Australia 
 
AAS27 was the first accounting standard issued under the guidance of the newly 
developing conceptual framework of accounting standard setting in Australia. Much 
of its development was the outcome of the dynamics associated with the institutional 
arrangements for the development and control of accounting standard setting in 
Australia.  
 
The nexus of this chapter with the research question is twofold. First, the timing, 
nature and development of the conceptual framework were born out of the struggle for 
control of the standard setting process. This struggle underpins how the accounting 
profession indirectly maintained control over the process and subsequently legitimised 
its involvement in public sector accounting standard setting and how it used its 
involvement with the PSASB to push for the application of common standards for 
both the public and private sectors. It considers the extent to which the accounting 
profession invoked the authority of a conceptual framework to justify the need for 
common standards and the impact of the conceptual framework on the development 
of AAS27.  
 
Second, due process as applied within the accounting standard setting environment is 
not an isolated concept to be investigated independently of those who control and 
administer it. Its ability to provide an appropriate consultative framework and 
mechanism for the development of local government accounting regulation is very 
much an outcome of the time and environment in which it is applied. Consequently, 
this chapter is descriptive in its pursuit of the underlying conditions and prevalent 
environment in which due process would be utilised in the development of AAS27. 
 
In terms of the reform of the Australian public sector, Australian governments saw the 
role of the accounting profession as one of a willing messenger who had the ability to 
espouse the purported benefits of the private sector accounting model and how it 
would benefit the public sector.  
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Willing and able as the accounting profession was to deliver such a message, it 
required an appropriate mechanism and vehicle through which it could maintain its 
regulatory independence and its professional reputation within the financial sphere.  
 
5.2 History 
 
The professional accounting bodies, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Australia (ICAA) and the Australian Society of Accountants, ASA, (now CPA 
Australia) initially issued formal guidance through recommendations and statements 
of accounting practice and later, accounting standards and concept statements, 
together with disciplinary and ethical codes of practice. Early pronouncements were 
largely based on existing best practice with the majority of accounting standards 
developed without a conceptual framework foundation.  
 
Following criticisms in the early 1960s emanating from an indictment of misleading 
financial reporting and accusations of audit failure resulting from several major 
company failures, such as the Sydney Guarantee Corporation and Reid Murray 
Holdings, the two professional accounting bodies in 1965 jointly funded the 
Accountancy Research Foundation which was reconstituted in 1973 as the AARF. It 
was to “provide a research base and prepare accounting standards for endorsement by 
the profession.”176 Standards developed by the AARF were titled Statements of 
Accounting Standards (AAS) and, although not mandatory, members of the 
accounting profession were obliged to comply with these in line with APS1: 
‘Conformity with Accounting Standards’.  
 
Public pressure for greater government involvement increased due to high incidences 
of non-compliance with the non-mandatory professional accounting statements. In a 
review spanning the period 1978-82, the NSW Corporate Affairs Commission found 
some 41 per cent of 8,699 financial statements reviewed failed to comply with one or 
more accounting standards.177 This, together with a continued period of company 
failures, seen to be the result of inadequacies contained within the published financial 
                                                 
176  Heazlewood, T., (1992), Current Developments in the Australian Standard Setting Process 
(Virtual Reality in Accounting), Discussion Paper No. 92-52, University of Southampton: Dept. of 
Accounting and Management Science, October, p.8. 
177  Australian Accounting Research Foundation, [AARF], (2002), Corporate Disclosure – 
Strengthening the Financial Reporting Framework, Paper presented to the Legislation Review 
Board for the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program, November. 
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reports, entrenched calls for government involvement. These criticisms were 
aggravated by the jurisdictional constraints inherent within a system of individual 
state acts and codes. Miller painted the states as being “severely hampered ... in their 
ability to deal with interstate fraud and market manipulation, ... evidence of the 
deficiencies of the system.”178  
 
Concerned with overseas developments which had seen extensive investigations into 
the accounting professions and the outcome of the Rae Report proposals in Australia 
which “served to remind the elite of the accounting profession that widespread 
communal concern could ignite government surveillance of the activities of any 
professional group,”179 both the ICAA and ASA sought legislative backing for their 
standards. Being concerned as to the consequences of greater government 
involvement that would accompany any such legislative backing, the accounting 
profession argued in its submission to the NCSC, that “for … reasons of public 
interest, the accountancy bodies favour legislative backing of accounting standards, 
though in a manner which would retain the maximum possible degree of professional 
judgement in compliance and enforcement.”180 
 
Concerns about “the suitability of existing standards and the problems of enforcing 
compliance especially from non-members of the profession such as company 
directors”181 led the NSW Attorney-General, in 1978, to instigate an Accounting 
Standards Review Committee. Chua and Sinclair suggest that “in essence, the 
Attorney-General was suggesting that the approval phase of the private sector 
standard setting process be taken out of the hands of the accounting profession and 
become the responsibility of government.”182 Chaired by Professor R. J. Chambers, 
the committee concluded that statutory recognition should be given to accounting 
standards although the existing body of standards were unsuitable for recognition. 
 
 
                                                 
178  Miller, M., (1991), “Shifts in the Regulatory Framework for Corporate Financial Reporting”, 
Australian Accounting Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, November, p.31. 
179  Chua and Sinclair, op.cit.: p.680. 
180  Australian Accountancy Profession Joint Submission, (1982), The Australian Accountant, 52(5), 
p.308. 
181  Heazlewood, op.cit.: p.8. 
182  Chua and Sinclair, op.cit.: p.682. 
 90
In 1981 the Committee of Inquiry into the Australian Financial System, the Campbell 
Report, supported legislative backing for accounting standards and suggested that an 
independent Accounting Standards Review Board (ASRB) be established, with 
responsibility for determining the adoption of accounting standards as having regard 
to the needs of different users. Notwithstanding this, it recommended that the 
professional accounting bodies retain responsibility for the design and development of 
accounting standards.  
 
In attempts to head off outside influence and to safeguard its control over accounting 
standards, the accounting profession offered an expanded, more representative 
membership of the AARF and suggested that a profession sponsored ASRB within the 
AARF, along lines similar to the US FASB, would be a more appropriate body. The 
accounting profession suggested that the majority of members should be accountants 
nominated by it and that the major focus of any such board should be to accept or 
reject proposed standards prepared by it, the accounting profession. It argued for 
automatic legislative backing for issued standards in line with the Canadian precedent, 
although strongly opposing the costly and possibly bureaucratic step of involving 
government in the standard setting process. The wishes of the accounting profession, 
however, did not materialise, with the ASRB being established as a statutory body in 
1984 with far wider powers and duties than were first espoused. In broad terms the 
board was empowered to:183 
 
 Determine priorities 
 
 Sponsor the development of accounting standards 
 
 Review accounting standards referred to it 
 
 Invite public submissions and conduct public hearings 
 
 Approve accounting standards 
 
Arguments supporting the establishment of the ASRB were generally twofold. First, it 
was felt that the AARF failed to appropriately include the views of all parties 
interested in the policy decisions associated with accounting standards, nor did it 
show sufficient concern for the economic implications resulting from those standards.  
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Second, acceptance of the accounting profession’s proposals would accord statutory 
protection without any corresponding requirement by it for public reporting and 
accountability. 184 
 
At the heart of the ASRB's function was the review of accounting standards 
formulated by the accountancy bodies and the possibility of recognising similar 
standards proposed by other third parties, a function the accounting profession 
vehemently opposed.  
 
Events following the establishment of the ASRB suggest a power struggle emerged 
between the accounting profession and government for control of the standard setting 
process. Complaints during the mid-1980s concerning the slowness of the ASRB in 
approving standards sent to it by the AARF were described as illustrating regulatory 
capture. Regulatory capture occurs if the regulated interest controls both the 
regulation and the regulated body, or if the regulated body is successful in 
coordinating the activities of the regulator so as to achieve a synchronisation of those 
activities with its preferred interests. Neutralising or ensuring non-performance by the 
regulatory body or their agreement to give the regulated body the regulation they want 
may also achieve this.185 
 
Walker, a founding member of the ASRB, believed the ASRB was not seen as being 
independent of the accounting bodies as was originally intended. He suggested that 
the accounting profession had ensnared the ASRB by ensuring its non-performance 
and that by the beginning of 1986 the accounting profession had managed to 
“influence the procedures, the priorities and the output of the Board.”186 Walker 
pointed to the fact that within twenty-four months of establishment, with the issue of 
only three approved statements, and the suspension of the due process to enable fast 
tracking, the ASRB had in effect been captured by the accounting profession.  
 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
representatives of the accounting bodies and AARF ensured that the ASRB was 
unproductive. The Board was hampered by the tardiness of those bodies in formally 
communicating their demands about copyright, by the delays in the submission of 
redrafted versions of ... standards.187  
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Henry Bosch, then chairman of the NCSC, suggested “one of the biggest stumbling 
blocks preventing a greater output of standards was the relationship between the 
AARF and the ASRB.”188 In expressing concern at the slowness taken to issue 
standards, he pondered whether we would be “much worse off if we took the 
American or perhaps the Canadian standards and enforced them here as from the 
beginning of 1986. At least all companies would be doing the same thing, and the 
results would be a great deal more comparable.”189 To overcome accusations of 
slowness, the ASRB took steps to fast track a number of standards presented by the 
accounting bodies by bypassing its own due process procedures. In this regard Walker 
felt that the independence of the ASRB had been compromised by the extent to which 
the board favourably treated those standards forwarded by the AARF as compared to 
those proposed by other organisations such as the Australian Shareholders 
Association.  
 
Walker also claimed that the ASRB had abandoned the requirements of ASRB 
Release 200 for the AARF, but required them for other bodies and by approving 
several AARF proposed standards, which did not meet the ASRB Release 100 
criteria. Release 100 documented criteria for the evaluation of accounting standards 
while Release 200 documented procedures to be followed with standard submissions. 
For example, the ASRB refused to consider a standard proposal by the Australian 
Shareholders Association on the ground that insufficient supporting documentation 
had been provided per the requirement of Release 200, yet it disregarded the Release 
200 requirement for a proposal forwarded by the AARF. 
 
In its initial form, the ASRB comprised seven members and although the ministerial 
council resolved to appoint an ASRB independent of the accounting bodies, all 
appointees held accounting qualifications of some nature. Moreover, while the 
accounting profession had only two seats, a majority of the remaining nominees had 
held senior posts in those bodies. For instance, the chairman, Geoff Bottrill, had been 
a former national president of the ASA. 
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In relation to the make up of the ASRB, Walker believed that the accounting 
profession’s cause gained momentum with the success they achieved in opposing the 
appointment of prominent Australian academic, Professor R. J. Chambers of the 
University of Sydney, as board chairman, arguing that “academic knowledge would 
not be the appropriate requirement for the post of chairman; rather, selection criteria 
should properly reflect the important considerations of practicality, acceptability and 
need in the community.”190  The accounting profession also opposed the appointment 
of a research director for the board, arguing instead that any independent research 
requirements should be provided by the AARF.  
 
Interestingly, the 1986 board membership comprised two former national presidents 
of the ASA, one of whom was an existing member of the AARF's Accounting 
Standards Board (AcSB); a former national president of the ICAA; a former state 
president of the ASA; a state councillor of the ASA; and a former chairman of the 
AARF. 
 
5.3 The Public Sector Accounting Standards Board 
 
The search for a more accountable and efficient public sector brought with it 
increased demands for accounting and managerial technologies which offered 
standardised practices capable of delivering a more efficient bureaucracy. 
 
Just prior to the establishment of the ASRB, concern as to whether the AARF was the 
only appropriate body to have responsibility to make standards for both the private 
and public sectors culminated in the establishment in 1983 of the PSASB as an arm of 
the AARF.  
 
At inception the make up of the PSASB comprised nine members, four nominated by 
each of the two professional accounting bodies, together with the Australian 
representative on the International Public Sector Committee. Agars saw significant 
advantages for the establishment of the PSASB within the AARF. 
 
As the research and technical arm of the Australian Society of Accountants and the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants, the AARF has acquired substantial expertise in 
the development of accounting and auditing standards by the Accounting Standards 
Board (AcSB) and the Auditing Standards Board (AuSB). In addition, the PSASB 
now has access to the considerable skills and interests of the membership of the two 
bodies in Australia.191 
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Conversely, Shand did not consider there to be a “strong reason for a separate Public 
Sector Board.”192 He was “not convinced that financial reporting issues in the public 
sector … [were] fundamentally different from those in the private sector.”193 
 
The conventional wisdom among private sector accountants was that accounting 
standards were universally applicable and were independent of the entity’s 
environment.194  
 
W.J. Kenley, the first long serving director of the AARF, typified the universal 
implementation school position by arguing “that government accountants should 
become involved in developing the profession’s single set of standards, rather than 
consider developing a separate set of public sector standards.”195 
 
The creation of the PSASB technically left the AARF with two accounting standard 
setting bodies, its AcSB arm and the PSASB, which gave rise to possible conflicts 
concerning specific standards and the allocation of resources between each of the 
boards. The first of these fears were allayed by the decision of the PSASB that there 
should be a common set of accounting standards applied, where possible, to both the 
private and public sectors.  
 
Peirson believed the approach adopted by the PSASB was that “it should not develop 
a set of accounting standards for the public sector which are separate and different 
from those for the private sector.”196 Consequently, this spirit of co-operation 
dispelled much of the anticipated conflict associated with the availability and 
allocation of resources between the two boards. Heazlewood alluded to the 
establishment of the PSASB as one of “importance ... in the future relationship 
between the AARF and the ASRB, [which] cannot be underestimated as the PSASB 
provided in part the rationale for AARF to continue to operate independently of the 
ASRB and company legislation.”197 
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While there was no doubt that the accounting profession recognised the need to 
develop a consistent set of standards suitable for the public sector, Guthrie alluded to 
a further three, although somewhat more controversial, reasons for the accounting 
profession’s involvement.198 First, he pointed to the fact that a significant number, 
perhaps at least 20 per cent, of ASA members were active within the public service. 
Agars quantified this at over 10,000 members of the Society being involved in the 
public sector and that the “need for a Public Sector Accounting Standards Board was 
identified by this group.”199 Second, Guthrie saw the large professional and 
accounting firms as viewing the public sector as a new frontier, capable by its relative 
size to generate substantial income producing activity. Paradoxically, Agars saw the 
accounting profession as viewing the public sector as the last frontier for “substantial 
growth in new audit business as well as a major source of consulting business.”200 
Third, Guthrie believed that the accounting profession saw the AARF as having the 
standard setting expertise. Comments attributed to the President of the Australian 
Society of Accountants in 1983, J. Tomlinson, indicated his belief that at the time 
there was nobody within the public sector competent enough to do the work.201  
 
Walker suggests that the accounting profession’s involvement in public sector 
standard setting “was not activated until there were initiatives from parliamentary 
committees and government.”202 
 
The accounting bodies and major accounting firms have taken an active role in 
promoting the adoption of accrual accounting by central budget government 
departments on the basis of emotive statements that existing practices were 
inadequate, and that only accrual accounting shows the ‘true costs’ of services, or the 
‘true financial position’ of government entities.203 
 
 
The question of whether the public sector is unique and consequently deserving of 
separate accounting standards has been one of debate. Karan noted that comparative 
studies of institutional arrangements revealed no consistent practice in the US, UK, 
Canada and New Zealand. Rather, “a clear distinction between private and public 
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sector standard setting is made in the United States, Canada and New Zealand and 
only a compromise situation ... considered in the United Kingdom.”204 The 
predominant view in these countries is that the operations of government entities are 
significantly differentiated to warrant separate accounting standards.  
 
Shand believed elements of this debate to have been somewhat misconstrued and 
suggested that the understanding of what was perceived to be meant by common 
standards was a semantic issue, that it was never the intent of the PSASB to have 
precisely identical standards being applied to both sectors.205  This aside, Walker 
contended there to have been very little analysis of the need for common standards, 
arguing instead that for the most part: 
 
Debates and discourse about what forms of financial reporting … [were] best or 
optimal for the public sector … [were] not always conducted in technical terms for an 
audience of technicians of researchers; [but] on the contrary, much of the debate … 
[was] targeted at politicians and regulatory agencies. Arguments about the superiority 
of one or other form of accounting … [were taking] place in an environment where 
the responses of the public servants or elected officials may [have been] … affected 
by concerns about media responses and the impact of certain disclosures on the 
outcome of elections.206 
 
He discerned from the literature to that time the following arguments for and against 
common accounting standards:207 
 
 Most of the literature espoused claims associated with the policy making 
superiority of different parties given their self-perceived greater knowledge and 
competence. 
 
 The adoption of common standards would be both cost effective and avoid the 
possibility and embarrassment of conflicting solutions being proposed between 
both sectors. 
 
At the forefront of this debate were the professional accounting bodies that through 
the AARF had advanced the common standard philosophy. It is interesting to note 
that, despite their enthusiasm to embrace common standards, perusal of both PSASB 
and AARF publications lend little documentary evidence to support that enthusiasm. 
Monograph 5 actually expressed some concerns as to the appropriateness of 
elucidating common accounting procedures, going as far to identify no fewer than 
twenty-seven individual issues relating to public sector standard development. 
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Justification in the literature amounted in many instances to superficial subjectivity on 
the part of many authors. Wyatt, for instance, asserted in brief terms that the needs of 
general purpose financial report users were generally similar,208 a view clearly 
supported by the PSASB who saw financial reporting issues as being fundamentally 
the same for both sectors. Comments from one local observer suggest that “it seems to 
me that too much of the debate … about public sector reporting has comprised a set of 
answers in search of the questions.” 209 
 
Importantly, the concept of the PSASB viewing financial reporting issues as 
fundamentally the same requires being tempered somewhat by the extent or level of 
fundamental being considered. While not seeing the substantial objectives and 
concepts of financial reporting as being different between sectors, Shand believed 
“the application or operationalisation” of them to be so; “there are differences, but not 
fundamental ones, between the ... sectors. Objectives and general definitional issues 
remain the same; the operational or display levels are where things differ.”210  
 
Given the lack of any precise documentation supporting its view, Walker believed the 
AARF had “sought to craft an explanation for having common standards by invoking 
the authority of a conceptual framework,”211 and that the issue of several conceptual 
framework statements constituted the underpinning rationale for common accounting 
standards. “In so doing, AARF sought to turn an analytical tool or an agenda-setting 
device into a prescription; it now claims to have determined what the objectives of 
financial reporting should be.”212 By applying a socio-political interpretation to the 
conceptual framework statements, Walker viewed these as technical documents that 
could be utilized as tools capable of forcing agenda issues rather than being neutral in 
nature. “One can simply view the process as an exercise in accounting politics.”213  
                                                 
208  Wyatt, A., (1989), “Who should get Government Accounting Standards?”, Journal of 
Accountancy, March, pp. 65-70. 
209  Conn, N., (1988), Treasury views on current developments in public sector financial recording, 
Northern Territory Public Accounts Committee, November, p.21. 
210  Shand, op.cit.: p.268. 
211  Walker, op.cit.: p.255.  
212  ibid.: p.260. 
213  ibid.: p.256. 
 98
Walker saw Monograph 5 issued in 1985 and the 1987 draft statements of concepts as 
being instigated to “legitimise the profession’s involvement in public sector standard 
setting.”214 
 
If there are common standards between both sectors, then private sector practitioners 
can claim expertise which equips them to undertake work for public sector clients. 
Naturally a responsible profession must undertake ‘research’ to decide whether 
common standards are justified. But if one starts out by assuming there are no 
‘fundamental differences’ between the information needs of users in the public and 
private sectors, then one need not find any.215 
 
Shand took a less sharp approach to this issue, believing the accounting bodies saw 
things happening in the public sphere and acted to ensure their involvement. 
“Professional bodies must be seen to be relevant if they are to survive.”216  
 
Walker also identified three major implications that were likely to arise with the 
pursuit of common standards. First, as a result of differing priorities, conflict would 
arise which would require resolution. A resolution he believed would generally favour 
the private sector due to the greater scrutiny applied by regulators and the closer 
attention given by the media. Private sector practitioners were also more likely to 
argue for guidelines on private sector issues in response to the possible litigatory 
consequences. Shand conceded on this point that a perusal of the PSASB’s output to 
1989 was predominantly identical with that of the private sector. The PSASB had 
worked very closely with the ASRB, which afforded it access to the research and 
technical skills of the AARF, an approach that occasionally diverted the PSASB’s 
attention away from priority issues for the public sector.  
 
Second, timing delays would most likely occur due to the finer detail required to be 
drafted within private sector standards in line with their compliance with other 
statutory acts and codes. Timing problems did indeed occur. For instance, during 1987 
and 1988, the ASRB was pressured to produce certain legally binding standards for 
the corporate sphere that consequently slowed the PSASB’s work agenda. Moreover, 
the private sector board also focused on certain issues such as trademarks and 
goodwill that had little consequence for the public sector.  
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Third, the substantive content of standards would be constrained by limiting the ambit 
of the conceptual framework to general purpose financial reporting. Consequently the 
ambit of accounting standards would also be limited to rules for general purpose 
financial reports. 
 
In terms of the aforementioned, the extent to which the authority of a conceptual 
framework justified the need for common standards and subsequently its impact on 
the promulgation of AAS27 needs to be considered, not only in light of any such 
authority but also in the historical antecedents of the development of the conceptual 
framework. Section 5.4 aims to explain the foregone conclusion of the outcome of 
ED50 irrespective of the due process of accounting standard setting in Australia and 
how the development of AAS27 was permeated with conceptual framework 
objectives, which underpinned the accounting profession’s argument for the 
application of common standards for both the private and public sectors. 
 
5.4 The Conceptual Framework of Accounting Standard Setting in Australia 
 
 
As a result of increasing criticism concerning the number, usefulness and internal 
consistency of accounting standards being developed throughout the world, the 
Australian accounting profession commenced work on a conceptual framework in the 
mid-1980s, which would provide a foundation for developing consistent and useful 
standards of accounting practice and financial reporting within the Australian 
financial reporting sphere.  
 
Historically, the AARF had been well aware of the domestic and international 
momentum building during the 1950s and 1960s to develop a conceptual framework. 
Substantial company crashes had fuelled public investigations that revealed 
significant financial reporting and auditing failures. Existing professional 
announcements were based largely on existing practice, and consequently open to the 
abuse of defined best practice. Moreover, there were no explicit or well-articulated 
underpinning theories, which would have served as a foundation from which the 
objectives and fundamentals of financial reporting could be derived. 
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During this same period, accountants had also begun to consider the importance of 
decision-usefulness as opposed to accountability. The intention of financial reporting 
for the first time was being seen as the provision of information useful for economic 
decision-making rather than as an end in itself. This consequently raised issues 
relating to the historical primacy of the financial reporting role of stewardship.  
 
In response to these issues and the lack of a foundation framework, the AARF during 
the 1970s commissioned several major studies which resulted in the issue of two 
monographs dealing with the objectives of financial reporting: Kenley 1970; ‘A 
Statement of Australian Accounting Principles’ and Kenley and Staubus 1973, 
‘Objectives and Concepts of Financial Statements’.217  These studies documented the 
emerging realisation that financial reports had a broader objective than the historical 
stewardship perspective and to some extent could be utilised to aid economic 
decision-making. However, no further work on the conceptual framework was 
undertaken until 1982, when the AARF released Accounting Theory Monograph No. 
2: ‘Objectives and Basic Concepts of Accounting’, prepared by A. D. Barton, which 
aimed to provide a logical framework of the objectives and basic concepts of 
accounting. It adopted an analytical approach built upon a framework of objectives 
from which detailed accounting standards could be developed.  
 
Barton noted however that any such framework would be broadly based with a focus 
on “fundamental issues ... [and would not] delve into particular problems which are 
rightfully the domain of accounting standard formulation.”218  
 
The AARF saw the study as a useful building block from which to take further steps 
along the pathway to the development of a conceptual framework and shortly 
thereafter introduced specific conceptual projects to its work program. Unfortunately, 
progress was somewhat slowed by the continuing struggle by the AARF for control of 
the Australian accounting standard setting process.  
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A much needed boost derived from the establishment of the PSASB in 1983, which 
determined from the outset to specify a conceptual framework from which it could 
pursue its future standard setting activities. Much to its credit, the PSASB developed 
the initial SAC1: ‘Objectives of Financial Reporting by Public Sector Entities’ in 
1985. 
 
Sutcliffe described the Australian approach to developing a conceptual framework as 
“an attempt to establish and articulate a structure within which the linkage between 
objectives, concepts and proposed (or existing) standards and practice can be 
evaluated.”219 Wines questioned whether the conceptual framework’s reliance on 
objectives, definitions and qualitative characteristics would “be of any further 
assistance above that provided by current accounting principles.”220 Given the 
subjectivity and professional interpretation required of many standards, would it 
enable any better understanding of the issues involved? He concluded that “the overall 
difficulty in applying any conceptual framework to the development of a specific 
accounting standard is that the stating of objectives, definitions and qualitative 
characteristics, does not, in itself, provide a basis for selecting between alternative 
accounting policies.”221  
 
Warren McGregor, Executive Director of the AARF, saw the establishment of an 
“explicit reporting framework [which would] result in a more definitive approach to 
the preparation, audit and regulation of financial reports.”222 Interestingly, he saw the 
notions of true and fair and fair presentation which have permeated financial reporting 
and legislation as being amorphous and never precisely defined by either the 
accounting profession or the courts. The construct of the conceptual framework would 
encompass less “problems for responsible practitioners, opportunities for creative 
accountants, and difficulties for regulators in seeking to enforce compliance with 
financial reporting requirements.”223 
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Wines also recognised “that the process of selecting amongst accounting alternatives 
[was] a political and social one.”224 Therefore, political and social consequences 
should be considered in tandem with the respective accounting theory and research 
and the outcome of these influences could result in inconsistencies between the 
conceptual framework and individual accounting standards. 
 
Towards the end of 1987, the AARF defined its perception of a conceptual framework 
as “a set of inter-related concepts which … define the nature, subject, purpose and 
broad content of financial reporting. It … would be an explicit rendition of the 
thinking which is governing the decision-making of the [standard setters] when they 
set down requirements, including accounting standards.”225 Importantly, the AARF 
saw the purpose of establishing a conceptual framework as providing a description of 
existing practice as well as providing a prescription for future practice. Rivett argued 
that despite the objective adopted, the “structure of objectives and related concepts is 
supposed to free … [the] standard setter from the constraints and inconsistencies of 
present practice so that the process of reform is easier. The AARF conceptual 
framework … [was] designed for this purpose.”226  
 
In December 1987 the AARF issued its four Exposure Drafts, ED42A: ‘The Objective 
of Financial Reporting’; ED42B: ‘Qualitative Characteristics of Financial 
Information’; ED42C: ‘Definition and Recognition of Assets’ and ED42D: 
‘Definition and Recognition of Liabilities’. These were closely followed in April 1988 
by the release of ED46A: ‘Definition of the Reporting Period’ and ED46B: 
‘Definition and Recognition of Expenses’. With the release of ED 51A: ‘Definition of 
Equity’ and ED51B: ‘Definition and Recognition of Revenues’ in August 1990, 
Series 1, 2 and 3 of the proposed Statements of Accounting Concepts had been 
completed and were subsequently released to replace the exposure drafts. Statement 
of Accounting Concepts 1: ‘Definition of Reporting Entity’ (SAC1) defined the 
reporting entity; Statement of Accounting Concepts 2: ‘Objective of General Purpose 
Financial Reporting’ (SAC2) identified the objectives of general purpose financial 
reporting while Statement of Accounting Concepts 3: ‘Qualitative Characteristics of 
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Financial Information’ (SAC3) described the qualitative characteristics of financial 
information. 
 
In terms of ED50 and the subsequent release of AAS27 the following chronological 
order details their respective developments amidst the flurry of conceptual framework 
activity being undertaken by the AARF. 
 
Table 5.1 Chronology of AAS27 Issued 
 
ED42A: ‘The Objective of Financial Reporting’ 
The publication of ED42A was preceded by the publication of 
Accounting Theory Monograph No. 2: ‘Objectives and Basic 
Concepts of Accounting’ in 1982 and Accounting Theory 
Monograph No. 5:  ‘Financial Reporting in the Public Sector - A 
Framework of Analysis and Identification of Issues’ in 1985. 
12/87 
 
ED42B: ‘Qualitative Characteristics of Financial Information’ 12/87 
ED42C: ‘Definition and Recognition of Assets’ 12/87 
ED42D: ‘Definition and Recognition of Liabilities’  12/87 
ED46A: ‘Definition of the Reporting Entity’ 
The publication of ED46A was preceded by the publication of 
Accounting Theory Monograph No. 8: ‘Definition of a Reporting 
Entity’ in 1989. 
4/88 
ED46B: ‘Definition and Recognition of Expenses’ 4/88 
ED50: ‘Financial Reporting by Local Governments’ 11/89 
ASRB100: Nature of Approved Accounting Standards and Statements of 
Accounting Concepts and the Criteria for the Evaluation of 
Proposed Approved Accounting Standards. 
This release incorporates conceptual framework considerations 
and describes the interrelationships of the corporate reporting 
framework and the Statements of Accounting Concepts. 
8/90 
 
SAC1:  ‘Definition of the Reporting Entity’ 
SAC1 is based on ED46A: ‘Definition of the Reporting Entity’ 
and the differential reporting aspects are based on ED48: 
‘Proposed Policy Statement on Differential Reporting’ issued in 
January, 1989, the publication of which coincided with that of 
Discussion Paper No.13: ‘Differential Reporting: Nature of the 
Accounting Standards Overload Problem and a Proposal for its 
Resolution’.  
8/90 
SAC2: ‘Objective of General Purpose Financial Reporting’ 
SAC2 is based on ED42A: ‘The Objective of Financial Reporting’ 
issued in1987.  
8/90 
 
SAC3:  ‘Qualitative Characteristics of Financial Information’ 
SAC3 is based on ED42A: ‘The Objective of Financial Reporting’ 
issued in 1987 and in part, on the content of Accounting Theory 
Monograph No. 2: ‘Objectives and Basic Concepts of Accounting’ 
issued in 1982. 
8/90 
ED51A: ‘Definition of Equity’  8/90 
ED51B: ‘Definition and Recognition of Revenues’ 8/90 
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AAS27: ‘Financial Reporting by Local Governments’ 7/91 
   
SAC4: ‘Definition and Recognition of the Elements of Financial 
Statements’ 
SAC4 is the accumulation of: 
ED42C: ‘Definition and Recognition of Assets’ issued in 1987  
ED42D: ‘Definition and Recognition of Liabilities’ issued in 1987 
ED46B: ‘Definition and Recognition of Expenses’ issued in 1988 
ED51A: ‘Definition of Equity’ issued in 1990 
ED51B: ‘Definition and Recognition of Expenses’ issued in 1990  
3/92 
 
 
AAS27 was the first standard issued under the guidance of the concept statements and 
to some extent was one of the new breed of accounting standards which encompassed 
the concepts of assets, liabilities, income and expenses as set out in the concept 
statements. This view is evidenced by reference to both ED50 Paragraph 121 and 
AAS27 Paragraph 13 that imposes upon local government the need for conformity 
with Statements of Accounting Concepts when preparing their general purpose 
financial reports. Further direct reference to Statements of Accounting Concepts 
contained within AAS27 occur within the commentary of Paragraph 9, which alludes 
to SAC2 specifying that local government financial reporting needs to disclose 
information useful to users. 
 
Although AAS27 contained few direct references to the concept statements, the 
alignment was much more prominent within the definitional aspects of the standard. 
ED50 had been significantly changed within its text and definitions. Additionally, the 
standard and its commentary had been aligned more closely with the issued and 
proposed concept statements. In this respect, Statement of Accounting Concepts 4: 
‘Definition and Recognition of the Elements of Financial Statements’ (SAC4) was 
issued in March 1992. Its purpose was to establish definitions and recognition criteria 
for the elements of financial statements, revenues, expenses, assets, liabilities and 
equity. Although issued some nine months after AAS27, SAC4 was the outcome of 
much of the preceding decade’s conceptual framework activity. 
 
Consequently, with SAC4 well in the pipeline together with SACs 1, 2 and 3 having 
been issued between ED50 in November 1989 and AAS27 in July 1991, AAS27 
reflected the more defined aspects of the conceptual framework than those espoused 
in ED50. This is clearly evident in the authorisations underpinning the AAS27 
Paragraph 12 definitions.  
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Following the release of AAS27, Jim Paul,227 Senior Project Manager - Accounting of 
AARF over this period, confirmed this: 
 
The view adopted in AAS27 is that each local government is a reporting entity and, 
consistent with the general policy of the accounting profession with respect to 
reporting entities, has an obligation to prepare general purpose financial reports that 
comply with Statements of Accounting Concepts and applicable Australian 
accounting standards. [p.3.] 
 
The definitions of assets, liabilities, revenues, expenses and equity included in 
AAS27 are based on the definitions contained in the exposure drafts. AAS27 is 
consistent with proposals for a Statement of Accounting Concepts dealing with 
assets, liabilities, revenues, expenses and equity. [p.9.] 
 
In addition to employing the definitions of assets, liabilities, revenues, expenses and 
equity, which are contained in the proposed Concepts Statements, AAS27 adopts the 
broad recognition criteria contained in those documents. [p.9.] 
 
The identification of the boundaries of local government and therefore the funds 
which need to be encompassed by its general purpose financial reports is based on 
the concept of control, as enunciated in Statement of Accounting Concepts SAC1 
“Definition of the Reporting Entity.” [p.6.] 
 
AAS27 encourages reporting of non-financial performance indicators. In addition, 
the standard requires that where such performance measures are included in general- 
purpose financial reports ... they are to be relevant and reliable and presented in a 
manner which satisfies the concepts of comparability and understandability (that is, 
they are to satisfy the relevant qualitative characteristics set out in Statement of 
Accounting Concepts SAC3.) [p.12.] 
 
Prominent Victorian local government auditor, Geoff Harry (F.C.A) of Coopers and 
Lybrand, also supported these views. “The views expressed in the concept statements 
are embodied within AAS27. … AAS27 is linked very closely with the concept 
statements.”228 
 
Initially, the underpinning thrust of the conceptual framework was the recognition that 
agreement on the purpose or objectives of financial reporting was the foundation 
stone for any resolution of specific reporting issues. In this respect the issue of SACs 
1 and 2 confirmed the emerging orthodoxy of decision-usefulness as the major 
criterion of financial statements. SAC1, Paragraph 7, states that, “general purpose 
financial reports are prepared to provide users with information … which is useful for 
making and evaluating decisions about the allocation of scarce resources.”229 SAC2 
Paragraph 26 notes the objective of general purpose financial reporting, “is to provide 
                                                 
227  Paul, J., (1991), How will AAS27 affect you?, Accounting Reform for Local Government, 
Melbourne: Business Law Education, October, pp.3-17. 
228  Harry, G.D., (1991), “Recognition of Assets and Liabilities. Recognition of Revenue and 
Expenses”, Accounting Reform for Local Government, Coopers and Lybrand, p.86. 
229  Australian Accounting Research Foundation, [AARF], (1990), Statement of Accounting Concept 1: 
Definition of the Reporting Entity, Melbourne: Victorian Printing.  
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information to users that is useful for making and evaluating decisions about the 
allocation of scarce resources.”230 
 
Notwithstanding this, the historical primary role of stewardship as the main focus of 
financial reporting was still encompassed within the framework. SAC2, Paragraph 27, 
notes “the rendering of accountability by reporting entities through general purpose 
financial reporting is encompassed by the broader objective of providing information 
useful for making and evaluating decisions about the allocation of scarce 
resources.”231 
 
Based on this premise of decision-usefulness as the primary objective, Discussion 
Paper 12 espoused the necessity of then identifying the potential users and the purpose 
for which those users require disclosure of financial information. Two examples of the 
common users and uses identified by the paper follow: 
 
 There is a potentially wide range of users of general purpose financial reports of 
local governments. 
 
 Users require financial information for accountability purposes and as input for 
decision-making. 
 
SAC2 identified those users whose information needs should dictate the nature of 
information to be disclosed as being either resource providers, recipients of goods and 
services or parties performing a review or oversight function. Through construction 
and working back from the identification of users dependent upon general purpose 
financial reports for making resource allocation decisions, the concept of a reporting 
entity was derived.  
 
SAC1 adopted the concept of a reporting entity, tied to the information needs of users 
and the nature of general purpose financial reports, ideologically adopting the view 
that the reporting entity concept is not dependent on the sector within which the entity 
operates. The proposition of applying the reporting entity concept has more or less 
imposed the development of common accounting standards for both the public and 
private sectors. 
 
                                                 
230  Australian Accounting Research Foundation, [AARF], (1990), Statement of Accounting Concept 2: 
The Objectives of General Purpose Financial Reporting, Melbourne: Victorian Printing.  
231  ibid. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
 
Notwithstanding the joint push by government and the accounting profession to 
implement the private sector accounting model within the public sector, control of 
accounting standard setting in Australia was in turmoil as the consequence of 
significant disenchantment with existing private sector reporting practices. Continued 
company failures and non-compliance with non-mandatory accounting standards led 
to calls for government intervention and regulation. 
 
Analysis revealed a concerted approach by the accounting profession to retain control 
of the standard setting process, first by hindering government intervention and second 
by invoking the authority of an undemonstrated conceptual framework to craft an 
explanation for applying common standards to both the public and private sectors. In 
the former instance, evidence suggests the accounting profession objected to the 
establishment of an independent ASRB and then hindered its existence and 
performance. Certain evidence suggests that the accounting profession had captured 
the ASRB.  
 
The development of a highly generalised conceptual framework positioned the AARF, 
because of its assumed greater competence and knowledge, as the foremost authority 
capable of establishing accounting concepts and standards. The ability to determine 
what the objectives of financial reporting should be gave the AARF superiority in the 
standard setting agenda and it is perhaps not surprising that the accounting profession 
used the conceptual framework as its rationale for involvement in the public sector. 
Clearly, the development of AAS27 demonstrates the applied outcome of this 
rationale and perhaps more importantly, the accounting profession’s ability to control 
financial reporting in Australia, which has been evidenced by its ability to apply 
common standards between two very different sectors.  
 
More importantly, with AAS27 being the first of the new breed of accounting 
standards set under the umbrella of the conceptual framework, where defined 
concepts relating to assets, liabilities, income and expenses had aligned the context of 
future accounting standards, the concept and process of due process was now capable 
of delivering outcomes in direct conflict with the outcomes sought under the 
conceptual framework. This point resonates within Chapter Six. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Due Process in the Australian Accounting Standard Setting 
Environment 
 
6.1 The Political Nature of Accounting Standard Setting 
 
In the Australian accounting sphere the concept of due process is applied within the 
institutional arrangements for regulating financial reporting and falls particularly 
within the promulgation of accounting standards. Accounting standard setting is the 
outcome of delegated legislation to an independent body and is two pronged in that it 
constitutes legally backed regulations, constructed from a form of delegated 
legislation. 
 
Unlike most regulations prepared by government departments, which reflect the 
implementation of government policy, accounting standards drafted by the AASB 
need not reflect government policy. Moreover, parliament has not specified the 
procedures to be followed in rule making or regulation setting. Consequently the 
subordinate authority must proceed as it thinks best. In this respect, the AASB applies 
a due process in setting accounting standards that incorporates procedures that include 
the publication of working papers, the opportunity for notice and comment, 
consultation, and the taking of expert advice. 
 
If accounting rules have widespread and significant economic and social implications, 
then proposed accounting rules would be of interest to many individuals and groups 
whose wealth and welfare may be affected.   
 
It is well documented that the setting of accounting standards is the outcome of a 
political, rather than a technical or economic process. Regulatory bodies endeavour to 
balance the competing demands and views of lobbyists, while also being mindful of 
their own situation and the extent to which their activities fall within the ambit of their 
political masters. 
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Gerboth saw this politicalisation as the heart of accounting regulation. 
 
For decades economists have realised that income and wealth – concepts that are 
fundamental to accounting – are value judgments. That is, in accounting …, concepts 
of income and wealth are not descriptive, but normative; not objective, but 
subjective; and not unique, but manifold … A politicisation of accounting rule- 
making [is] not only inevitable, but just. In a society committed to democratic 
legitimisation of authority, only politically responsible institutions have the right to 
command others to obey their rules. 232 
 
 
Likewise Solomons discerned the political nature of accounting standards stating: 
 
Accounting can no longer be thought of as non-political. The numbers that 
accountants report have, or at least are widely thought to have, a significant impact 
on economic behavior. Accounting rules therefore affect human behavior. Hence, the 
process by which they are made is said to be political. It is then only a short step to 
the assertion that such rules are properly to be made in the political arena.233 
 
Accounting regulations not only impact on reported earnings and the financial 
positions of business entities, but also upon the demand for accounting services and 
the scope and construct of information disclosed to financial statement users. 
Accounting standards restrict the choice of accounting methods available to 
management and may force companies to report financial information in a form those 
companies would not have voluntarily chosen. Consequently, stakeholders who are 
affected by such regulations will seek to persuade the rule makers to write the rules to 
their advantage. 
 
Hines suggested that for a standard setting body to remain politically viable its 
processes must be seen to be, and be, neutral with participation not merely being 
symbolic, but carrying the responsibility to influence directly the process outcome. 
Irrespective of the diligence and expertise applied to the formation of accounting 
rules, conflicting views would create difficulties associated with reconciling neutrality 
with reality. Hines discerned from this dilemma that if accounting standards could not 
therefore be neutral, “the process that gave rise to the issue of regulations must, at 
least, be seen to be neutral instead, if the regulatory body was to remain politically 
viable.”234 
                                                 
232   Gerboth, D., (1973), “Research, Intuition and Politics in Accounting Inquiry”, The Accounting 
Review, July, Vol. 48, pp.475-482, In Hines, R., (1983), “Economic Consequences of Accounting 
Standards: A Good Reason for a Representative ASRB”, The Chartered Accountant in Australia, 
July, Vol. 54, pp.24-25. 
233  Solomons, D., (1978), “The Politicization of Accounting”, Journal of Accountancy, November, 
Vol. 146, p.69. 
234 Hines, R., (1983), “Economic Consequences of Accounting Standards: A Good Reason for a 
Representative ASRB”, The Chartered Accountant in Australia, July, Vol. 54, p.25. 
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6.2 Accounting Standard Setting in Australia - The Decision Makers 
 
Following the implementation of the new institutional arrangements for accounting 
standard setting in 2000 as a result of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program, 
(CLERP) the accounting standard setting function now resides with the AASB and its 
Urgent Issues Group who are overseen by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) 
whose duty is to monitor the operation of accounting standards to assess their 
continued relevance and effectiveness in meeting their objectives. 
 
Although the FRC was established to set the broad strategic direction for the AASB 
and monitor its performance, the enacted legislation did not grant the FRC the power 
to: 
 
 Direct the AASB in relation to the development or making of a particular 
standard 
 
 Veto a standard formulated and recommended by the AASB 
 
 
The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act (1999) reflected the 
government’s belief that accounting standards are essential to the maintenance of 
investor confidence in Australia’s capital markets and need to be closely aligned with 
major overseas capital markets in order for Australian business to be competitive in 
the global economy. Consequently, the AASB must have regard to the interests of 
Australian corporations, which raise or propose to raise capital in major international 
financial centres. The Act also specifies that the AASB conduct a cost/benefit analysis 
on all standards, though such an analysis, need not be undertaken in a scientific 
manner by quantifying each cost and benefit. Rather, the analysis could involve the 
production of an economic impact statement, which assesses its impact on users, 
preparers and the economy as a whole. 
 
Most regulations tabled in parliament come from government departments and reflect 
the implementation of government policy. Accounting standards are drafted by an 
appointed standard setting body, through delegated legislation, consisting of 
individuals selected from nominations made by relevant professional and industry 
bodies. Members of the AASB are appointed as individuals rather than as 
representatives of their nominating associations. The standards they draft need not 
reflect government policy. 
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More importantly however, parliament has not specified the procedures to be 
followed in rule making. Consequently the subordinate authority must proceed as it 
thinks best. It might adopt procedures that include the publication of working papers, 
the opportunity for notice and comment, consultation, and the taking of expert advice. 
The standard setting environment in Australia has incorporated these procedures and 
has developed much in line with the democratic procedures associated with Western 
policy making. 
 
6.3 Policy Making 
 
Policy making involves an authority that has to draw upon general considerations of a 
social, economic, or ethical kind in deciding an issue, where the decision is likely to 
affect a range of groups and interests. This means that different possible courses of 
action are available and that the policy maker has some freedom in deciding what to 
do. Some aspects of policy making are open and responsive to public participation, 
but many others are hidden from the public and resolved without reference to it. 
Public involvement is usually evoked through informal procedures and networks, 
which provide an arena for interest groups, who have generally been shown to play a 
vital role in policy making.   
 
Galligan suggests that the “main concern in deciding policy should be to act for the 
common good … while the interests and claims of individuals and groups are 
ingredients to be added to the cauldron of policy making, the final decision should 
reach beyond particular concerns to a broader sense of the interests of all.”235 This 
implies a duty of care to the participants premised upon standards of fair treatment, 
which is intrinsically bound within a notion of democratic participation. Ultimately, 
the desired outcome of an effective policy making process rests with its ability to be 
responsive to the community in general, and in particular to those affected.  
 
Principles of democratic participation suggest the need for: 
 
 Means for gaining information about what is proposed 
 
 Allowing those with an interest or concern to put their point of view and to have 
some influence on the outcome 
 
 Including processes by which the policy choice would be explained with 
reasons and facts 
                                                 
235  Galligan, op.cit.: p.455. 
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Procedures for making such policies cascade along a spectrum encompassing both 
rule making and trial type adjudication. Rule making procedures are based on giving 
notice of the terms of the proposed rule, including information about the material and 
the evidence relied on and inviting the public to make representations. Trial type 
procedures, on the other hand, incorporate parties, evidence, examination and 
argument, as is found within the adversary system, where the object is to settle the 
case in question.  
 
Accounting standard setting in Australia can be seen to contain an element of both 
rule making and trial type adjudication with the former generally consisting of an 
authority formulating the rules following public inquiry, to regulate an area of 
activity, and the latter argument and examination being an important part of that 
process. Idealistically, issues are then decided by considering the best course of action 
in the circumstances with attention given to considerations of a social and economic 
kind, where there is clearly no right answer, where opinions may sharply differ, and 
where a number of possible solutions might be both open and defensible. 
 
Two issues can be gleaned from the aforementioned. First, participation by interested 
parties is clearly one of the main values sought. However, views about the point and 
worth of participation are varied and divergent. Second, if the aim of policy is to 
achieve what is good for society as a whole, there are several different conceptions of 
what this means and what processes are suited to achieving it. Galligan suggests these 
issues can be resolved with reference to the following three normative models and 
their respective levels of community participation. 
 
6.3a Standard Model 
 
The first model of the common good is the one most likely to be evidenced in modern 
Western society. In its broadest sense, ‘for the common good’ carries the connotation 
that the policy maker defines the issue, examines the evidence and facts, identifies the 
different courses open, and then decides as appears best for the overall good. The 
good of the community is the governing criterion, not simply the policy maker’s view 
of what is good, but that the policy maker will be guided by a framework of values 
which incorporates rationality, coherency and consistency along with being reasoned 
and reasonable in light of values specific to the community.  
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This model accepts that people of goodwill may still disagree on what should be done 
and consequently a decision by someone in authority is essential. The role of 
procedures in this model is to provide a structured process that enables opinions and 
interests to be revealed through participation and involvement but which ultimately 
must ensure that the official makes a decision which best advances the common good. 
 
6.3b   Competing Interests Model 
 
 
This second model narrows ‘for the common good’ to mean the accommodation of 
conflicting interests and choosing the outcome that best satisfies those competing 
interests. This image of competing interests represents a major approach to policy 
making which has found significant acceptance and implementation throughout the 
West. Galligan suggests this to be the least attractive model as “the result is that either 
the more powerful interests prevail or the decision maker covertly appeals to some 
external principle.”236 
 
6.3c  The Consensus Model 
 
This approach, while incorporating the aforementioned competing interests model, 
goes beyond merely embracing the interest of those affected. It is premised on the 
belief that “members of a society should be able to agree on what the common good 
requires … through procedures which encourage discussion, are open and transparent, 
and within which popular participation is given special importance can be utilised to 
determine the common good.”237 Through a construct of proceduralism and strong 
democracy, “people can reach a higher level of understanding and tolerance; they can 
also grasp a full understanding of the social order within which their own interests are 
important but not dominant.”238  
 
This imagery of policy making through consensus draws upon a notion of citizenship 
that goes beyond self-interest; that through participation, through hearing the other 
side, and through debate, citizens develop a sense of the good of all. The role of 
procedures involved within this model is inextricably and indispensably linked to the 
process of reaching agreement. Agreement on the outcome demands the participation 
                                                 
236  ibid.:  p.469. 
237  ibid.:  p.467. 
238  ibid. 
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of citizens hence participatory procedures are essential to achieving the common 
good. This sense of seeking the common good through agreement appeals to noble 
ideas. It has a vision of participatory democracy and citizenship, yet its dependence 
upon the momentary consensus of shifting alliances identifies its overwhelming 
weakness, its naïve idealism. 
 
The standard model appears to provide the most attractive and realistic model. 
Realistic, in the sense that, policy makers, in practice, do try to justify their decisions 
by appeal to the common good and attractive, because it acknowledges that final 
agreement may be impossible and that a decision will have to be made by someone in 
authority.  
 
Utilising this premise the task becomes one of considering how groups and 
individuals should be treated in the policy making environment and how their input is 
incorporated as part of the policy forming process. A good starting point begins with 
the writings of Jeremy Bentham239 who identified the relationship between 
procedures, outcomes and values. He suggested that procedures are there to produce 
accurate outcomes. Accurate outcomes mean the correct application of the law to the 
facts with accurate outcomes important because they mean upholding social values, 
the values inherent within the substantive law and the value in stability through 
regular and consistent application of the law. It is important here because it suggests a 
clear, precise and regimented process, which can be readily and easily applied; but 
does it, or can it, capture the true nature of due process? 
 
6.4      The Due Process as applied to Accounting Standard Setting 
 
By the late twentieth century the simple idea that fair treatment requires fair 
procedures had been transformed into a dynamic principle with special significance in 
administrative contexts. An explosion of administrative government was coupled with 
the delegation of extensive authority to administrative bodies.  
 
                                                 
239   Galligan, op.cit.: p.11, See: Twining, W., (1986), Theories of Evidence: Bentham and Wigmore, 
London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson. 
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The term natural justice has been replaced by the more general term procedural 
fairness to be applied across a spectrum of administrative processes, with its precise 
content to be determined in each context.  Governing statutes, for the most part, made 
no reference to due process and rarely laid down procedures to follow. Overall, 
procedures varied greatly and were mostly informal in nature, “unconstrained by the 
rules of evidence, and altogether unlike those of a court of law.”240  
 
Policy Statement 1: ‘The Development of Statements of Accounting Concepts and 
Accounting Standards’241 prepared by the AASB documents the procedures for 
standard setting in Australia. Contained within is the due process, which is deemed to 
accommodate community participation within the process. Figure 6.1 documents 
these procedures.  
Figure 6.1 Procedures for the Development of Accounting Concepts and 
Accounting Standards in Australia 
 
                                                 
240  Galligan, op.cit.: p.181. 
241  Australian Accounting Research Foundation, (1993), The Development of Statements of 
Accounting Concepts and Accounting Standards, Policy Statement 1, Melbourne, Victorian 
Printing.  
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Miller suggests the above due process illustrates the PSASB’s commitment to public 
exposure.242 Ryan et al saw it as “the means by which standard setters acquire 
knowledge about economic consequences and conceptual problems from constituents, 
without serving the private interests of constituents.”243  
 
6.4a Who are the participants in this system? 
 
Generally, lobbying through responses is undertaken to establish a dialogue with 
those in power, with a view to either raising the general level of awareness of the 
issues involved and changing attitudes, or else achieving a specific and limited 
objective. In this context, considerable research activity has been undertaken aimed at 
identifying incentives which may motivate lobbying behaviour.244   
 
Historically, two models of lobbying behaviour have emerged. The first of these, 
which has been labelled the Economics of Regulation, is founded on the works of 
Stigler245 and is premised upon the view that regulations benefit those being 
regulated. Hence, firms falling under the regulatory umbrella will attempt to influence 
the regulatory process to an extent that will enable them to either maintain or improve 
their wealth position. In the traditional economic sense, this is often accomplished by 
influencing regulators to interpose barriers of entry to regulated industries. 
 
                                                 
242  Miller, M., (1995), “The Credibility of Australian Financial Reporting: Are Co-Regulation 
Arrangements Working?”, Australian Accounting Review, Vol. 5, No. 21, pp.3-16. 
243  Ryan, C., Dunstan, K., and T. Stanley, (2000), “Local Government Accounting Standard Setting in 
Australia: Did Constituents Participate?”, Financial Accountability and Management, Vol. 16, No. 
4, November, p.373. 
244  See: Morris, R.D., (1986), “Lobbying on Proposed Accounting Standards”, The Chartered    
Accountant in Australia, March, pp. 46-51; Watts, R.L. and J.L. Zimmerman, (1986), Positive 
Accounting Theory, New Jersey: Prentice Hall International; Deegan, C., Morris, R.D., and D. 
Stokes, (1988), “Audit Firm Lobbying on Proposed Disclosure Requirements”, University of New 
South Wales, School of Accounting - Working Paper, No 78; MacArthur, J.B., (1988), “An 
Analysis of the Content of Corporate Submissions on Proposed Accounting Standards in the UK”, 
Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 18, No. 71, pp.213-226. 
245  Stigler, G.J., (1971), The Theory of Economic Regulation, Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science, Spring, pp.3-21. 
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The second and more popular model of lobbying behaviour commonly referred to as 
the Theory of Economic Consequences is premised on the works of Watts and 
Zimmerman.246 It is premised on much of the agency theory of Jensen and Meckling 
who defined the agency relationship as a “contract under which one or more persons 
[the principal(s)] engage another person [the agent] to perform some service on their 
behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent.”247 
 
The underlying precept is that accounting numbers are used in contracts entered into 
between firm owners, management and stockholders and find significance in the 
derivation of income. For instance, if management's choice of accounting technique 
had no influence on the cash flows of a firm, nor therefore on the wealth distribution 
between parties to the firm, then management would be indifferent to such choices. 
Unfortunately however, given the existence of bonding and monitoring costs 
associated with obtaining congruence between agents and their principals, arising 
from the separation of resource ownership from control, accounting selection may 
impact significantly on the arrangements between firm constituents. 
 
Huang and Tower noted the basic premise underlying economic theories is “that 
individuals act in both a rational and utility-maximising manner,” concluding that an 
individual’s “acceptance or rejection of any form of regulation (accounting or 
otherwise) is dependent on whether the regulation is relatively more beneficial or 
costly to them.”248 When a regulatory body acts to either impose or preclude the use 
of available accounting rules or regulations, it introduces a constraint into the 
contracting process that also decreases the efficiency and range of available choices of 
that process. Consequently, changes to accounting rules and regulations, which impact 
upon income, would be avoided by those who viewed the impact negatively, and 
conversely, supported by those perceiving it to be beneficial. 
 
                                                 
246  Watts, R.L. and J.L. Zimmerman, (1981), “Auditors and the Determination of Accounting 
Standards”, University of Rochester Working Paper. 
 
247  Jensen, M., and W. Meckling, (1976), “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, p.308. 
248  Huang, S.J. and G. Tower, (1994), “A Power Analysis of the Development of the Differential 
Reporting Statement (SAC1)”, Murdoch University Working Paper, p.5. 
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Tower and Kelly believed self-interest explained the lobbying efforts of different 
interest groups, arguing that the standard setting process derived from the complex 
interactions between numerous interested parties, each of who had different objectives 
and acted in their own self-interest to obtain the most beneficial accounting standards. 
Overall, they found agency theory offered only limited usefulness in delineating the 
processes and role of the standard setting mechanism, reaching the conclusion that 
“agency theory offers only partial insights into possible motivations underlying 
observed behaviour [and] that it fails to provide a holistic explanation of the 
accounting standard setting process.”249 They based their conclusions upon the 
unrealistic assumptions inherent within agency theory such as the existence of a 
perfectly competitive market equilibrium and the efficient market hypothesis which 
were generally assumed by agency theorists rather than demonstrated.  
 
 
6.4b Focus of Participant Input 
 
Given the self-interest nexus between changes to the available basket of accounting 
choices and wealth in terms of the accrued benefits or costs underpinning these 
theories, it may be possible to assume a negativity of response associated with the 
majority of submissions and lobbying to regulatory bodies. One study on this issue, 
pertaining to company lobbying in the private sector, by Gavens, Carnegie and 
Gibson, investigated whether responses to proposed accounting standards were 
prompted by disagreement, and found 58 per cent of survey respondents were always 
motivated to submit on the basis of disagreement with all or part of regulatory 
proposals. These authors point out: 
 
Evidence that company responses are strongly motivated by disagreement would 
suggest [those] responses [were] likely to be critical of the proposal. The submissions 
may therefore constitute a biased assessment of the more generally held views of the 
business community about the exposure draft. They are therefore likely to have a 
biased impact on the outcome.250 
 
 
                                                 
249  Tower, G., and M. Kelly, (1989), “The Financial Accounting Standard Setting Process: An Agency 
Theory Perspective”, Massey University Discussion Paper No. 94, June, p.1. 
250  Gavens, J.J., Carnegie, G.D. and R.W. Gibson, (1989), “Company Participation in the Australian 
Standard Setting Process”, Accounting and Finance, November, Vol. 29, p.52. 
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A survey undertaken by Hurst251 in 1994, asked local government submitters to the 
due process on ED50 when they would be more likely to make a submission. Results 
confirm the bias towards negativity. The results can be seen in Table 6.1 below. 
 
Table 6.1 ED50: General Reasons for Submitting   Yes No 
Full support for a proposal        13 15 
Support for only specific issues contained in the proposal    21 12 
(and passive acceptance of the other proposals) 
Disagreement with only specific issues contained in the proposal   47        3 
(and passive acceptance of the other proposals)               
Total disagreement with a proposal       30  3 
 
Apart from these possible bias inferences, Gavens et al also found support for the 
proposition that “larger companies participated to a greater extent than small 
companies in the accounting standard setting process”252 with the participation being 
evidenced by both the greater receipt of exposure drafts and submission of comments 
by those larger companies. 
 
In an evaluation of the corporate lobbying undertaken, Morris identified two major 
observable traits. First, companies that lobbied using formal submissions 
systematically differed from those that did not submit. Second, amongst corporate 
submitters those favouring a proposed standard differed systematically from those 
which opposed it. Morris concluded that, “standard setters are not receiving an 
unbiased sample of corporate submissions.”253  This raises some concern, to the 
extent that the standard setting bodies are responsive to submissions on exposure 
drafts and their consequent influence in the development of accounting standards. 
Gavens et al believed this “apparent bias may also adversely affect the ability of the 
standard setters to produce standards which will provide decision-useful information 
to all entities,” due to being “unaware of the extent to which non respondents may 
agree with the proposed standard.”254  
 
                                                 
251   Hurst, G., (1994), Survey of Local Government Submitters to ED50, Unpublished. 
252  Gavens et al, op.cit.: p.56. 
253  Morris, op.cit.: p.48. 
254  Gavens et al, op.cit.: p.57. 
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This problem could be further exacerbated to the extent that personal opinions in the 
form of submissions may filter into the regulatory process on official organisational 
letterheads, which without investigation may induce a further perceptual bias into the 
review process. For instance, Coombes and Stokes inferred that responses expressed 
the organisational view and not that of the individual signatory to the submission on 
the grounds that “many stated explicitly that the exposure drafts had been considered 
by several executives within their organization.”255 The further studies by Dhaliwal 
and Kelly also assumed the overall corporate management facade of submissions as 
opposed to considering the possibility of divergence between the signatory author and 
the corporate organisation.256 
 
Currie, Robinson and Walker examined several hundred submissions to the Australian 
standard setter, identifying that corporate accountants signed the majority of corporate 
submissions. They concluded that, “until the contrary is demonstrated, it seems 
inappropriate to assume that the views of corporate accountants coincide with the 
views of other managers.”257  
 
Aside from this possible biased perception of submissions, the standard setter also 
faces the difficulty of determining the representative distribution of those submissions 
received. For example, ED50 issued in 1989 elicited one hundred and fifty-four 
written submissions, which was at that date the most received. However, this 
represented only approximately 14 per cent of the total available local government 
council population around the time of submission.  
 
Table 6.2 presents a cross sectional view of the number of submissions received by 
the AARF on a number of exposure drafts leading up to the issue of AAS27 in 1993. 
                                                 
255  Coombes, R.J. and D.J. Stokes, (1985), “Standard-setters’ Responsiveness to Submissions on 
Exposure Drafts: Australian Evidence”, Australian Journal of Management, December, Vol. 10, 
p.36. 
256  See: Dhaliwal, D.S., “Some Economic Determinants of Management Lobbying for Alternative 
Methods of Accounting: Evidence from the Accounting for Interest Costs Issue”, Journal of 
Business Finance and Accounting, Summer, 1982, pp.255-265; Kelly, L., “Corporate Management 
Lobbying on FAS No. 8: Some Further Evidence”, Journal of Accounting Research, Autumn 
1985, pp.6l9-632; Kelly, L., “Corporate Lobbying and Changes in Financing or Operating 
Activities in Reaction to FAS No. 8”, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy , Winter 1982, 
pp.153-173. 
257  Currie, C., Robinson, P. and R.G. Walker, (1987), “Political Activity and the Regulation of 
Accounting: Gaps in the Literature”, University of New South Wales - School of Accountancy 
Working Paper, No. 72, p.23. 
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Table 6.2 Number of Submissions to Earlier Exposure Drafts 
 
Exposure 
Draft 
Exposure Draft Title Applicable 
Standard 
No. Issued Sub. 
Equity Method of Accounting for Investments AAS14 12 Jul-79 57 
Accounting for Revaluation of Tangible Fixed Assets and 
Investments in the Context of Historical Cost Accounting 
AAS10 14 Sep-79 29 
Statement of Sources & Application of Funds AAS12 16 Aug-80 46 
Accounting for Leveraged Leases by Lessors  18 Jan-81 14 
Accounting for Construction Contracts AAS11 20 Apr-82 21 
Accounting for Research & Development Costs AAS13 21 May-82 25 
Accounting for Goodwill AAS18 23 May-83 50 
Foreign Currency Translation AAS20 24 Sep-83 40 
Accounting for the Acquisition of Assets AAS21 29 Mar-85 17 
Proposed Amendment of Accounting Standard AAS 12 and 
Approved Accounting Standard ASRB 1007 to Require 
Disclosure of Cash Flows from Operations 
AAS12 
AAS28 
37 Jul-86 30 
Accounting for Defined Benefits Superannuation Plans AAS25 38 Nov-86 
Accounting for Defined Contribution Superannuation Plans AAS25 39 Nov-86 
38 
Consolidated Financial Statements AAS24 40 Jun-87 40 
Related Part Disclosures AAS22 41  28 
Proposed Statements of Accounting Concepts (Series 1) 
-    Objective of Financial Reporting 
-    Qualitative Characteristics of Financial Statements 
-    Definition and Recognition of Assets 
-    Definition and Recognition of Liabilities 
 
SAC2 
SAC3 
SAC4 
SAC4 
42 Dec-87 51 
Financial Reporting of General Insurance Activities AAS26 43 Dec-87 51 
Extinguishment of Debt AAS23 44 Apr-88 62 
Proposed Statements of Accounting Concepts (Series 2) 
-    Definition of a Reporting Period 
-    Definition and Recognition of Expenses 
 
SAC1 
SAC4 
46 
46(A) 
46(B) 
Apr-88 28 
Consideration by the ASRB of Accounting Standards 
 1, 2, 3, 4, & 7 for Interim Approval and Certain Proposed 
amendments to such Standards 
AAS1 
AAS2 
AAS3 
AAS4 
AAS7 
47 Jan-89 95 
Proposed Statement of Policy on Differential Reporting APS1 48 Jan-89 131 
Accounting for Identifiable Intangible Assets  49 Oct-90 117 
Financial Reporting By Local Government AAS27 50 Nov-89 154 
Statement of Cash Flow AAS28 52 May-91 58 
Accounting for Employee Benefits  53 Aug-91 22 
Calculation and Disclosure of Earnings Per Share AASB1027 54 Dec-91 32 
Financial Reporting by Government Departments AAS29 55 Jan-92 46 
Present Procedures for the Development of Statements of 
Accounting Concepts and Accounting Standards 
 57 Mar-93 46 
Interim Financial Reporting  58 Mar-93 31 
 
Notwithstanding the possibility of simple ignorance, of either proposals or their 
implications, Currie et al suggest that low participation may have emanated from an 
association between the level of responses and the publicity given to a proposed 
standard, or that responses may have been influenced by the procedural aspects 
utilised by the standard setter to publicise new proposals.258  For example, invitations 
                                                 
258  ibid.: p.21. 
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to respond to new or existing proposals are generally dispatched according to the 
existing mailing lists of subscribers, interested parties and previous respondents, 
which are maintained by the regulatory bodies. Generally, there is a three-month 
response period that is preceded by a moderate level of advertising, which usually 
entails some extent of professional journal coverage. Currie et al suggest that such 
procedures “are targeted at a limited sub-set of potentially-interested parties” and if so 
may “partly explain the low level of participation from consumers rather than 
producers of accounting information.”259 
 
Morris260 identified four reasons why the incentives to participate are perceived to be 
low for individuals and entities. First, there are the comparatively high costs borne by 
entities or individuals as part of keeping informed and aware of a proposed standard. 
As these often entail detailed relationships between the proposal itself and other 
standards, potential lobbyists do not acquaint themselves with the full spectrum of a 
proposed standard. 
 
Second, a potential participant will refrain from participating if it is perceived that 
their efforts will be fruitless. Currie et al support this by suggesting that potential 
submitters may be dispirited in submitting as a result of their perceptions upon the 
amount of attention paid to previous submissions and perhaps the extent to which they 
view the regulatory body as being dominated by certain interest groups such as the 
major accounting firms. 
 
By use of a survey of respondents to selected exposure drafts, Sims261 attempted to 
discern the level of communication, that took place between the lobbyists and the 
standard setter after written submissions were made and more importantly the 
feedback, or extent to which lobbyists perceived the regulators had given serious 
consideration to their submission. Table 6.3 details the questionnaire responses to the 
level of feedback received by the submitters of the Sims survey. 
 
                                                 
259  ibid.: p.22. 
260  Morris, op.cit.: p.46. 
261  Sims, M., (1993), “Will ED57 Improve Accounting Standard Setting in Australia?”, Charles Sturt 
University Working Paper. 
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Table  6.3 Submitter Response to Feedback on Submission 
 
IMAGE REMOVED DUE TO COPYRIGHT 
 
 Source: Sims, M. A., (1993), "Will ED57 improve Accounting Standard Setting in Australia?”p.8. 
 
Interestingly, while Sims found that 93 per cent of the ninety survey respondents 
failed to receive a summary of the submissions or any feedback on their own 
submissions besides an acknowledgment letter, 55 per cent were confident their 
submission had been given serious consideration, although serious consideration was 
not defined within the survey instrument. Survey respondents were also able to 
identify some correlation between the proposals of their submission and an 
identifiable change made in the issued standard based upon changes that paralleled 
suggestions they had made in their submission. Some of the more typical comments 
noted by Sims and frequencies thereof:262 
 
 The standard reflected my/our suggestions. (11)  
 
 I would like to think my submission received serious consideration. (4)  
 
Of the 45 per cent of submitters who were either unsure or believed no serious 
consideration was given to their submissions, Sims likewise noted some 
representative responses.263  
 
 I am a small fish in a big pond.  
 
 My views are too radical.  
 
 The problem I pointed out was not rectified.  
 
 
 I think the AARF had made up their mind before the issue of ED.  
 
Hurst achieved almost identical results with his local government survey results. 
When asked whether they received any direct communication regarding the content of 
their submission in addition to an acknowledgment letter, 93 per cent of the sixty 
responses were answered in the negative. See Table 6.12 on page 136. 
                                                 
262    Sims, op.cit.: p.9. 
263    ibid. 
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When then asked whether they thought their individual submission received serious 
consideration, 49 per cent answered negatively with 25.5 per cent unsure while the 
remaining 25.5 per cent indicated yes. See Table 6.13 on page 136. 
 
Similar results, as shown in Table 6.4, were achieved when respondents were asked to 
consider whether they believed the AARF and the AASB took due notice of the 
submissions of local government bodies when setting AAS27. 
 
Table 6.4 Due Notice Given to Submissions from Local Government 
Yes 15
No 31
Unsure 17              
 
Yes
24%
No
49%
Unsure
27%
 
 
In this respect several of these comments are pertinent to this argument and have been 
reproduced hereunder: 
 
 We believe the agenda was predetermined. 
 
 The length of time allocated for submission to be made was short and gave the 
impression that they were either hoping not to receive any or were not going to 
give credence to any received. 
 
 It was generally thought that the new accounting standard would be introduced 
irrespective of anything raised by councils. 
 
 Discussions with accountants close to AARF indicate that the AARF took no 
notice of any submission presented. 
 
 The decision was made well before councils were asked. 
 
 Obvious from their publications, public comments and meetings that they had 
already made up their mind as to the result. We were just part of the process 
they had to go through. 
 
 No attempt was made to correspond with interest groups. Impression given by 
politicians that ED50 was ‘fait accompli’. 
 
 A lack of local government representation on the review body. 
 
 They have gone their own way and taken no notice of our concerns. 
 
 There is an increasing push for standards Australia wide by the bureaucrats in 
Canberra and their covert operations (viz. AARF). 
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Overall, however, the lack of actual feedback may have distorted respondent 
perceptions to the extent that feedback silence was seen to constitute a lack of 
consideration and interest for the submissions from local government. Several 
comments alluded to this feeling:  
 
 No evidence to suggest that it [the AARF] did consider the submission 
 
 No feedback - appeared not to influence where they had already decided to go 
 
 No response or debate on issues raised by council 
 
 AARF doesn’t like to bend. I’m not sure where their great knowledge and 
wisdom comes from. 
 
Third, Morris alludes to the problems associated with the free riding of non-
participants who share the benefits, without cost, obtained by those who do lobby. 
Given the absence of any cost sharing mechanism between the participant and the free 
rider, there is no incentive for the free rider to contribute to the participant’s costs. 
Consequently, some potential participants might refrain from lobbying if it is 
anticipated that the total expected benefits to be received exceed the costs of lobbying 
which are borne alone. 
 
Fourth, participation is neither compulsory nor are there penalties associated with not 
lobbying. Avenues of non-compliance with standards do exist, even though there is 
the risk of a qualified audit report and the associated consequences of the 
Corporations Act (2001). Sutton264 argued in this respect that “raising (lowering) the 
cost of non-compliance will increase (reduce) the level of producer lobbying.” The 
greater the cost associated with non-compliance, the greater the benefits that would 
flow to the lobbyist from securing a preferred proposal. 
 
Sutton also suggested that financial statement preparers were more likely to 
participate than the users or consumers of such statements, as the potential economic 
outcomes that flowed to the preparer from securing a preferred proposal were greater 
in absolute terms. His argument was premised on the basis that the preparer was likely 
to be wealthier than the user or consumer. Even if not, with the exception of 
comprehensively diversified companies, they usually drew their income from fewer 
sources. Hence, this lack of diversification rendered the preparer of financial 
                                                 
264  Sutton, T.G., (1984),  “Lobbying of Accounting Standard Setting Bodies in the UK and the USA: 
A Downsian  Analysis”, Accounting, Organizations and  Society, No.1, p.93. 
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statements more vulnerable to any adverse economic consequences associated with a 
proposed standard. Sutton also inferred from this that undiversified producers of 
financial statements were more likely to lobby than diversified producers. 
 
6.4c Participant Influence 
 
Sutton believed that by observing participant behaviour, conclusions could be drawn 
concerning the perceived benefits and costs of using certain techniques and channels. 
His preferred method of lobbying encompassed private, more direct discussions and 
meetings with the regulators, which were viewed in terms of cost as being most 
effective with a high probability of influencing the regulator's opinions. Other less 
direct methods, such as appeals to parliament or to professional accounting bodies, 
were viewed as costlier, although perceived to be more effective than indirect 
methods such as sending written submissions or oral testimony at public meetings. 
 
Sutton also examined the relationship between the timing and methods used to lobby, 
finding them to be inextricably linked.  Lobbying, he suggested, was more likely to be 
effective while the regulator’s preferences were still unresolved, arguing that the 
regulatory body would be more conducive to influence during that period where their 
views were crystallising, rather than at the point of exposure draft issue which 
reflected their collective views. He also suggested that benefits might have accrued to 
the lobbyists if their lobbying behaviour was not perceived as such by the regulators. 
The difficulty of obtaining evidence of direct lobbying activity, given it is not 
observable by most researchers, has led to the majority of studies being premised on 
written submissions and inferences drawn from the influence those submissions had. 
 
Findings by Haring,265 who utilised survey data obtained from the FASB to 
investigate their selection choice of accounting rules, identified several issues 
concerning the influence for lobbying. The FASB did not in general appear responsive 
to business interests; rather final support for a regulation varied inversely with the 
strength of business preferences.  
                                                 
265  Haring, J.R., (1979), “Accounting Rules and the Accounting Establishment”, Journal of Business, 
October, pp.507-519. 
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Haring’s analysis indicated that FASB support for a rule varied directly and 
significantly with the strength of the FASB’s sponsoring organisations and accounting 
firm preferences, concluding that it should not be surprising that accounting rules 
adopted should tend to be those that accountants want adopted. 
 
In contrast, findings from a study by Coombes and Stokes,266 which utilised the 
content of written submissions on Australian exposure drafts in order to measure the 
responsiveness of the accounting profession to the written submissions of 
respondents, suggested that the regulator had released standards consistent with the 
majority view of respondents and that the content of standards did not appear aligned 
to the preferred view of any particular interest group. They did however acknowledge 
the extent to which their evidence was incomplete due to the difficulty in obtaining 
certain lobbying evidence. Specifically, the views of the individual committee 
members of the AARF, ASA and ICAA were not adequately documented. Committee 
voting patterns were not recorded and it was impossible to consider the written and 
oral submissions that occurred outside the formal channels created by the AARF. 
Difficulties associated with drawing conclusions from written submissions were also 
identified by Puro who noted that, “Lobbying behaviour in general is complex and 
regularities in participants’ behaviour are not easily determined.”267  
 
Hope and Gray268 also discerned the inadequacy of utilising written submissions with 
the subsequent revelation by the regulator that representations not contained within 
the written submission had influenced the final decision taken. Currie et al269 not only 
questioned the adequacy of written submissions as a source of lobbying evidence on 
specific issues but also doubted whether submission documents constituted an 
effective form of lobbying, at least to members of the standard setting agencies. This 
view was supported by Brown270 who suggested that the AARF’s review and 
evaluative process centred around staff-generated analysis rather than a thorough 
perusal and reading of the submissions by regulatory committee members.  
                                                 
266  Coombes and Stokes, op.cit.: pp.31-45. 
267  Puro, M., (1984), “Audit Firm Lobbying Before the Financial Accounting Standards Board: An 
Empirical Study”, Journal of Accounting Research, Autumn 4, p.624. 
268  Hope, T. and R. Gray, (1982)“Power and Policy Making: The Development of an R & D 
Standard”, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Winter, pp.531-558. 
269  Currie et al, op.cit.: p.7. 
270  Brown, P.R., (1982), “FASB Responsiveness to Corporate Input”, Journal of Accounting, Auditing 
and Finance, Summer, pp.282-290. 
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The inference being, that while written submissions may have some influence over the 
preparation and content of regulatory staff-induced summarisations, they may have 
significantly less impact with actual committee members who may only see selected 
summaries and a refined selection of actual submissions. If there is, as Currie et al 
suggests, a reliance on regulatory staff to summarise submissions or, “to highlight 
those submissions which advance the main arguments for or against particular 
proposals,”271 the extent to which their personal reflections permeate the summary 
may have serious consequential effects on the lobbing influence of written 
submissions. In this respect, the AARF ED50 Response Summary document drew to 
the attention of PSASB members some twenty-six submissions of particular interest 
from the one hundred and fifty-four received. Table 6.5 identifies those submissions 
of particular interest and compares these with the total submissions received.  
 
LOCAL LOCAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT
GOVERNMENT AUDITOR GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OTHER TOTAL
DEPARTMENTS GENERAL REPRESENTATIVE URBAN RURAL FIRMS 
GROUP
4 1 6 5 4 3 3 26
Table 6.5        AARF SUBMISSIONS IDENTIFIED AS BEING OF PARTICULAR INTEREST 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 
10 
20 
30 
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80 
SUBMISSIONS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST COMPARED TO TOTAL SUBMISSIONS 
 
 
Legend  Particular Total 
  Interest Submitted 
1 Local Government Departments 4 4 
2 Auditor-General Departments 1 4 
3 Local Government Represent. Group 6 15 
4 Local Government: Urban 5 31 
5 Local Government: Rural 4 73 
6 Accounting Firms 3 5 
7 Other 3 22 
       
                                                 
271  Currie et al, op.cit.: pp.10-11. 
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What is most interesting is that although 68 per cent, or one hundred and four 
submissions, of the total submissions emanated from local government, only 21 per 
cent, or nine, were considered to offer any significant input. When split between 
urban and rural councils, this indicates that although seventy-three rural councils 
submitted, only four were considered significant, yet of the five accounting firm 
submissions, 60 per cent or three were accorded special attention for PSASB 
members. 
 
There are a multitude of reasons why the task of reviewing submissions could be 
fraught with difficulty, with the vagueness of responses being not the least. 
Ultimately, these difficulties will be compounded by the inability of the summariser to 
discern several issues from the one paragraph, and to quantify meaningfully 
submitters' responses without biasing them with inferences drawn due to the lack of 
submissions not covering or commenting on the full range of issues.  
 
Coombes and Stokes,272 for instance, weighted each submission equally for the 
purposes of analysis, suggesting that an “alternative weighting scheme would have 
introduced an unacceptable level of subjectivity.” Tutticci, Dunstan and Holmes273 
offered objectivity as the defence for counting submissions as votes, as opposed to 
any qualitative analysis involving researcher judgment. 
 
Puro274 and Brown275 identified specific policy issues from within each exposure draft 
and then analysed each submission relative to its preference for the identified policy 
issues, and subsequently compared these with the final standard. Puro argued that it 
was more appropriate to base the analysis on single substantive issues as opposed to 
discerning an overall response to an exposure draft, as respondents often supported 
parts of an exposure draft, while either remaining silent about or opposing other parts. 
 
                                                 
272  Coombes and Stokes, op.cit.: p.36.  
273  Tutticci, I., Dunstan, K. and S. Holmes, (1994), “Respondent Lobbying in the Australian 
Accounting Standard-setting Process: ED49. A Case Study”, Accounting Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, Vol. 7, p.91. 
 
274  Puro, op.cit.: pp.624-626. 
275  Brown, op.cit.: pp.282-290. 
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Francis276 criticised the one issue, one vote approach as perhaps not being truly 
representative of the lobbyist’s overall position; suggesting that single issue 
considerations might fail to reflect the holistic overview of the submitter’s self- 
interest. Currie et al saw the concept of one submission as one vote being contentious 
to the extent it neither differentiated between expressions of arguments and reactions 
contained within the submissions, nor considered the relevance of any supporting 
arguments. More important, however, was their concern with the possibility that the 
regulatory body was perhaps responding more to votes per se, than to a thorough 
critique of the underlying arguments contained within submissions. “The tallying 
process necessarily involves the adoption of some major assumptions, the choice of 
which may have a significant effect on the findings.”277  
 
For instance, the AARF summary on ED50 broke responses down into the following 
categories, based upon selective principles and relevant ED paragraphs. 
 Supported 
 
 Supported, but concern about implementation 
 
 Supported, with some exceptions/concerns 
 
 Sub-Total: supported in some way 
 
 Rejected 
 
 No clear view expressed 
 
Overall, the use of such categories lends itself to the individual subjectivity of the 
preparer who in this instance was an employee of the AARF. The preferred course of 
action would be a more thorough examination of the actual submission text, a course 
Currie et al considered difficult, although “subjective judgments could be attained by 
comparing respondents’ comments with their subsequent behaviour.”278 
 
Tutticci et al279 established that a more thorough analysis of the content of 
respondents’ positions was required if submissions were to be viewed as providing 
persuasion in excess of casting votes, citing findings by Brown and Sutton which 
suggested lobby opportunities in excess of purely vote casting. By adopting a method 
of content analysis based on the form oriented procedures developed by O’Keefe, 
                                                 
276  Francis, J.R., (1987), “Lobbying against Proposed Accounting Standards: The Case of Employers 
Pension Accounting”, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 6, pp.35-57.     
277  Currie et al, op.cit.: p.12. 
278  Currie et al, op.cit.: p.25. 
279  Tutticci et al, op.cit.: pp.86-104. 
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Soloman and MacArthur they concluded that respondents presented “varying 
positions on different issues within” their submissions.280 Huang and Tower applied a 
similar content analysis method as used by Tutticci, together with probit analysis, in 
an attempt to recognise the different preference intensities of respondents, finding that 
respondent views were influential on the regulatory body.281  
 
Tutticci et al suggested that the subsequent withdrawal of ED49 might have been the 
result of the considerable reaction to the proposed standard from the one hundred and 
eighteen submissions. However, it was “not possible to draw a causal relationship in 
this instance owing to the impact of other factors not addressed ... for example, the 
extent of informal lobbying undertaken and the impact of progress in the international 
accounting standard setting arena.”282 This view was supported by a subsequent 
media release by the AASB and PSASB in March 1992, noting that “in view of the 
lack of consensus on the subject at national and international level, the boards are not 
currently proceeding with the issuance of an accounting standard based on Exposure 
Draft 49.”283 These findings suggest that previous studies may have either overstated 
or understated the importance of certain respondent’s lobbying positions, to the extent 
they failed to consider persuasion in excess of vote tallying. 
 
To some extent there is an argument associated with the concept of organised 
lobbying which suggests an occurrence of favourable outcomes such as the success of 
full cost oil and gas exploration companies in the overturn of FAS19 and to a lesser 
extent the revision to FAS8 on Foreign Currency Translation. These were both 
examples of post-exposure draft lobbying. Recent studies by Carnegie and West, and 
Ryan et al, indicate that some constituents “have had favourable access to the 
process.”284 One such notable approach in this respect is the provision of information 
by the lobbyist to the regulatory body, which discreetly supports the lobbyist’s 
position. 
                                                 
280  ibid.: p.102, See: O’Keefe, T.B. and S.Y. Soloman, (1985), “Do Managers believe the Efficient 
market Hypothesis?”, Accounting and Business Research, Spring, pp.67-79; MacArthur, J.B., 
(1988), “An Analysis of the Content of Corporate Submissions on Proposed Accounting Standards 
in the UK”, Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 18, No. 71, pp. 213-226. 
281  Huang, S.J. and G. Tower. op.cit.: pp.1-24. 
282  Tutticci et al, op.cit.: p.103. 
283  ibid.: p.88. 
284  Ryan et al, op.cit.: p.374, See: Carnegie, G. and B. West, (1997), “Observing the PSASB; ED50 
and the Recognition of Infrastructure Assets”, Australian Accounting Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp.30-
39. 
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While pre-exposure draft lobbying by organised respondents is less well documented, 
this may be more so by design than accident. Sutton, for example, suggests that 
lobbyists “conceal their sponsorship of information supplied to the rule making body 
not simply because they do not wish to invite counter-argument.”285 Rather, the 
regulatory body will attach a lesser value to it once it perceives the acquired 
information is subsidised. Hence, “the lobbyist must increase the supply of such 
information for it to have the same impact as undiscounted information.”286  
 
Currie et al287 proposed that respondents would attempt to conceal any such collusion 
if it considered that the regulatory body would discount organised submissions. 
Moreover, such a campaign, if sufficiently camouflaged, may fail to be detected by 
either the researcher who relies on the responses or the regulatory body. 
 
6.5 Outcomes of the Due Process - Case Study: ED50 to AAS27: Financial  
Reporting by Local Governments 
 
Change in local government was fuelled by the development of a conceptual 
framework for financial reporting in the private and public sectors and specifically by 
the release of Discussion Paper 12 issued in 1988 and by the release of ED50 in 1989. 
ED50 set out proposed standards for the form and content of general purpose financial 
reports of local governments. The intent of these documents being the implementation 
of private sector accounting reporting practices by local government, which was 
subsequently embodied within AAS27 issued in 1991. 
 
6.6 Through the Due Process 
 
The one hundred and fifty-four submissions received for ED50 are listed in Table 6.6. 
 
Table 6.6 Submissions Received for ED50 
Local Local 
Government Auditor Government Accounting 
Department General Representative Firms
Groups
4 4 15 31 73 5 21 *153
Total
Local Government
Urban Rural
Other 
 
* One submission was withheld by the AARF. 
 
                                                 
285   Sutton, op.cit.: p.88. 
286  ibid. 
287  Currie et al, op.cit.: p. 26. 
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The brief guide which accompanied ED50 sought specific comment on thirteen issues 
and is presented in Table 6.7. 
 
Table 6.7 Specific Comments Sought on ED50 
 
 A BRIEF GUIDE TO ED50   AARF RESPONSE 
ANALYSIS 
 Specific Comment Sought   ED50 
     
 
1 
The requirement to prepare a single set of financial 
statements encompassing all the operations which 
the council controls 
  
1 
Single set of financial 
statements for all controlled 
entities 
     
2 The requirement to recognise all assets which 
satisfies the relevant recognition criteria 
 3 Recognise infrastructure and 
other non-saleable assets 
     
 
3 
The recommendation that Local Governments 
revalue regularly their non-current assets to their 
written down current cost 
  
10 
Regular revaluation 
 of 
 non-current assets 
     
4 The requirement to depreciate all non-current 
assets with limited useful lives 
 4 Depreciation of all  
depreciable assets 
     
5 Whether the accounting policies proposed in 
respect of Grants & Rates are supported 
 5 
6 
Accounting for Grants 
Accounting for Rates 
     
6 The disclosure requirements in respect of broad 
programs and activities 
 7 Note - Re: broad programs / 
activities. 
     
7 The requirement to disclose restricted assets  11 Disclosure of restricted assets 
     
 
8 
The requirement to disclose a summary of the 
budget adopted for setting rates for the reporting 
period 
  
8 
Disclosure 
 of  
budget summary 
     
 
9 
The reporting of information about compliance 
with externally imposed financial requirements on 
an exception basis 
  
12 
Exception reporting  
on  
compliance 
     
 
10 
The recommendation that Local Governments 
report semi-financial and non-financial 
performance indicators 
  
9 
Disclosure  
Of non-financial  
performance indicators 
     
 
11 
The requirement that general purpose financial 
reports are made available within four months of 
balance date 
  
13 
 
Timeliness of reporting 
 
     
 
12 
The length of period from the issuance of Standard 
during which Local Governments may phase in the 
adoption of the requirements 
  
15 
Period  
for adoption  
of the standard 
     
 
 
 
13 
Whether the (Illustrative) Operating Statement 
should report revenues and expenses by nature or 
type. 
Whether the (Illustrative) presentation of assets and 
liabilities in the Statement of Financial Position, 
which enable disclosure of non-current assets is 
supported 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
16 
 
17 
 
14 
Operating Statement to include 
all revenues and expenses and 
other items 
Classification in Operating 
Statement 
Structure of Statement of 
Financial Position 
Compliance with Concepts and 
Applicable Standards 
 
On receipt of submissions the AARF then summarised responses within seventeen 
issues. Table 6.8 presents a summarisation of that data indicating majority support for 
all issues. 
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Table 6.8 AARF Breakdown of ED50 Submissions  
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1 1 66 16 7 89
13 2 15 1 15 6 37
2 3 23 28 4 45 14 114
3 10 29 24 17 70
4 4 37 13 11 6 13 5 85
5 5 49 6 30 7 92
5 6 51 17 1 69
6 7 35 17 7 5 8 5 77
7 11 56 3 1 60
8 8 47 2 14 12 2 77
9 12 48 6 7 61
10 9 37 10 21 7 75
11 13 57 4 8 69
14 28 5 3 36
12 15 5 9 13 24 9 11 60
13 16 13 27 14 45*
13 17 30 17 39*
* Comments on these issues were not mutually exclusive  
 
A response summary document was then prepared by the AARF for the attention of 
the PSASB, which identified twenty-six submissions of particular interest. Table 6.9, 
taken from Table 6.5, details these submissions and is presented again here due to its 
timing and placement within the procedures taken. 
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Table 6.9 Comparison of Submissions of Particular Interest to Total  
                        Submissions 
Particular Total
Interest Submitted
Local Government Departments 4 4
Auditor General's Departments 1 4
Local Government Represent. Group 6 15
Local Government : Urban 5 31
Local Government : Rural 4 73
Accounting Firms 3 5
Other 3 22  
 
6.7    Post Standard Survey   
 
A post standard survey was undertaken by Hurst in 1994 to determine the views of 
local government on the outcome of the due process and their involvement within the 
process. Of the one hundred and four urban and rural councils who made submissions, 
one hundred and one were surveyed with sixty-three responses. Responses are 
detailed below in Tables 6.10, 6.11, 6.12, 6.13, 6.14, 6.15, and 6.16. Table 6.1 is 
replicated in Table 6.11 for ease of discussion. 
 
6.7a    What was the prime reason for making your submission? 
 
Table 6.10 Reasons for Making Submission  
 Reason Response 
 Cost 4 
 Concern 22 
 Input 27 
 Disagreement 5 
 Agreement 6 
   Note ** Responses are not mutually exclusive 
Cost Concern Input Disagreement Agreement
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
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6.7b    Would you be more likely to make a submission due to: 
 
Table 6.11 ED50: General Reasons for Submitting 
 
 Yes No 
Full support for a proposal 13 15 
Support for only specific issues contained 
in the proposal (and passive acceptance of 
the other proposals) 
 
21 
 
12 
Disagreement of only specific issues 
contained in the proposal (and passive 
acceptance of the other proposals) 
 
47 
 
3 
Total disagreement with a proposal 30 3 
 
6.7c Did you receive any direct communication from the AARF/PSASB              
regarding the content of your submission in addition to an 
acknowledgement letter? 
 
Table 6.12 Communication from AARF/PSASB  
 
 Yes No 
   
Number 4 56 
   
Percentage 7% 93% 
 
6.7d   Do you think your submission received serious consideration? 
 
Table 6.13 Consideration Given to Submissions 
 
 Yes No Unsure 
    
Number 16 31 16 
    
Percentage 25% 49% 26% 
 
6.7e   Do you believe that the Australian Accounting Research Foundation 
              and the Australian Accounting Standards Board took due notice of the 
              submissions of Local Government bodies when setting AAS27? 
 
Table 6.14 Due Notice Given to submissions from Local Government  
 
 Yes No Unsure 
    
Number 15 31 17 
    
Percentage 24% 49% 27% 
 
Appendix 6a documents the written responses by the submitters to ED50 to both 
Tables 6.13 and 6.14 above. These comments allude significantly to a feeling of 
inevitability of outcome and a lack of ability to influence that outcome.  
 
 
 
 137
6.7f    Did you perceive any fundamental shifts from the proposals in ED50 to  
               the requirements of AAS27 in relation to: 
 
Table 6.15 Fundamental Shifts from the Proposals in ED50 to the 
Requirements of AAS27 
  Yes No Unsure 
     
 
1 
The preparation of a single set of financial         
statements encompassing all of the operations         
which the council controls 
 
5 
 
55 
 
3 
     
2 The requirement to recognise infrastructure         
and other ‘non-saleable’ assets. 
9 51 3 
     
3 The regular revaluation of non-current assets. 7 52 4 
     
4 The requirement to depreciate all non-current         
assets with limited useful lives. 
5 54 4 
     
5 The treatment of accounting for grants  22 33 8 
     
6 The treatment of accounting for rates. 8 48 7 
     
7 The disclosure requirements in respect of broad         
programs and activities 
11 39 13 
     
8 The requirement to disclose ‘Restricted’ assets.  8 39 16 
     
9 The requirement to disclose a budget summary.  19 32 12 
     
10 The disclosure of non-financial performance         
indicators.  
16 33 14 
     
 
11 
The requirement to report, on an exception basis,       
information on compliance with externally          
imposed financial requirements. 
 
7 
 
31 
 
25 
     
12 The timeliness of reporting.         14 41 8 
 
A comparison of both ED50 and AAS27 indicates there to be very little apparent 
change between the two on a per paragraph basis. This view is supported by the 
survey results pertaining to the respondents’ perceptions of any fundamental shifts 
from the proposals in ED50 to the requirements of AAS27. 
 
Minor changes to ED50 resulting from the Due Process 
 
1. In ED50 it was proposed that where conditions are imposed on local              
government in exchange for receipts of grants, those contributions should be              
recognised as revenues when those conditions are satisfied. 
 
The PSASB adopted the view that contributions such as grants, rates, donations, 
regulatory fees and fines should be recognised as revenue when a local 
government entity obtains control over the contributed asset. 
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2. ED50 proposed that local government entities should be required to include in 
their financial reports a budget summary, which would disclose information about 
the budget in which rates for the reporting period had been established and the 
extent to which those rates had been deployed for the purposes they had been 
raised.  
 
The PSASB felt that until the AARF project on reporting information about 
performance is completed, it would be premature to require local government to 
include a Budget Summary in their financial reports, although such a summary 
could provide useful information. 
 
3. ED50 proposed that local government entities should be required to make their 
financial reports available to users within four months of balance date. 
 
The standard requires only that there should be timely reporting without setting 
down reporting timetables. 
 
4. ED50 proposed that local government entities should be encouraged to revalue 
non-current assets to their written down current cost regularly.  
 
This proposal has not been included in the standard. Rather the standard simply 
indicates that revaluations are permitted within the constraints applied in AAS10 
‘Accounting for the Revaluation of Non-Current Assets’. 
 
6.7g    Respondents were asked, on a broad basis, to comment on the  
            application and relevance of AAS27 to Local Government 
 
Table 6.16 Application and Relevance of AAS27 to Local Government 
 Yes 
Extremely relevant and applicable (Much better off with it) 20 
Slightly relevant and applicable (Slightly better off with it) 21 
Indifferent (No change – Neither better or worse) 6 
Slightly irrelevant and inapplicable (Slightly worse off with it) 9 
Extremely irrelevant and inapplicable (Much better off without it) 7 
 
Extremely relevant
and applicable.
Slightly relevant and
applicable.
Indifferent  (No
change)
Slightly irrelevant and
inapplicable
Extremely irrelevant
and inapplicable
0 5 10 15 20 25
 
 
Caution needs to be exercised given these responses were elicited from local 
government practitioners at a time when AAS27 had been implemented. 
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6.8 Survey Result Summation and Findings 
 
 Review of the literature and the survey findings suggest that for the most part 
participants submit in negative terms.  
 
 There was little and insignificant feedback from the AARF to the submitters. 
 
 The majority of submitters believed that their submission did not receive serious 
consideration.  
 
 The majority of submitters believed that the AARF did not take due notice of 
the submissions of local government.  
 
 Submitters identified little change between ED50 and AAS27. 
 
It is possible to surmise from the above that the majority of survey respondents 
believed the major focus of submissions were divergent from the proposals contained 
in ED50. The more general comments in this respect were most adequately 
summarised by the following survey respondent comment: 
 
In light of the number of submissions made - the common objections to ED50 and the 
fact that these issues were not subjected to change before AAS27, it is difficult to see 
how serious the consideration was. 
 
The written responses appear to indicate both distrust for the due process and an 
overbearing perception of the inevitability of AAS27 being endorsed on ED50 
principles. Moreover, while the above would lend some credence to a view of 
disagreement with the ED50 proposals, this was not supported by the AARF 
Breakdown of ED50 Submissions findings presented in Table 6.8. This instead 
indicated a much greater acceptance of the ED50 proposals, though, that analysis 
considered the total submissions as opposed to the Hurst survey respondents who 
were solely from the ranks of local government. The survey population consisted only 
of one hundred and one local government council submissions on ED50. 
 
6.9 Participant Perception of the Due Process 
 
The Sims summary of responses received from formal submitters to the AARF/AASB 
also indicated a relatively high dissatisfaction level with the existing standard setting 
process. A selection of some of the criticisms presented in the Sims study is listed in 
Table 6.17, and their frequency would seem to reveal participants view the standard 
setting process as closeted. 
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Table 6.17 Participant Perception of the Due Process 
 
Criticism Frequency 
 
 Lack of stated priorities from AARF; Process too secretive; 
not enough background research to support the EDs. 
 
17 
 Insufficient consultation with 'big 8' members, industry, 
small business and the business sector. 
 
17 
 There is a lack of public hearings/debate and involvement 
of non-accountant users. 
 
14 
 The outcome is pre-determined, the process is essentially a 
political exercise with little consideration given to 
submissions Sympathetic views and those of specific 
groups are favoured and contrary views are rejected. 
 
14 
 Lack of feedback to interested parties, with reasons for 
departures from the EDs not given to either the public or to 
interested parties. 
13 
 
This situation is further elucidated by the responses to the suggested improvements to 
the standard setting process. 
 
 Broaden the base of parties involved, such as non-accountants, lawyers, small 
business and the public sector. 
 
 Explain the purpose of the exposure draft before its release in say, journals and 
magazines as well as the exposure draft itself.  
 
 Publish the significant differences between the resultant standard and its 
exposure draft, and why the changes were made.  
 
Sims found that the degree of “openness of the standard setting process” was seen to 
be an “area for attention” based on the responses utilised in her study, indicating some 
64 per cent desired publication by the standard setters of their reasons behind the 
decisions made. 288 
 
Overall, the Sims study revealed a consensus of opinion centred on the issues of: 
 
 The lack of involvement by parties outside the accounting profession. 
 
 The pace of the due process. 
 
 The lack of relative feedback to submitters on the outcome of their responses. 
 
                                                 
288  Sims, op.cit.: p.14. 
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6.10 Conclusion   
      
Accounting standard setting is a political construct, predicated on a mixture of the 
normative standard and competing interests rule making models, which accommodate 
conflicting interests under the guise of creating accounting rules ‘for the common 
good’. Standards are drafted by an appointed standard setting body consisting of 
individuals selected from relevant professional and industry bodies. Parliament has 
not specified the procedures to be followed in rule making nor do standards drafted 
need to reflect government policy. The subordinate authority may proceed as it thinks 
best.  
 
It has been claimed that the regulation of accounting has “become more closely 
aligned to the form of interest group politics that has been labelled neo-corporatism. 
In neo-corporatist arrangements, efforts to secure consensus are achieved through 
government recognition of interest groups and the granting to those groups of 
privileged access to the policy making process.”289 
 
Research evidence suggests that democratic participation within the due process is 
constrained to a limited subset of knowledgeable and self-interested participants and 
is narrowly enshrined in time, with the opportunity for comment through written 
submissions and limited consultation. It also suggests that the institutional design of 
the due process enables an individual’s entitlement to a fair hearing to be overridden 
by the need for a decision to be made. Consequently it does not promote the 
settlement of disputes, but rather merely bringing them to an end. There appears no 
implied right to, or ground for review against an administrative decision and little 
feedback to participants or publication by the standard setters of the reasons behind 
their decisions. 
 
Suggested difficulties with the due process are threefold. First, participants are 
observed to have a narrow persona in that they participate due to self-interest and 
generally are negative towards proposals. Second, as demonstrated above, there is low 
participant involvement in the due process. Third, there are difficulties in evaluating 
and utilising participant input. There would appear to be bias due to the limited 
number and general negativity of submissions along with difficulties in determining 
                                                 
289  Walker [1], op.cit.: p.283. 
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the representative distribution of submissions received. Bias problems also exist in 
relation to individual based submissions being sent in on corporate letterheads, not to 
mention difficulties associated with drawing conclusions from written submissions 
alone. Further possible bias is that induced by the use of regulatory staff-generated 
summaries and the difficulties associated with weighting single issues as votes as 
opposed to an overall holistic approach. 
 
Of perhaps more concern is the opaque nature of the due process and its limited 
inclusion of written submissions. Lobbying per se lends itself to a multitude of forms 
ranging through petitions, letters, visits, submissions, and advertisements with much 
being neither accessible to, nor observable by the public. The preferred direct method 
encompasses private discussions and/or meetings with the regulators and is viewed as 
being the most effective with the perceived probability of influencing the regulator’s 
opinions. Appeals to parliament and professional accountancy bodies are perceived to 
be rather more effective than other indirect methods, such as sending written 
submissions or oral testimony at public meetings.  
 
Obtaining evidence of this type of lobbying activity, given it is non-observable, has 
led to the majority of studies being premised on written submissions. Research 
evidence between the timing and methods used to lobby has found lobbying more 
likely to be effective while the regulator’s preferences were still unresolved. In this 
respect a lack of feedback from the regulatory body has led to significant criticism of 
a lack of transparency within the due process, which has been evidenced within this 
paper.            
 
In attempting to elucidate the extent to which the due process as applied by the AASB 
aligns with the construct of due process, which has developed over time through the 
concept of natural justice, there appear several divergences and inconsistencies 
between each. 
 
Due process as developed through the common law has, at its heart, a construct of 
democratic participation that incorporates a feeling of just treatment and profound 
attitude of fairness between individual and individual, and more particularly between 
individual and government. In this respect, democratic participation rests with its 
ability to be responsive to the community in general, and in particular to those 
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affected, by enabling a means for gaining information about what is proposed. It 
should also enable those with an interest or concern to put their point of view and to 
have some influence on the outcome and the processes along with the policy choice 
explained with reason and fact. 
 
Inherent within is a notion of natural justice and equality which is predicated upon 
concepts of neutrality, where the dispute settler should neither be biased in favour of 
or against a party nor have a private interest in the outcome. Fair notice and fair 
opportunity to respond and provide evidence should be accorded each party and any 
settlement based on the arguments and evidence provided and supported by reason 
and fact. This notion of equality as a formal element of justice not only requires that 
laws be administered impartially but also demands that the actions of public officials 
who exercise authority should not be capricious or arbitrary, but based on principle, 
and encompasses the interconnected notions of objectivity, rationality, impartiality, 
consistency and equality. It is not enough to merely treat the parties in a like or equal 
fashion, but rather that rules of fair procedure be established which maintain the parity 
of the parties. They should not only have an equal opportunity to state their case but 
also a fair or adequate opportunity to do so. 
 
Whatever the uncertainty inherent within the phrase natural justice, it connotes, above 
all, the maxim audi alteram partem [to hear the other side; no person should be 
judged without a hearing] and nemo iudex in re sua [every judge must be free from 
bias] and that the decision maker must afford a person whose interests will be 
adversely affected by a decision an opportunity to present his or her case. Embedded 
within a denial of natural justice is the implied right or ground for review against an 
administrative decision. At common law, denial of such natural justice allows a 
review in circumstances, where the administrative decision might affect a person’s 
rights, interests or legitimate expectations. 
 
Clearly, the due process developed through law differs significantly from that applied 
within the accounting standard setting environment. Not only is it more pluralistic and 
democratically inclusive, but also demands both broad participation and a far greater 
transparency of process. Within its quest to achieve common good outcomes from the 
policy making process, it subordinates the self-interest focus that permeates the 
standard setting process. 
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Due process as applied by the law, is extended by attributes of equality and natural 
justice and has been subsumed itself within the rule of law to be applied to maintain 
or restore the relative position of equality between individuals. Due process as applied 
within the accounting standard setting environment has been shown, first, to be a 
subordinated process encapsulated within the confines of both the socio-political 
nature of accounting and the existing regime of accounting standards, 
pronouncements and conceptual framework constraints. Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, due process in the accounting standard setting environment is a 
procedural input that may or may not influence the outcome. Due process in law is 
enshrined in the output decision, that the parties have been heard, their evidence 
listened to and that the decision made is a product of that evidence and hearing. 
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Appendix 6a 
 
Participant Feedback on the Due Process 
 
Appendix 6a documents the written responses to the 1994 Hurst survey of council 
respondents to ED50. Responses relate to the following two questions: Do you think 
your submission received serious consideration? Do you believe that the Australian 
Accounting Research Foundation and the Australian Accounting Standards Board 
took due notice of the submissions of Local Government bodies when setting AAS27?  
 
Do you think your submission received serious consideration? 
 
 
 No feedback 
 
 We believe that change was pre-determined. Our concerns were quite justified 
in that AAS27 has not yet been fully implemented and significant increases in 
costs have occurred. 
 
 Do not have any concrete evidence 
 
 At no time was local government asked for a cost estimate of introduction of 
these measures or request for further information. 
 
 It was probably too brief and was dismissed as a resistance to change which 
seems to be the tag applied to anyone disagreeing with the rash of poorly 
considered ‘you beaut’ proposals for change which are presently in vogue in this 
country. 
 
 No evidence to suggest that it did 
 
 The length of time allocated for submission to be made was short and gave the         
impression that they were either hoping not to receive any or were not going to 
give credence to any received. 
 
 It would appear that the issues raised were not addressed satisfactorily in the 
final draft of the standard. 
 
 No feedback 
 
 I am aware that the majority of submissions from local government rose ‘like’ 
issues and yet AARF did not make any major changes to AAS27 or the draft. 
 
 I think it was politically kick started by Nick Greiner and the AARF/PSASB 
said ‘you bewdy mate’. 
 
 No communication from AARF. AAS27 basically reflects ED50 and SAC4 
only compulsory for local government. 
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 AARF doesn’t like to bend at all I’m not sure where their great knowledge and         
wisdom comes from. 
 
 No acknowledgement and very little change from ED50 to AAS27 
 
 In the light of the number of submissions made - the common objections made 
to ED50 and the fact that these issues were not subjected to change before 
AAS27, it is difficult to see how serious the consideration was. 
 
 I don’t think AARF wanted to know. 
 
 Because the original draft was largely biased towards Victoria. Thus comments 
from NSW councils which were further advanced in accruals. 
 
 End result 
 
 No feedback - appeared not to influence where they had already decided to go 
 
 No attempt was made to correspond or obtain further information from 
interested parties. No changes were made. 
 
 No communication received 
 
 Organisation endorsed ED50 
 
 Appreciation from the Foundation on the time and interest taken in preparation 
of response. Comments were to be carefully considered by the PSASB. 
 
 Probably, mind was already made up 
 
 Submission was generally in the positive/supportive mode 
 
 The time given to prepare such an important return should have received serious 
consideration. I believe it was considered although not necessarily acted upon. 
 
 Do not know 
 
 Unlikely 
 
 Discussion between council officers and AARF 
 
 No response or debate on issues raised by council 
 
 Unsure 
 
 As it supported the argument of the Institute of Municipal Management (IMM) - 
it would have been used to endorse the IMM and the AARF/PSASB’s position. 
 
 Don’t know 
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 Because not adopted 
 
 I don’t think I was the only one to raise the issues. 
 
 They had made up their minds about what ‘they’ wanted and no real 
consideration was given to our genuine concerns. 
 
 Submission was very broad and unqualified. Therefore unable to measure any 
specific areas for change/response. 
 
 Being a small council, any submission would be outweighed by larger councils. 
 
 Via local government accounting committee 
 
 Unsure 
 
 I am aware of the process employed by AARF to consider submissions. I know 
the results to questions were aggregated and summarised for deliberation by the 
PSASB in its development of AAS27. 
 
 Spoke to staff at AARF 
 
 It was already a fait accompli. 
 
 Don’t know 
 
 
Do you believe that the Australian Accounting Research Foundation and the 
Australian Accounting Standards Board took due notice of the              
submissions of Local Government bodies when setting AAS27? 
 
 There was no feedback on submissions and what notice or changes were made 
as a result of them. 
 
 We believe that the agenda was predetermined. Results would indicate that this 
was correct. 
 
 It appears as though what was contained in ED50 was what ended up in AAS27 
and therefore there does not appear to have been much notice of local 
government representations. 
 
 The change went ahead - the fact remains cash accounting is best understood by 
the average ratepayer.  
 
 Problems with cash accounting could have been addressed and corrected 
without full accrual accounting. 
 
 Final draft unaltered in any significant way 
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 Apart from the treatment of rate income, most of the proposals in ED50 seem to 
have been embodied in AAS27. 
 
 Acknowledgement letter received only. No later contact for further information 
etc. - no copy of AAS27 when issued (although this was promised.) 
 I think it may have been hard to create a standard that related purely to local 
government. 
 
 It was generally thought the new accounting standards would be introduced 
irrespective of any comments raised by councils. 
 
 No information was made available on the Foundations/Boards deliberation or 
consideration of the submissions 
 
 AAS27 was issued without any of the proposed changes. 
 
 No details of how submissions were dealt with by the foundation; or evidence of 
accepting key issues raised 
 
 Most of my peers have commented in strong fashion on the retention of the 
working funds concept. 
 
 AARF's background is to ensure that accounts represent a true position because 
profits of the entity are stripped for shareholders. False projection can mean 
adverse dividends, then entity collapses. 
 
 Local government is a service provider and profits are not a concern - see non 
applicability of recoverable amount test. 
 
 Discussions with accountants close to AARF indicate that AARF took no notice 
of any submission presented. 
 
 Some aspects of both Council's and Orana Group IMM submissions were 
common to objections with most councils and institute groups, and yet no 
change was made. Notably accounting for grants in year of receipt rather than 
matching to expenditure in year of expenditure, and problems of distortion of 
the operating result by not matching grant revenues and expenditures in the 
same period. 
 
 It appears to be a document designed by non practitioners. 
 
 The decision was made well before councils were asked. 
 
 Some modifications brought about 
 
 AAS27 and ED50 not changed significantly. Concern continues to exist on 
valuing and depreciating certain infrastructure assets as part of the accounting 
structure. 
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 Obvious from their publications, public comments and meetings that they had 
already made up their mind as to the result. We were just part of the process 
they had to go through 
 
 There has been no response to submission. 
 
 Very few changes were made in response to submissions. No attempt was made 
to correspond with interest groups. Impression given by politicians that ED50 
was fait accompli. 
 
 No particular knowledge of submissions of local government generally 
 
 Number of changes following introduction 
 
 Foundation too heavily weighted with academics 
 
 Due to accounting standard setting process 
 
 It would appear that due notice was taken. 
 
 The failure to address problems referred to. The bombastic adherence to their 
stated values. 
 
 They took due notice of the submissions of local government bodies, but 
ultimately chose to accept some and reject others. 
 
 The concerns with respect to particular depreciation may have been considered, 
but no major alterations were made. 
 
 Representatives of local government associations were consulted initially to set 
the draft in motion and notice via submissions were extended to peak 
organisations. 
 
 Valuation of asset issues were not adequately addressed. Question of control of 
assets still open to interpretation. 
 
 Unaware of any changes attributable to the submissions 
 
 A lack of local government representation on the review body. 
 
 Due to the number of actual changes made to the draft when compared with the 
standard 
 
 Major concerns such as the implications of current cost depreciation appear to 
have been noted, but some issues, such as concerns about how to account for 
capital grants were not noted. 
 
 Time frame for implementation was achieved 
 
 Very little change from original 
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 It is felt that the agenda was set and that there was going to be little influence by 
local government bodies without backing of peer organisations. 
 
 Because of discussions subsequent to issue of AAS27 with IMM staff in 
Victoria 
 
 Most people see concern about the treatment of grants in the standard. 
 
 They have gone their own way and taken no notice of our concerns. 
 
 Whilst I agree with the concept of AAS27, certainly some of its practical 
considerations are causing problems. 
 
 Not present when deliberation made 
 
 Council never received any responses on the two submissions including 
acknowledgement of the two letters 
 
 Yes, but momentum was there and we all felt it to be inevitable, regardless of 
the facts 
 
 Because of weight of numbers and contents of submissions 
 
 I am aware of the extent of and work undertaken by AARF during the 
consultation process. I do not believe it could have been done any more. 
 
 No feedback. AARF not familiar with local government at grass roots. No reply 
received. 
 Some changes were made before final release 
 
 AAS27 was introduced despite the opposition it received. 
 
 There is an increasing push for national standards Australia wide by the 
bureaucrats in Canberra and their covert operations (viz. AARF) 
 
 The process was very much determined prior to W.A. LGA's movement. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Case Study of Local Government Accounting Reform 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
One of the main agendas of this research was to establish whether the introduction of 
the private sector accounting model improved the financial reporting of local 
government.  
 
This chapter aims to determine whether AAS27 has delivered a better form of 
financial reporting by local government. A discussion on the benefits of using accrual 
accounting precedes an analysis of the financial statements of five Victorian councils, 
which aims to identify any improvements in local government financial reporting. 
 
Improved financial reporting was very much premised upon the benefits purported to 
flow from the use of an accrual accounting system. First, the use of accrual 
accounting would measure performance and financial position in ways similar to 
those in the private sector, which would then allow useful inter sector comparisons. 
Second, it would provide a better picture of the public sector’s assets and liabilities 
than was possible under the fund accounting system.  
 
The major criticism of the fund system was that it was only cash based. If cash was 
not spent, there was no transaction. Each financial year was self-contained through a 
process of annual appropriations and an inability to carry forward any unspent 
allocations meant that there was no continuity in the system. Added to this was a lack 
of distinction between capital and operating expenditure. Cash spent on a non-current 
asset was treated in the same way as cash spent on wages. The system did not produce 
any records of assets and liabilities. If there were lists of things owned and obligations 
owed, they were outside the accounting information system. The system did not 
provide a way of controlling a large public investment in property, plant and 
equipment and in infrastructure assets such as roads, ports, bridges and dams. Without 
a record of assets employed in government operations, it was thought impossible to 
measure performance or to determine the full cost of service delivery.  
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Third, accrual accounting would enable a distinction between capital and operating 
expenditure. This was deemed important in terms of any assessment of 
intergenerational equity issues. Where there is no distinction between capital and 
operating expenditure, it was argued that the generation that pays for non-current 
assets subsidises later generations, which receive the benefits from those assets. An 
accrual system that distinguished between capital and operating expenditure and 
which charged depreciation on assets would enable capital costs to be spread across 
generations provided prices are set to cover the full cost of providing services. 
 
7.2 Consequences and Outcomes of Applying Accrual Accounting 
 
First, Section 7.2a provides a general overview of investments, debt, accumulated 
funds and changes in net assets over the period 1996 - 2000 to identify overall trends 
and movements in these major financial items. Of interest is the variability between 
years and its impact on the use and comparability of council financial reports.  
 
Second, Section 7.2b looks at the consequences of bringing infrastructure assets onto 
the financial reports and their subsequent valuation. This is demonstrated by 
examining the change in net assets position after removal of abnormal items, which 
have significantly included the consequences of asset valuations. 
 
Third, Section 7.2c looks at the impact of the depreciation of those assets on the 
bottom-line. Given the large movements in asset valuation, it is not surprising to find 
that depreciation expense as a percentage of total expenditure has significantly 
increased. 
 
Fourth, Section 7.2d examines the effect on the bottom-line when both the abnormal 
items associated with asset valuation movements and the depreciation of those assets 
is removed. Of interest is the significantly greater volatility introduced into the 
financial statements. 
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7.2a Movements in investments, debt, accumulated funds and changes in net 
assets over the period 1996 - 2000 
 
Comparative yearly figures for each council presented in Tables 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 and 7.5 
below indicate a significant quantum movement in reported equity. Whether these 
significant yearly shifts and swings will flatten or stabilise is yet to be seen. Suffice to 
say, the reported increases in accumulated funds have not been the result of 
significant new inputs of revenue or decreases in expenditures, but rather revaluations 
of existing infrastructure assets. In this respect, it could be argued that the financial 
reports of local government since the imposition of AAS27 have made the reading of 
the actual performance of local government more opaque and less easily identifiable, 
which will be argued within the findings of this study. 
 
Table 7.1 Cash + Investments – Overdraft: 1995 - 2000 
 
 
1995/1996 1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
City of Ballarat 11,041,000$     9,067,000$       12,551,000$    13,236,000$      11,139,630$    
Greater Bendigo City Council 15,650,514$     10,897,253$     8,979,554$      10,051,000$      8,831,000$      
City of Greater Geelong 26,893,000$     36,002,000$     30,345,000$    22,727,000$      22,155,000$    
Horsham Rural City Council 6,038,184$       4,433,736$       4,694,133$      5,445,229$        4,185,358$      
Melton Shire Council 9,175,895$       4,715,276$       5,660,188$      4,780,397$        5,191,411$      
Average 13,759,719$     13,023,053$    12,445,975$   11,247,925$     10,300,480$     
 
Table 7.2 Borrowings: 1995 - 2000 
 
1995/1996 1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
City of Ballarat 25,061,000$     25,421,000$     24,792,000$    23,870,000$      20,688,000$    
Greater Bendigo City Council 10,710,662$     8,654,502$       6,400,680$      11,223,000$      8,666,000$      
City of Greater Geelong 54,915,000$     54,979,000$     42,116,000$    38,182,000$      34,481,000$    
Horsham Rural City Council 1,413,060$       1,600,844$       2,081,627$      4,200,528$        4,333,710$      
Melton Shire Council 7,945,578$       11,061,228$     11,747,252$    12,629,576$      12,823,970$    
Average 20,009,060$     20,343,315$    17,427,512$   18,021,021$     16,198,536$     
 
Average data from these individual councils support both the trend of declining 
investment holdings and reductions in the levels of debt held.  
 
 
Table 7.3 below details changes in net assets resulting from operations after 
abnormals. A perusal of these figures indicates significant volatility in council 
financial reporting as councils have struggled with the measurement requirements 
sought under AAS27.  
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Table 7.3 Changes in Net Assets Resulting from Operations after 
                        Abnormals: 1995 - 2000 
 
1995/1996 1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
City of Ballarat 2,407,000$       (19,198,000)$   (2,865,000)$     (589,000)$          (38,134,000)$   
Greater Bendigo City Council 30,755,239$     (1,204,771)$     8,681,000$      30,842,000$      39,520,000$    
City of Greater Geelong 7,325,000$       (7,404,000)$     10,058,000$    21,518,000$      9,558,000$      
Horsham Rural City Council 1,635,938$       (520,074)$        112,536,119$  (42,895,098)$     (8,568,547)$     
Melton Shire Council (3,513,081)$     (9,578,598)$     617,144.0$      2,192,213$        12,966,692$    
Total 38,610,096$     (37,905,443)$  129,027,263$ 11,068,115$     15,342,145$     
 
This volatility is very much evidenced through the Horsham Rural City Council’s 
financial statements which show significant movements between positive and 
negative positions.  
 
Table 7.4 details the Statement of Financial Position ending balances of road assets, 
land and buildings for the Horsham Rural City Council which would have impacted 
significantly on the changes in the net asset position of the council.  
 
Table 7.4 Statement of Financial Position Ending Balances: 1995 - 2000 
 
1995/1996 1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Road Assets 8,186,468$      89,602,557$    201,656,441$  158,372,288$  155,372,288$  
Land 456,345$         10,079,801$    1,006,101$      10,286,550$    8,114,645$      
Buildings 862,321$         17,581,999$    17,825,267$    18,315,357$    14,420,253$    
Horsham Rural City Council
 
 
The bottom-line accumulated total of changes in net assets in Table 7.3 above also 
indicates a surplus of funds, which is evidenced, also through increased accumulated 
funds.  
 
Table 7.5 Accumulated Funds: 1995 - 2000 
 
1995/1996 1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
City of Ballarat 86,181,000$     546,003,000$   543,096,000$  542,459,000$    504,313,000$  
Greater Bendigo City Council 169,101,048$   284,463,997$   293,144,983$  323,987,000$    362,946,000$  
City of Greater Geelong 161,610,000$   580,424,000$   580,412,000$  608,493,000$    623,381,000$  
Horsham Rural City Council 16,696,286$     127,128,035$   238,295,185$  194,666,951$    187,632,305$  
Melton Shire Council 54,367,579$     178,456,101$   177,056,199$  178,961,390$    191,711,280$  
Average 97,591,183$     343,295,027$  366,400,873$ 369,713,468$   373,996,717$   
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7.2b The consequences of bringing infrastructure assets onto the financial 
reports and their subsequent valuation  
 
Local government capital expenditure, which resulted in non-current assets under 
AAS27, is generally of two types. First, there are infrastructure assets, which include 
roads, bridges, railways, sewers, reservoirs, airports, power stations and distribution 
systems for gas, water and power. These have the essential features of being public 
facilities, concerned with essential services, immovable and usually necessary to 
sustain living standards. Second, there are heritage assets which include monuments, 
art and museum collections, national parks and nature reserves, and noteworthy 
buildings that are intended to be preserved indefinitely because of their unique 
historical, cultural or environmental attributes. The essential features of heritage 
assets are that they cannot be replaced and they will be preserved indefinitely.  
 
Henderson and Peirson have identified several characteristics of both heritage and 
infrastructure assets that may differentiate them from other assets. Being outlays that 
cannot be changed by any future action their costs are sunk. They generally have no 
market value nor are they vendible; they provide social rather than commercial 
benefits; they have no determinable physical life and are more like liabilities than 
assets in that they provide no cash inflows, but significant cash outflows for 
maintenance.290  
 
AAS27 adopts the definition and recognition criteria of assets contained within SAC4, 
which states that assets have three essential characteristics. First, the asset must 
provide future economic benefits.  
 
Second, the entity must have control over the future economic benefits, such that it is 
able to enjoy the benefits and deny or regulate the access of others to the benefits. 
Third, the transaction or other event, giving rise to the entity's control over the future 
economic benefits must have occurred. Furthermore, an asset should be recognised in 
the statement of financial position when, and only when, it is probable that the future 
economic benefits embodied in the asset will eventuate and the asset possesses a cost 
or other value that can be measured reliably. 
 
                                                 
290 Henderson, S. and G. Peirson, (2002), Issues in Financial Accounting, 10ed, NSW: Prentice Hall.  
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AAS27 requires non-current assets be accounted for initially at their acquisition cost, 
but they may be subsequently revalued provided their carrying amount does not 
exceed recoverable amount. Assets acquired at no cost are to be valued at their fair 
value at acquisition date. 
 
The greatest financial effect on the financial statements has been through the 
valuation of infrastructure assets and their consequent depreciation. Consequently, the 
thrust of this part of the research will focus on the operating statement and statement 
of financial position to determine whether such changes and disclosures represent a 
more meaningful form of financial performance and position than previously under 
the fund system and whether they provide data of any less dubious quality. One 
simple insight into this can be gleaned from the notes to the financial statements of the 
City of Ballarat for the year 1999/2000. 
 
Note D Recognition of Non-Current Assets 
 
 
 
Note F  Non-Current Assets 
 
The useful lives of the non-current assets are as follows: 
 
Buildings 30 to 200 years 
Furniture and fittings 6 to 15 years 
Other structures 3 to 200 years 
Plant and equipment 2 to 25 years 
Road pavements 15 to 200 years 
 
During the year council revalued and reassessed the useful lives of buildings, furniture 
and fittings, plant and equipment, other structures and road pavements. This 
assessment was undertaken to better reflect the consumption of future benefits 
embodied in these assets. In regard to road pavements, a change in the assessment in 
useful lives occurred resulting in the range of useful lives changing from between 35 
and 200 years to between 15 and 200 years. The financial effect of this change in 
accounting estimates in future years was an increase in depreciation and a 
Whilst council has control over the Eureka 
Flag, it has not been included in the financial 
statements, as uncertainty exists as to the 
appropriateness of its carrying value. This is 
due to the unique nature of the asset and the 
absence of a market value. 
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corresponding decrease in net assets of $516,000. In regards to buildings, a change in 
the assessment in the accounting estimate occurred which will in future years result in 
an annual increase in depreciation and a corresponding decrease in net assets of 
$759,000. 
 
Major asset movements for the City of Ballarat over the period 1995/1996 to 
1999/2000 reveal substantial variation in asset valuations and asset placements which 
can be seen in Tables 7.6, 7.7 and 7. 8.  
 
Table 7.6 City of Ballarat - Non-Current Assets: 1995 - 2000 
 
NON-CURRENT ASSETS 1995/1996 1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
Fixed Assets
Land 17,121,000$         36,546,000$         36,105,000$         35,697,000$         36,754,000$         
Land Improvements 1,811,000$           
Buildings 49,152,000$         51,190,000$         53,785,000$         52,821,000$         51,272,000$         
Road Pavements 11,302,000$         349,232,000$       343,558,000$       337,523,000$       295,521,000$       
Other Structures 5,702,000$           97,662,000$         97,190,000$         97,183,000$         108,839,000$       
Plant and Equipment 3,088,000$           3,132,000$           2,418,000$           2,453,000$           2,988,000$           
Furniture and Fittings 614,000$              30,151,000$         31,213,000$         2,126,000$           1,731,000$           
Office Equipment 575,000$              
Artworks 28,932,000$         31,252,000$         
Receivables 4,431,000$           4,386,000$           558,000$              432,000$              501,000$              
Work In Progress 3,875,000$           3,214,000$           733,000$              1,651,000$           4,114,000$           
Investments 1,040,000$           1,077,000$           1,030,000$           1,653,000$           1,630,000$           
                  
Total Non-Current Assets 98,711,000$         576,590,000$       566,590,000$       560,471,000$       534,602,000$        
 
Clearly, there have been significant swings in values in relation to road pavements, 
work-in-progress, furniture and fittings and artworks which not only make it difficult 
to compare consecutive financial reports of the council but make it almost impossible 
to compare with other councils, which will be evidenced further on. 
 
Table 7.7 City of Ballarat - Road Pavements: 1995 - 2000 
 
1995/1996 1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
ROAD PAVEMENTS $000 $000 $000 $000 $000
At Valuation 12,510$       625,927$     625,927$     627,441$     295,190$     
Less Accumulated Depreciation (1,208)$        (276,695)$    (286,342)$    (295,864)$    (4,035)$        
At Cost 3,990$         6,019$         4,377$         
Less Accumulated Depreciation (17)$            (73)$             (11)$            
11,302$    349,232$  343,558$  337,523$   295,521$    
 
 
Road pavements include earthworks, substructures, seals, and kerbs relating to roads, 
footpaths, bridges and roundabouts. Interestingly, councils had under AAS27 until the 
end of the first reporting period, ending on or after 30 June 2000, transitional provisions 
that enabled them to elect not to recognise land under roads as an asset in the statement 
of financial position. These transitional provisions have now been further extended. 
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Table 7.8        City of Ballarat – Other Structures: 1995 - 2000 
 
 
 
 
Other structures include drains, street furniture, road signs, bus shelters, rotundas and 
other minor structures.  
 
The reporting of abnormal changes as a result of the asset measurements required by 
AAS27 has significantly changed the face of the financial statements. Abnormal items 
are those items that are usually not of a normal operating nature and are reported 
separately albeit calculated within the final operating deficit or surplus position. 
Figures 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 along with Tables 7.9, 7.10, 7.11, 7.12 and 7.13 
below details the effect of changes in the net assets position of councils resulting from 
operations before and after abnormal items for the period 1995/1996 to 1999/2000. 
The nature of the majority of these abnormals can be seen by reference to the notes 
attached to those of the City of Ballarat detailed below and have not been separately 
detailed given they relate to adjustment to the useful lives and valuation methods 
associated with the measurement of assets. 
 
Table 7.9 Changes in Net Assets Including/Excluding Abnormal Items:  
1995 - 2000  
 City of Ballarat 
Including Excluding Abnormal
95/96 2,407,000 $        2,407,000$         -$                 Legend
96/97 (19,198,000) $     (2,525,000)$        (16,673,000)$   Broken Line  - - - - - - Excluding 
97/98 (2,865,000) $       (2,865,000)$        -$                 Straight Line _______  Including 
98/99 (589,000) $          (589,000)$           -$                 
99/20 (38,134,000) $     704,000$            (38,838,000)$  
 
1999/2000 Abnormal ($38,838,000) 
          
 Infrastructure asset write off as a result of the revaluation of non-current assets 
$38,838,430 comprising write-off of $54,216,933 being the value of arterial road 
pavements previously recorded as belonging to the council when in fact the 
council on behalf of Vic Roads only manages these assets. Write-off of net costs 
of road reseals to the value of $2,145,307 comprising road reseals not previously 
recognised at $11,059,918 less amounts written off of $13,205,225 being 
adjustment of useful life of reseals from 50 years to 15 years. Write-on of 
previously unrecognised assets comprising unsealed roads of $17,523,810. 
1995/1996 1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000
OTHER STRUCTURES $000 $000 $000 $000 $000
At Valuation 5,676$         127,662$     128,643$     129,689$     105,961$     
Less Accumulated Depreciation (207)$           (30,000)$      (32,888)$      (34,776)$      (951)$           
At Cost 482$            1,458$         2,321$         3,834$         
Less Accumulated Depreciation (249)$          (23)$            (51)$             (5)$              
5,702$      97,662$    97,190$    97,183$     108,839$   
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1996/1997 Abnormal ($16,673,000) 
 
 Loss on revaluation of assets $10,474,000 
 Recognition of unfunded superannuation liability $6,199,000 
 
Figure 7.1 Changes in Net Assets Including/Excluding Abnormal Items: 
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$(45,000,000)
$(40,000,000)
$(35,000,000)
$(30,000,000)
$(25,000,000)
$(20,000,000)
$(15,000,000)
$(10,000,000)
$(5,000,000)
$-
$5,000,000
95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/
Year
Am
ou
nt
 
Table 7.10 Changes in Net Assets Including/Excluding Abnormal Items: 
  1995 - 2000 
 Greater Bendigo City Council  
Including Excluding Abnormal
95/96 30,755,239$      30,155,417 $       599,822$        Legend
96/97 (1,204,771) $       5,951,993 $         (7,156,764)$    Broken Line  - - - - - - Excluding 
97/98 8,681,000$        4,001,148 $         4,679,852$     Straight Line _______  Including 
98/99 30,842,000$      6,397,000 $         24,445,000$   
99/20 39,520,000$      7,114,000 $         32,406,000$    
 
Figure 7.2 Changes in Net Assets Including/Excluding Abnormal Items: 
  1995 - 2000 
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Table 7.11 Changes in Net Assets Including/Excluding Abnormal Items: 
  1995 - 2000 
 City of Greater Geelong  
Including Excluding Abnormal
95/96 7,325,000$        10,156,000 $       (2,831,000)$    Legend
96/97 (7,404,000)$       9,911,000 $         (17,315,000)$  Broken Line  - - - - - - Excluding 
97/98 10,058,000$      6,210,000 $         3,848,000$     Straight Line _______  Including 
98/99 21,518,000$      11,108,000 $       10,410,000$   
99/20 9,558,000$        9,558,000 $         -$                 
 
Figure 7.3 Changes in Net Assets Including/Excluding Abnormal Items: 
  1995 - 2000 
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Table 7.12 Changes in Net Assets Including/Excluding Abnormal Items: 
  1995 - 2000 
 
 Horsham Rural City Council 
Including Excluding Abnormal
95/96 1,635,938$        1,603,385 $         32,553$          Legend
96/97 (520,074)$          365,786 $            (885,860)$       Broken Line  - - - - - - Excluding 
97/98 112,536,119$    (4,444,787) $        116,980,906$ Straight Line _______  Including 
98/99 (42,895,098)$     (2,260,958) $        (40,634,140)$  
99/20 (8,568,457)$       (3,542,080) $        (5,026,377)$     
 
Figure 7.4 Changes in Net Assets Including/Excluding Abnormal Items: 
  1995 - 2000 
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Table 7.13 Changes in Net Assets Including/Excluding Abnormal Items: 
  1995 - 2000 
 
 Melton Shire Council 
Including Excluding Abnormal
95/96 (3,513,081) $       (3,513,081)$        -$                Legend
96/97 (9,578,598) $       (6,062,711)$        (3,515,887)$    Broken Line  - - - - - - Excluding 
97/98 (617,144) $          (545,726)$           (71,418)$         Straight Line _______  Including 
98/99 2,192,213 $        2,695,336$         (503,123)$       
99/20 12,966,692 $      14,476,773$       (1,510,081)$     
 
 
Figure 7.5 Changes in Net Assets Including/Excluding Abnormal Items: 
  1995 - 2000 
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What Figures 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 reveal is the significant impact movements in 
asset measurement have had on the reported net assets position of councils. Such 
movements have resulted in financial reports reporting significant volatility over very 
short periods. Comparability within and between councils has become more difficult. 
Removing the effects of abnormal items indicates more stable patterns of financial 
position, which would more likely be representative of the longer-term position of 
councils given their generally consistent levels of resources. As previously noted in 
Section 7.2a, the volatility is not the consequence of increases and decreases in 
monetary resources, which have in fact decreased, but the consequence of non-
monetary book valuations, which may never be realised. As also previously stated, 
many of these assets are more like liabilities in that they incur significant outflows for 
maintenance and provide no cash inflows. 
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7.2c The impact of the depreciation on the bottom-line 
 
A consequence of adopting accrual accounting is that depreciation will be calculated 
and reported as an expense of operations. Depreciation expense was not a component 
of fund accounting. Depreciation expense as a percentage of total expenses reveals a 
significant volatility on the financial statements. Figures 7.6, 7.7, 7.8, 7.9 and 7.10 
along with Tables 7.15, 7.16, 7.17, 7.18 and 7.19 identify this volatility and the extent 
to which depreciation expense has become the largest single expense incurred by local 
government. Table 7.14 shows the relative increases over the period 1996/1997 to 
1999/2000. 
 
 
Table 7.14 Depreciation as a Percentage of Total Expenditure: 1996/1997 and  
                        1999/2000 
 % of Total Expenses 
1996/1997 
% of Total Expenses 
1999/2000 
City of Ballarat 7% 25% 
Greater Bendigo City Council 13% 26% 
City of Greater Geelong 6% 23% 
Horsham Rural City Council 4% 41% 
Melton Shire Council 25% 20% 
 
Table 7.15 Depreciation Expense as a Percentage of Total Expenses: 
  1995 - 2000 
 
City of Ballarat
Expenses (Excluding Dep) Depreciation %
95/96 47,082,000$    3,187,000$    7%
96/97 43,066,000$    3,580,000$    8%
97/98 46,303,000$    14,417,000$  31%
98/99 48,698,000$    13,806,000$  28%
99/20 48,341,000$    12,204,000$  25%  
 
 
Figure 7.6 Depreciation Expense as a Percentage of Total Expense: 
  1995 - 2000 
 
$-
$10,000,000
$20,000,000
$30,000,000
$40,000,000
$50,000,000
95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/20
Year
A
m
ou
nt
 
 
 163
Table 7.16 Depreciation Expense as a Percentage of Total Expense: 
  1995 - 2000 
 
Greater Bendigo City Council
Expenses (Excluding Dep) Depreciation %
95/96 41,849,536$    5,408,538$    13%
96/97 35,698,327$    6,108,942$    17%
97/98 43,349,715$    13,173,833$  30%
98/99 46,273,000$    10,859,000$  23%
99/20 48,001,000$    12,241,000$  26%
 
 
 
Figure 7.7 Depreciation Expense as a Percentage of Total Expense: 
  1995 - 2000 
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Table 7.17 Depreciation Expense as a Percentage of Total Expense: 
  1996 - 2000 
 
City of Greater Geelong
Expenses (Excluding Dep) Depreciation %
96/97 82,326,000$    5,168,000$    6%
97/98 84,771,000$    17,270,000$  20%
98/99 84,747,000$    18,599,000$  22%
99/20 93,286,000$    21,236,000$  23%  
 
 
Figure 7.8 Depreciation Expense as a Percentage of Total Expense: 
  1996 - 2000 
 
 
$-
$10,000,000
$20,000,000
$30,000,000
$40,000,000
$50,000,000
$60,000,000
$70,000,000
$80,000,000
$90,000,000
$100,000,000
96/97 97/98 98/99 99/20
Year
A
m
ou
nt
 
 
 164
Table 7.18 Depreciation Expense as a Percentage of Total Expense: 
  1995 - 2000 
 
Horsham Rural City Council
Expenses (Excluding Dep) Depreciation %
95/96 10,721,756$    481,336$       4%
96/97 10,603,603$    787,647$       7%
97/98 11,572,308$    7,380,055$    64%
98/99 11,987,381$    5,659,660$    47%
99/20 14,204,338$    5,801,537$    41%  
 
Figure 7.9 Depreciation Expense as a Percentage of Total Expense: 
  1995 - 2000 
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Table 7.19 Depreciation Expense as a Percentage of Total Expense: 
  1995 - 2000 
 
Melton Shire Council
Expenses (Excluding Dep) Depreciation %
95/96 21,761,691$    5,342,819$    25%
96/97 23,647,295$    5,294,262$    22%
97/98 24,224,438$    5,346,313$    22%
98/99 26,006,339$    5,311,810$    20%
99/20 27,496,771$    5,412,544$    20%  
 
Figure 7.10 Depreciation Expense as a Percentage of Total Expense: 
  1995 - 2000 
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As a line item within the Statement of Financial Performance the extent of this shift 
over the five councils is a $37,307,338 decrease on the bottom-line as can be seen in 
Table 7.20. 
 
Table 7.20 Impact of Depreciation on the Bottom-Line: 1996/1997 and 
1999/2000 
 
 Depreciation 
1996/1997 
Depreciation 
1999/2000 
City of Ballarat $3,187,000 $12,204,000 
Greater Bendigo City Council $5,408,538 $12,241,000 
City of Greater Geelong $5,168,000 $21,236,000 
Horsham Rural City Council $481,386 $5,801,537 
Melton Shire Council $5,342,819 $5,412,544 
 $19,587,743 $56,895,081  
 
The effect of this change can be seen in Figures 7.11, 7.12, 7.13, 7.14 and 7.15 along 
with Tables 7.21, 7.22, 7.23, 7.24 and 7.25, which compare the bottom-line positions 
with and without depreciation over the period 1995 - 2000. 
 
Table 7.21 Impact on Bottom-Line Including/Excluding Depreciation:  
1995 - 2000 
 
City of Ballarat
Revenue less Expenses (Including Dep) (Excluding Dep)
95/96 2,407,000$         5,594,000$         
96/97 (2,525,000)$       1,055,000$         
97/98 (2,865,000)$       11,552,000$       
98/99 (589,000)$          13,217,000$       
99/20 704,000$            12,908,000$         
Legend
Broken Line - - - - - - Excluding
Unbroken Line______Including  
 
 
Figure 7.11 Impact on Bottom-Line Including/Excluding Depreciation: 
  1995 - 2000 
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Table 7.22 Impact on Bottom-Line Including/Excluding Depreciation:  
1995 - 2000 
 
Greater Bendigo City Council
Revenue less Expenses (Including Dep) (Excluding Dep)
95/96 14,161,653$       19,570,191$       
96/97 (2,525,000)$       12,060,935$       
97/98 4,001,134$         17,174,967$       
98/99 6,397,000$         17,256,000$       
99/20 7,114,000$         19,355,000$        
Legend
Broken Line - - - - - - Excluding
Unbroken Line______Including  
 
 
Figure 7.12 Impact on Bottom-Line Including/Excluding Depreciation: 
  1995 - 2000 
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Table 7.23 Impact on Bottom-Line Including/Excluding Depreciation: 
  1996 - 2000 
 
City of Greater Geelong
Revenue less Expenses (Including Dep) (Excluding Dep)
96/97 9,911,000$         15,079,000$       
97/98 6,210,000$         23,480,000$       
98/99 11,108,000$       29,707,000$       
99/20 9,558,000$         30,794,000$              
Legend
Broken Line - - - - - - Excluding
Unbroken Line______Including  
 
Figure 7.13 Impact on Bottom-Line Including/Excluding Depreciation: 
  1996 - 2000 
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Table 7.24 Impact on Bottom-Line Including/Excluding Depreciation: 
  1995 - 2000 
 
Horsham Rural City Council
Revenue less Expenses (Including Dep) (Excluding Dep)
95/96 1,603,385$         2,084,721$         
96/97 365,786$            1,153,433$         
97/98 (4,737,945)$       -$                   
98/99 (2,260,958)$       3,398,702$         
99/20 (3,542,080)$       2,259,457$               
Legend
Broken Line - - - - - - Excluding
Unbroken Line______Including  
 
Figure 7.14 Impact on Bottom-Line Including/Excluding Depreciation: 
  1995 - 2000 
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Table 7.25 Impact on Bottom-Line Including/Excluding Depreciation: 
  1995 - 2000 
Melton Shire Council
Revenue less Expenses (Including Dep) (Excluding Dep)
95/96 (3,513,081)$       1,829,738$         
96/97 (6,062,711)$       (768,449)$          
97/98 (545,726)$          4,800,587$         
98/99 2,695,337$         8,007,147$         
99/20 14,476,773$       19,889,317$            
Legend
Broken Line - - - - - - Excluding
Unbroken Line______Including  
 
Figure 7.15 Impact on Bottom-Line Including/Excluding Depreciation: 
  1995 - 2000 
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As can be seen, the effects of depreciation on the bottom-line has not only had a 
significant impact on the reported profit of these five councils, but has also created 
significant swings in their reported positions over the researched years. Moreover, the 
inclusion of depreciation expense has resulted in a significant new expense being 
included within local government financial reports. As can be seen in Figure 7.16, the 
inclusion of this expense may be attributable to both the rise in deficit reporting 
councils and the fall in surplus reporting councils towards the end of the 1990s. 
 
Figure 7.16 Surplus/Deficit Councils: 1984 - 2000 (Figure 4a.2 reproduced) 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
84/85 85/86 87/88 90/91 92/93 97/98 99/20
Year
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Surplus
Deficit
 
Interestingly however, while there has been an increase in deficit reporting councils, 
the level of total deficit reported has fallen significantly, in contrast to the number of 
surplus reporting councils that has decreased, although with significantly higher total 
surplus, as is evidenced through Figure 7.17. 
 
Figure 7.17 ($000s) Surplus/Deficit Gap: 1984 - 2000 (Figure 4a.3 reproduced) 
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This position raises the question of how such a large impost is being so capably 
consumed within the financial position of councils. To accommodate such an expense 
either total revenue would need to have increased significantly or there would need to 
be large decreases in expenditure. Table 7.26 indicates a larger growth rate for total 
revenue over the later years of this research, which would go some way towards 
covering this cost.  
 
Table 7.26 Total Revenue/Total Expenditure Growth Rates: 1997 - 2000 
 
 
Total Revenue Total Expenditure
$m Increase $m Increase
96/97 2,568 96/97 3,002
97/98 2,964 15.4% 97/98 2,985 -0.6%
98/99 3,191 7.7% 98/99 3,100 3.9%
99/00 3,338 4.6% 99/00 3,222 3.9%  
 
7.2d The effect on the bottom-line when both the abnormal items associated 
with asset valuation movements and the depreciation of those assets is 
removed 
 
Figures 7.18, 7.19, 7.20, 7.21 and 7.22 along with Tables 7.27, 7.28, 7.29, 7.30 and 
7.31 detail the effect of changes in the net assets position resulting from operations 
after excluding both abnormal effects and depreciation. This should provide the reader 
with an idea of the before and after position and effect on local government financial 
reporting of the major thrust of the AAS27 reforms pursuant to valuing infrastructure 
assets and their subsequent depreciation. 
  
Table 7.27  Changes in the Net Assets from Operations Including/Excluding 
both Abnormal Effects and Depreciation: 1995 - 2000 
City of Ballarat
Abnormals Depreciation
95/96 2,407,000$      5,594,000$      -$                  (3,187,000)$     Legend
96/97 (19,198,000)$   1,055,000$      (16,673,000)$    (3,580,000)$     Broken Line  - - - - - - Excluding
97/98 (2,865,000)$     11,552,000$    -$                  (14,417,000)$   Straight Line _______  Including
98/99 (589,000)$        13,217,000$    -$                  (13,806,000)$   
99/20 (38,134,000)$   12,908,000$    (38,838,000)$    (12,204,000)$   
Excluding ExcludingIncluding
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 7.18 below, the inclusion of these assets and the 
depreciation, at the City of Ballarat, has increased the volatility of reported outcome 
and significantly reduced council’s reported financial position, which would have 
recorded operating surpluses over the period instead of the significant deficits that 
were actually reported.  
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Figure 7.18 Changes in the Net Assets from Operations Including/Excluding 
both Abnormal Effects and Depreciation: 1995 - 2000 
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Table 7.28 Changes in the Net Assets from Operations Including/Excluding 
both Abnormal Effects and Depreciation: 1995 - 2000 
 
Greater Bendigo City Council
Abnormals Depreciation
95/96 30,755,239$    35,563,955$    599,822$          (5,408,538)$     Legend
96/97 (1,204,771)$     12,060,935$    (7,156,764)$      (6,108,942)$     Broken Line  - - - - - - Excluding
97/98 8,681,000$      17,174,981$    4,679,852$       (13,173,833)$   Straight Line _______  Including
98/99 30,842,000$    17,256,000$    24,445,000$     (10,859,000)$   
99/20 39,520,000$    19,355,000$    32,406,000$     (12,241,000)$   
ExcludingIncluding Excluding
 
 
Figure 7.19 Changes in the Net Assets from Operations Including/Excluding 
both Abnormal Effects and Depreciation: 1995 - 2000 
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Table 7.29 Changes in the Net Assets from Operations Including/Excluding 
both Abnormal Effects and Depreciation: 1996 - 2000 
City of Greater Geelong
Abnormals Depreciation
96/97 (7,404,000)$     15,079,000$    (17,315,000)$    (5,168,000)$     Legend
97/98 10,058,000$    23,480,000$    3,848,000$       (17,270,000)$   Broken Line  - - - - - - Excluding
98/99 21,518,000$    29,707,000$    10,410,000$     (18,599,000)$   Straight Line _______  Including
99/20 9,558,000$      30,794,000$    -$                  (21,236,000)$   
ExcludingIncluding Excluding
 
 
Figure 7.20 Changes in the Net Assets from Operations Including/Excluding 
both Abnormal Effects and Depreciation: 1996 - 2000 
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Table 7.30 Changes in the Net Assets from Operations Including/Excluding 
both Abnormal Effects and Depreciation: 1995 - 2000 
Horsham Rural City Council
Abnormals Depreciation
95/96 1,635,938$      2,084,721$      32,553$            (481,336)$        Legend
96/97 (520,074)$        1,153,433$      (885,860)$         (787,647)$        Broken Line  - - - - - - Excluding
97/98 112,536,119$  2,935,268$      116,980,906$   (7,380,055)$     Straight Line _______  Including
98/99 (42,895,098)$   3,398,702$      (40,634,140)$    (5,659,660)$     
99/20 (8,568,457)$     2,259,457$      (5,026,377)$      (5,801,537)$     
ExcludingIncluding Excluding
 
Figure 7.21 Changes in the Net Assets from Operations Including/Excluding 
both Abnormal Effects and Depreciation: 1995  - 2000 
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Table 7.31 Changes in the Net Assets from Operations Including/Excluding 
both Abnormal Effects and Depreciation: 1995 - 2000 
Melton Shire Council
Abnormals Depreciation
95/96 (3,513,081)$     1,829,738$      -$                  (5,342,819)$     Legend
96/97 (9,578,598)$     (768,449)$        (3,515,887)$      (5,294,262)$     Broken Line  - - - - - - Excluding
97/98 (617,144)$        4,800,587$      (71,418)$           (5,346,313)$     Straight Line _______  Including
98/99 2,192,213$      8,007,146$      (503,123)$         (5,311,810)$     
99/20 12,966,692$    19,889,317$    (1,510,081)$      (5,412,544)$     
Including ExcludingExcluding
 
Figure 7.22 Changes in the Net Assets from Operations Including/Excluding 
both Abnormal Effects and Depreciation: 1995 - 2000 
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7.3  Conclusion 
 
On a broad scale, the evidence presented here has shown that the outcome of AAS27 
with its resultant inclusion of assets within the financial reports of local government 
has had the effect of making their reported financial position much more volatile and 
less comparable. This calls into question the benefits of including asset movements 
and its consequent depreciation. It would not be unexpected if such volatility persisted 
given the high valuation of these assets, the methods employed in valuation and the 
terms of depreciation. As evidenced above, the consequence of re-estimating the 
useful life of road pavements can generate significant movements and charges through 
the financial reports.  
 
AAS27 was predicated on providing decision-useful information to the broader 
council population. Qualified accountants are aware that the presentation of 
information in financial reports is presented so as to be understandable given a 
requisite level of financial knowledge and that the accounting illiterate have access to 
the services of accountants if needing interpretive help. It is suggested here that the 
current financial reporting regime of local government has created a vaguer, more 
complicated and more volatile set of financial reports, specifically for its largest 
cohort of prescribed users, the ratepayers. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Evaluation of Local Government Accounting Reform: 
Findings and Conclusions 
 
The objective of this research was twofold. First it sought to evaluate the extent to 
which the due process, as applied to AAS27, provided an appropriate consultative 
framework and mechanism for the development of local government accounting 
regulation. Second, the extent to which the outcome of the due process delivered the 
purported benefits espoused within the 1993 accounting reforms.  
 
In terms of providing an appropriate consultative framework for the development of 
accounting regulation, the due process as considered in the development of AAS27 
could best be described as a procedural construct directed towards legitimising 
regulatory accountability through appeals to public involvement. Rather than a 
substantive process aimed at accommodating natural justice, the due process as 
applied within the accounting standard setting has a political bent. It is predicated on a 
mixture of the normative standard and competing interests rule making models that 
accommodate conflicting interests under the guise of creating accounting rules ‘for 
the common good’.  
 
It is argued within this research that the consultative process known as due process 
had little involvement in the promulgation of AAS27. Due process was used to allay 
public concern and to provide an image of public accountability and accessibility in 
name only. What is revealed is that democratic participation within due process is 
constrained to a limited subset of knowledgeable and self-interested participants and 
is narrowly enshrined in time with the opportunity for comment through written 
submissions and limited consultation. It also found that the institutional design of the 
due process enables an individual’s entitlement to a fair hearing to be overridden by 
the need for a decision to be made and consequently does not promote the settlement 
of disputes, but rather merely bringing them to an end.  
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The study suggests that the Australian accounting profession, which saw the public 
sector and local government as a new frontier for substantial income generating 
activity, by developing a highly generalised conceptual framework, positioned itself 
as the foremost authority capable of establishing accounting concepts and standards 
through its ability to determine what the objectives of financial reporting are. When 
enshrined within a construct of neo-corporatism and delegated legislative authority, it 
would not be surprising to find that the subordinate body would proceed as it thought 
best, particularly if it had acquired the ability to control its subordinations which is 
well documented. 
 
This paper supports the proposition that the outcome of AAS27 was decided well 
before ED50 was released within the public domain under the due process. Research 
into due process has indicated that the most influential lobbying on issues occurs at 
the developmental stages of any new standards which is somewhat removed from the 
due process stage of community input. Moreover, by the issue of ED50, the concepts 
espoused within the conceptual framework, specifically SACs 1, 2 and 3, had been 
well established and given the accounting profession’s augmentation of the principles 
as their main argument and rationale for involvement in the public sector, it would 
have been inconceivable should AAS27 not reflect these concepts. This outcome is 
not in dispute given the very close proximity of what was espoused in ED50 and 
promulgated in AAS27.  
 
More important, however, is what was revealed when the due process itself was 
analysed. Due process as developed over time through the common law held 
democratic participation through the constructs audi alteram partem [to hear the other 
side; no person should be judged without a hearing], nemo iudex in re sua [every 
judge must be free from bias] as its core values. This study suggests that these two 
maxims found little reality within the accounting standard setting process. As has 
been demonstrated above, the accounting profession instigated, or at least were the 
willing messenger of governmental policy for financial reporting change within the 
public sector. They fuelled this change by first addressing the reform issues by the 
release of key critiques such as Monograph 5 and Discussion Paper 12 and second, by 
invoking the authority of an untested conceptual framework to justify common 
standards for both the public and private sectors. 
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ED50 when released brought with it the largest response through submissions to that 
date, with some one hundred and fifty-four written submissions received. As detailed 
within Chapter Six, the AARF summarised these submissions and selectively 
discriminated perceived support for the proposed standard in its formulations to the 
PSASB, which then ratified AAS27 along the lines of ED50. This study found, that 
most submissions received by the standard setter opposed the proposed changes. A 
post standard survey to local government councils reinforced this observation and 
suggested the outcome of the due process had been pre-ordained. Importantly, it also 
alluded to the inability of the process to provide either appropriate insights or 
communicative feedback as to the formulation of the outcome. Given accusations of 
regulatory capture at the time, as discussed in Chapter Four, it would not be untoward 
to suggest that the accounting profession was instigator, examiner and executioner of 
AAS27 and particularly open to criticisms of not hearing the other side or being 
biased. 
 
The most evident difference between the common law due process and that espoused 
within the accounting standard setting environment rests on the relationship between 
procedures, outcomes and values. In the standard setting context, due process finds 
total inclusion within the procedural domain alone; as part of a conduit for receiving 
and of allowing for participation, whereas common law due process is consumed 
within the very nature of outcomes. It is the value of participation that gives meaning 
to the outcome and is substantive in its nexus to the decision. As Golding has alluded, 
“There is little point in devising standards or rules of fair procedure unless following 
them results in just decisions and outcomes… If the substantive law is unjust, it does 
not seem to matter much whether the procedural rules are fair or not.”291 
 
The decision or outcome of the due process is imbedded within AAS27 and its 
influence on local government financial reporting. By removing the cash based fund 
system of financial reporting and applying the private sector accounting model to 
local government, it was deemed that improved financial reporting would be achieved 
through the provision of more relevant and reliable accounting information which 
would be included in the decision-making model. Improved financial reporting was 
also said to deliver better accountability.  
                                                 
291   Golding, op.cit.: p.120.  
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On the latter issue of accountability, it is felt that the imposition of commercial 
accounting principles has sullied actual accountability, along with covertly greying 
the lines of accountability as discussed in Chapter Three. As an aside, it has been 
observed that the major thrust of AAS27 was to bring local government infrastructure 
and heritage assets onto the balance sheet, so that total resources could be valued. It is 
not of little interest that privatisation would demand a valuation of assets to conclude 
a sale. The use of the private sector accounting model gave government the ability to 
cost assets and arrive at values capable of being used for privatisation.  
 
The argument applied for the imposition of AAS27 was based on the premise under 
SAC1 that local government had users dependent on them for the provision of 
accounting information useful for decision-making. This broadened the scope of local 
government financial reporting to embrace the larger council populace and away from 
reports aimed only at the providers of resources. Benefits espoused were the provision 
of more effective and efficient outcomes from local government and that resources 
would be better utilised if this occurred. Commercial accounting principles had for the 
most part been identified as providing a backdrop for accountability, by making 
visible and disciplining performance so that it could be demanded, policed and 
enforced.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the calculative consequences which accompanied the 
private sector accounting model brought with them the potential to create seemingly 
precise and specific quantitative facts that delineated what is costly, beneficial and of 
value. In so doing, calculative priority could be given to the economic rather than the 
social. “Costs, consequences and benefits can come to be divided into the defined and 
known.”292 In a practical sense, accounting provides evidence of an organisation’s 
legitimacy and application of its procedures demonstrates the organisation’s 
commitment to rational economic actions and efficient management.  
 
                                                 
292  Hopwood, op.cit.: p.417. 
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This study suggests that the private sector accounting model has given selective 
visibility to local government outcomes by influencing what comes to be seen as 
possible, problematic, desirable and significant. Appeals to the legitimacy provided by 
such accountings, brings with it also the opportunity and freedom for those who 
control it not only to be unaccountable but also control the direction of debate. 
 
By appealing to supposedly less opaque private market values, and promises of 
greater accountability and increased community knowledge of public sector financial 
affairs, central government, through application of the private sector accounting 
model, has directed greater attention towards the subordinate. Contemporary 
economic rationalism has demanded the shift towards balanced budgets or surpluses, 
which are seen to be economically correct and portray sound financial responsibility 
and accountability. The shifting of responsibility towards the subordinate required a 
sullied mode of reporting which blurred a clear path of upward accountability and left 
the choice of action in the domain of the subordinate. In this respect, the output of the 
private sector accounting model has been used to measure blame for the subordinate 
while at the same time covertly, because of its overly financial focus, blur the 
directions of accountability. 
 
At the heart of accounting and espoused within SAC3 is the requirement to provide 
useful accounting information that is relevant, reliable, comparable and 
understandable which will enable users to make informed economic decisions. 
AAS27 was promulgated on the premise that the private sector accounting model 
would deliver these characteristics to local government financial reporting. This study 
has found that in the medium term after its application, these changes have resulted in 
significant volatility of the reported financial information between years, with a 
resultant difficulty in both comparing internal council performance and any 
comparisons with other outside councils. For the accounting illiterate ratepayer, who 
local government was not seen as accountable to, who deals in the every day on a cash 
basis, the new financial reporting of the economic entity as opposed to a simple funds 
concept is suggested to be of little value. Visits to several councils indicated 
significantly low interest in their financial reports. 
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Hopefully the reader can discern a much larger overview than just the application of 
AAS27 and its consequences. Particularly, how the New Right neo-liberalism that 
developed impetus during the 1970s and sought limited and smaller government 
claimed the political landscape by dismantling the post war welfare state. How 
government philosophy was enacted through the opportunistic actions of the 
accounting profession, who saw the public sector as a new frontier for substantial 
income generating activity and who as willing messenger endorsed government 
perceptions of public sector inefficiency and accountability. By espousing the benefits 
of the private sector accounting model and its application benefits, performance 
measurement through the use of accounting was used to shift accountability from the 
centre to the outer.  
 
Important also is an oversight of how accounting standard setting in Australia has 
been coerced within these changes and how ideas of delegated legislation, due process 
and accountability are covertly political. As a social science, accounting should not be 
seen for something which it is not. Kenneth MacNeal in his seminal 1939 book Truth 
in Accounting suggested the course followed by accounting practice was the course of 
least resistance. “Accounting is at the crossroads. It can yield to inertia, refuse to 
recognize its own opportunity, ignore the public need, and continue to dig its own 
grave.” 293  Norman J. Lenhart in reviewing this publication suggested there is “some 
evidence that portions of the book might have been written before the research was 
started.”294 Analogous to the imposition of private sector accounting principles on the 
public sector, it is propounded here that the research and results of AAS27 would be 
the outcome of hindsight, not foresight. 
 
In hindsight, the private sector accounting model, as applied to local government, has 
served well the purpose for which it was applied. Through its overly financial focus 
and purist commercial credentials of delivering efficient and effective management by 
being capable of measuring performance, the role of government has been recreated. 
Responsibility for the delivery of public goods and services has been blurred. 
Revenues and expenditures that can be measured under the perceived better private 
sector accounting model should perhaps be more efficiently managed also by the 
                                                 
293   MacNeal, K., (1939), Truth In Accounting, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania, pp.323-324. 
294   Lenhart, N.J., (1939), “Review of Truth in Accounting”, The Journal of Accountancy, June, 
pp.395-396. 
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private sector. What better conduit and messenger for such a shift than the guardians 
of the system, the accounting profession, to have added the necessary spin required to 
deliver and sell such a shift to the general public. 
 
In 2002, the CPA Australian Position Paper on AAS27, prepared by the CPAs Public 
Sector Centre for Excellence forwarded to the AASB, suggested that the 
implementation of AAS27 had provided:295 
 
 An improvement in the quality of finance and accounting staff employed in 
many local governments, with qualified accounting staff being employed for the 
first time in many instances 
 
 The basis of the preparation of annual financial statements on a consistent basis 
across the local government sector 
 
 An impetus towards a better framework for asset management 
 
 An impetus towards better public sector management in local government sector 
 
Excerpts taken from this paper, which was prepared as a result of a review undertaken 
by the AASB, are of significant interest. 
 
By retaining the public sector standards which deal with the unique issues of the 
public sector we will ensure that the focus is specifically directed to the information 
needs of public sector users, and gives due regard to meeting the needs from 
accounting information in the public sector. There is, therefore, a risk that specific 
issues will be subsumed within individual and topic specific standards without due 
regard to the broader public sector context if the three standards are revoked.296          
 
This appears a quantum shift from the argument put forward over a decade earlier that 
the uniqueness of local government did not warrant a specifically tailored local 
government standard as there was little difference in the information requirements of 
users between the private and public sectors. 
 
There is, however, some concern in local government that a significant amount of 
attention is placed on systems and reporting to meet the requirements of accounting 
standards, and little on the users of this information. While there has been significant 
improvement in the quality of reports from the local government sphere, and the 
resourcing of accounting staff, it is felt there are still many gaps, particularly in small, 
country local governments who face significant difficulties in resourcing skills to 
meet the demands of the standards.297 
          
                                                 
295    CPA Australia, (2002), CPA Australia Position Paper on AAS27, AAS29, and AAS31, Melbourne:  
CPA. p.2. 
296     ibid.: p.3. 
297     ibid. 
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For example in Western Australia, preliminary findings from a review of local 
government financial reporting requirements by the Department of Local 
Government and Regional Development indicate that there are many difficulties 
currently being experienced with the use of general purpose financial reports, 
required by standards and statutes, particularly in the interpretation and 
understanding of these reports at all levels — non-financial management, elected 
councillors and the public. There is a trend in local government to produce reports in 
accordance with the standards for compliance purposes, and at the same time, to 
produce other more meaningful reports whose form and presentation does not meet 
these obligations, for financial management and users.298 
 
It is somewhat intriguing that much of the argument put forward for AAS27 was 
premised on providing a more effective decision-useful information model for not 
only management but also to the broader clientele of local government, the rate 
payer/public who was espoused as requiring such information. General purpose 
financial reports would appear beyond the comprehension of non-financial 
management, elected councillors and the public. These same criticisms reverberated 
from the accounting profession during the lead up to AAS27 except for one simple 
difference; the public was then not included. 
 
The review appears to support a general view that the AASB is setting standards that 
everyone must comply with, irrespective of whether the information produced 
actually provides what is intended by the standard — useful, meaningful, 
understandable financial information. Such an attitude could potentially drive local 
government to producing two sets of reports — one under the AASB standards, and 
one under their own for users. The danger is that this encourages a minimalist 
approach — doing just enough to satisfy the standards, because the uses of the report 
are minimal outside the formal requirements. 
          
There has been a lot of progress and this should not be lost. However, if we 
concentrate solely on the application of standards and ignore the users we may lose 
the ground already gained. 299 
 
SAC3 suggests that information should be relevant, reliable, understandable and 
comparable as long as it is presented in a timely manner and is cost/benefit effective. 
In the language of science, reliable, understandable and comparable generally relates 
to the ability to be consistently replicated. Can this same consistency be said of 
accounting? Accounting is seen as a social science and as such is human driven with 
accounting numbers constructed and manipulated to meet various ends. It has been 
argued here of the political nature of accounting and it should come as no big surprise 
that the socio-political nature of different users of accounting information is 
divergent, a point that would appear lost for as long as the Australian accounting 
                                                 
298   ibid.  
299   ibid.  
 182
standard setters continue to conceptualise ‘useful, meaningful, understandable’ as 
consistent between different users and believe general purpose financial reporting 
delivers that same ‘useful, meaningful, understandable’ to divergent and different 
users with different requirements. 
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that many users have real problems with the current 
regime of reports, regardless of whether AAS 27 is changed or removed.300 
          
 
In considering changes to AAS27 the CPA report listed a number of areas that it 
considered as being of concern for local government: 
 
 The formatting of the operating statement 
 
 Presentation and treatment of changes in equity 
 
 The application of related party transactions to local government 
 
 Segment reporting 
 
 Treatment of acquisition and sale of assets 
 
 Treatment of grants and contributions 
 
 Budget to actual and rate determination information 
 
 Land under roads 
 
 Disclosure requirements 
 
Although AAS27 required the nature and objectives and the carrying amount of assets 
which are reliably attributable to that function and/or activity to be reported by way of 
note, it is interesting that the CPA report identified segment reporting and related 
party reporting as being of concern. These two standards, Australian Accounting 
Standards AAS16: ‘Financial Reporting by Segments’ and AAS22: ‘Related Party 
Disclosures’, were deliberately selected not to apply to local government through 
Section 13 in AAS27. 
 
With regard to segment reporting, this would appear to be too closely aligned to a 
form of fund reporting, which was previously seen to be of little value in providing 
relevant, reliable, comparable and understandable information. For it to be still an 
issue now perhaps suggests that users of local government reports would appreciate 
reports that delineated exactly what service or product funds were being spent on.  
                                                 
300   ibid. 
 183
There has been considerable discussion on the current reporting regime that has 
blurred the ability of users of local government financial reporting to view clearly the 
expenditure and revenues for specific activities. Whether this was a desired outcome 
from implementing AAS27 has not been concluded, but is perhaps worth 
consideration. The ability to shift money between activities under the fund system 
would have been clearly noticed. The suggestion here is that classification according 
to nature or type enabled financial statements to encompass a number of 
characteristics and there were a number of ways in which classifications of those 
elements could be made.301  
 
Of the other issues concerned, it would appear that the problem relates to the form 
rather than to the underlying items, which are the subject of the reported items. 
Presentation, treatment and disclosure in this context relate to the rearrangement of 
the same data so as to give it a new look. Somewhat akin to the emperor’s new 
clothes, the accounting profession can dress AAS27 up to look great, but the 
criticisms today would seem to suggest that the users of local government financial 
reports can see through the dressing to what lies beneath. 
 
On balance, we believe that AAS 27 needs to be retained for at least another three to 
five years, with improvements to the standard to ensure information is useful to users 
and overlaps with other standards or SACs are eliminated. … It is clear that the gains 
made from AAS 27’s adoption are too important to be put at risk by phasing it out 
too early. 302 
          
The CPA report, in concluding on AAS27, encourages the employment of qualified 
finance staff in local governments. As a private sector qualified accountant employed 
within local government in the early 1990s to oversee the transition of the old fund 
system to accrual accounting, this final suggestion of the report should be seen for 
what it is. The fund system of financial reporting which was developed over a century 
ago and stood the test of time, was not one developed by unqualified bookkeepers, nor 
was it ever seen as an end in itself, which appears to be the outcome of AAS27, but 
rather the nexus built between councils, government and the general public in the 
running and maintaining of public assets.  
                                                 
301   See: AAS27: Section 80. 
302   CPA Australia, op.cit.: p.4. 
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The accounting profession has long recognised that private sector financial reports are 
not prepared for the accounting illiterate but for those with some accounting 
knowledge. Those without sufficient skills should refer to somebody with them. As 
these are transactions between willing participants there is little argument, but when 
applied in the council setting, where democratically elected members are suggested, 
as also the public, to be illiterate in the understanding of financial reports prepared for 
their benefit raises questions as to whether the designed accounting decision-making 
model being applied is appropriate for the purpose and outcomes sought by those 
users.     
 
In concluding, I would hope the reader can take away an insight on the nature of 
standard setting in Australia and the outcomes of this process while considering that 
the “principles of participation, consideration, and openness constitute the 
foundational standards of fair treatment in policy making … [and] create rights in 
citizens with respect to the policy process.”303 Fine words like, relevant, reliable, 
understandable, comparable and due process. 
 
 
                                                 
303   Galligan, op.cit.: p.473. 
 185
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Agars, P.D., (1987), “The Public Sector Accounting Standards Board”, Accounting 
Forum, S.A. Institute of Technology; School of Accountancy, Vol. 11, No. 1.  
 
Advisory Council for Inter-Government Relations, (1984), Responsibilities and 
Resources of Australian Local Government, Report 7, Canberra: Australian 
Government Printing Service. 
 
Australian Accountancy Profession Joint Submission, (1982), The Australian 
Accountant, 52(5). 
 
Australian Accounting Research Foundation, [AARF], Melbourne: Victorian Printing,   
 (1970) A Statement of Australian Accounting Principles, ARS1, 
  [Author – W.J. Kenley] 
 (1972) Objectives and Concepts of Financial Statements,  
  [Authors W.J. Kenley and G.J. Staubus] 
 (1982) Objectives and Basic Concepts of Accounting, Accounting  
  Theory Monograph No. 2. [Author – A.D. Barton] 
 (1985) Financial Reporting in the Public Sector – A  Framework for 
  Analysis and Identification of Issues, Accounting Monograph No. 5. 
[Author – P. Sutcliffe] 
 (1987) Guide to Proposed Statements of Accounting Concepts. 
 (1987) Exposure Draft 42A: Objective of Financial Reporting, 
  Proposed Statement of Accounting Concepts, Series No.1, December. 
 (1987) Exposure Draft 42B: Qualitative Characteristics of Financial  
  Information, Proposed Statement of Accounting Concepts, Series 
No.1, December. 
 (1987) Exposure Draft 42C: Definition and Recognition of Assets, 
  Proposed Statement of Accounting Concepts, Series No.1, December. 
 (1987) Exposure Draft 42D: Definition and Recognition of Liabilities, 
  Proposed Statement of Accounting Concepts, Series No.1, December. 
 (1988) Exposure Draft 46A: Definition of the Reporting Entity, 
  Proposed Statement of Accounting Concepts, Series No.2, April. 
 (1988) Exposure Draft 46B: Definition and Recognition of Expenses, 
  Proposed Statement of Accounting Concepts, Series No.2, April. 
 (1988) Financial Reporting by Local Governments, Discussion Paper No. 12, 
   [Authors - D.T. Greenhall, J. Paul, and P. Sutcliffe] 
 (1989) Financial Reporting by Local Governments, Exposure Draft 50, 
  November. 
 (1990) A Report on Institutional Arrangements for Accounting Standard 
  Setting in Australia, [The Peirson Report], November. 
 (1990) Exposure Draft 51A: Definition of Equity, Proposed Statement of 
  Accounting Concepts, Series No. 3, August. 
 (1990) Exposure Draft 51B: Definition and Recognition of Revenues, 
  Proposed Statement of Accounting Concepts, Series No. 3, August. 
 (1990) Statement of Accounting Concept 1: Definition of the Reporting 
Entity, August. 
 (1990) Statement of Accounting Concept 2: The Objectives of General 
Purpose Financial Reporting, August. 
   
 186
 (1990) Statement of Accounting Concept 3: Qualitative Characteristics 
  of Financial Statements, August. 
 (1991) Financial Reporting by Local Governments, AAS27, July.  
 (1992) Statement of Accounting Concept 4: Definition and Recognition of 
  the Elements of Financial Statements, March. 
 (1993) The Development of Statements of Accounting Concepts and 
  Accounting Standards, Policy Statement 1.  
 
Australian Accounting Research Foundation, [AARF], (2002), Corporate Disclosure 
– Strengthening the Financial Reporting Framework, Paper presented to the 
Legislation Review Board for the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program, 
November. 
 
Australian Accounting Standards Board, (1985), ASRB Release 100: Nature of 
Approved Standards and Statements of Accounting Concepts and Criteria for the 
Evaluation of Proposed Approved Accounting Standards, February. 
 
 (1985) ASRB Release 200: Accounting Standards Review Board - 
  Procedures for Approval of Accounting Standards, February. 
 
Bahmueller, C., (1981), “The National Charity Company: Jeremy Bentham’s Silent 
Revolution”, USA: University of California Press, p.193. In The Public Sector: 
Contemporary Readings in Accounting and Auditing, Guthrie, J., Parker, L. and 
D. Shand, (eds), Marrickville: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990, pp.408-420. 
 
Barton, A., (2001), Review of accrual budget documentation, Submission to Round 
Table Public hearing for the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, July, 
      www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jpaa/accrualbudget/inqinde2.htm 
 
Bosch, H., (1985), Profit is a Measure, Paper presented at the Accounting Association 
of Australia and New Zealand Conference, Sydney, August.  
 
Brown, P.R., (1982), “FASB Responsiveness to Corporate Input”, Journal of 
Accounting, Auditing and Finance, Summer, pp.282-290. 
 
 Byrne, A., (1991), “The Role of the Public Sector in Australia’s Economy and 
Society”, In The Future of the Public Sector, Russell E.W., (ed), Monash 
University: Public Sector Management Institute, pp.56-71. 
         
Caiden, G., (1990), “Australia’s Changing Administrative Ethos; An Exploration”, 
Dynamics in Australian Public Management: Selected Essays, Kouzmin, A. and 
N. Scott, (eds), Melbourne: Macmillan, pp. 29-44. 
 
Calder, G.K., (1981), Planning Techniques available to assist in making choices, 
Paper presented at seminar on Financial Management for the Councillor, 
Michelton: The Municipal Association of Victoria. 
 
Carnegie, G. and B. West, (1997), “Observing the PSASB; ED50 and the Recognition 
of Infrastructure Assets”, Australian Accounting Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp.30-39. 
 
Cassell, C. and G. Symon, (1995), Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research: 
A Practical Guide, Sage, London. 
 
 187
Chambers, R., (1987), Accounting as Financial Instrumentation, Paper presented at 
Waseda University. Tokyo. 
 
Chua, W.F. and A. Sinclair, (1994), “Interests and the Profession-State Dynamic - 
Explaining the Emergence of the Australian Public Sector Accounting Standards 
Board”, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 21, No 5, July, pp. 
669-705.  
 
Coombes, R.J. and D.J. Stokes, (1985), “Standard-setters’ Responsiveness to 
Submissions on Exposure Drafts: Australian Evidence”, Australian Journal of 
Management, December, Vol. 10, pp.31-45. 
 
Commonwealth Joint Parliamentary Committee of Public Accounts, (1982), The 
Form and Standard of Financial Statements for Commonwealth Undertakings – A 
Discussion Paper, Report 199, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service. 
 
Conn, N., (1988), Treasury views on current developments in public sector financial 
recording, Northern Territory Public Accounts Committee, November. 
 
Council of Local Authorities for International Relations, (1997), Comparative Study 
on Local Government Reform in Japan, Sydney: Australia and New Zealand, 
Japan Local Government Centre.  
 
CPA Australia, (2002), CPA Australia Position Paper on AAS27, AAS29, and AAS31, 
Melbourne: CPA.  
 
Currie, C., Robinson, P. and R.G. Walker, (1987), “Political Activity and the 
Regulation of Accounting: Gaps in the Literature”, University of New South Wales 
- School of Accountancy Working Paper, No. 72. 
 
Deegan, C., Morris, R.D. and D. Stokes, (1988), “Audit Firm Lobbying on Proposed 
Disclosure Requirements”, University of New South Wales - School of Accounting, 
Working Paper, No. 78. 
 
Dhaliwal, D.S., (1982), “Some Economic Determinants of Management Lobbying for 
Alternative Methods of Accounting: Evidence from the Accounting for Interest 
Costs Issue”, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Summer, pp.255-265. 
       
Dominelli, L. and A. Hoogvelt, (1996), “Globalisation, the privatisation of welfare, 
and the changing role of professional academics in Britain”, Critical Perspectives 
on Accounting, No. 7, pp.191-212. 
    
Duce, M.R., (1984), Developments in Annual Reporting (Raising the Standards), 
Paper presented to the Annual Conference of the Local Government Accountants 
Association of Queensland, November, In Financial Reporting by Local 
Governments, Discussion Paper No.12, AARF, 1988. 
 
Evans, H.,  (1999), The Senate and Parliamentary Accountability, Discussion Paper 
No. 25, Canberra: ANU, pp.1-10. 
 
Evatt Research Centre, (1989), State of Siege: Renewal or Privatisation for Australian 
State Public Services?, Marrickville: Australian Public Service Federation. 
 
 188
Exworthy, M. and S. Halford, (1999), “Conflict, Compromise and Collaboration”, 
Professionals and the New Managerialism in the Public Sector, Philadelphia: 
Open University Press.  
 
Financial Accounting Standards Board, [FASB], (1978), Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts No.1, Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business 
Enterprises, Stamford Connecticut: November  
 
Flick, G.A., (1984), Natural Justice: Principles and Practical Application, 2ed, 
Sydney: Butterworths. 
 
Floyd, J. and D. Palmer, (1985), Corporate Management in Local Government: An 
Introduction, Parramatta: Hargreen Publishing Company. 
 
Francis, J.R., (1987), “Lobbying against Proposed Accounting Standards: The Case of 
Employers Pension Accounting”, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 
6, pp.35-57.      
 
Fuller, D. and B. Roffey, (1993), “Improving public sector accountability and 
strategic decision-making”, Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 52, 
No. 2, pp.149-163. 
 
Funnell, W. and K. Cooper, (1998), Public Sector Accounting and Accountability in 
Australia, Sydney: UNSW Press. 
    
Galligan, D.J., (1996), Due Process and Fair Procedures, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Gamble, A., (1988), The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of 
Thatcherism, London: Macmillan Education Ltd.  
 
Gavens, J.J., Carnegie, G.D. and R.W. Gibson, (1989), “Company Participation in the 
Australian Standard Setting Process”, Accounting and Finance, November, Vol. 
29, pp.47-58. 
 
Gerboth, D., (1973), “Research, Intuition and Politics in Accounting Inquiry”, The 
Accounting Review, July, Vol. 48, pp.475-482, In Hines, R., (1983), “Economic 
Consequences of Accounting Standards: A Good Reason for a Representative 
ASRB”, The Chartered Accountant in Australia, July, Vol. 54, pp.24-25. 
 
Gerritsen, R., (1998), “The Victorian Reforms in National and International 
Perspective”, In Local Government Reform in Victoria, Galligan, B., (ed), 
Melbourne: State Library of Victoria.  
 
Gifis, S., (1996), Barron’s Law Dictionary, 4ed, New York: Barron’s Educational 
Series Inc. 
 
Golding, M.P., (1987), Philosophy of Law, London: Prentice-Hall, pp.106-124. 
        
Gregory, R., (1995), “Accountability, Responsibility and Corruption: Managing the 
Public Production Process”, In The State Under Contract, Boston. J., (ed), 
Wellington: Bridgit Williams Books, pp.56-77. 
 
 189
Greiner, N., (1990), “Accountability in Government Organisations”, In The Public 
Sector: Contemporary Readings in Accounting and Auditing, Guthrie, J., Parker, 
L. and D. Shand, (eds), Marrickville: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990, pp.31-35. 
 
Guthrie, J., (1989), “Current Developments in Public Sector Accounting and Auditing 
Standard Setting in Australia”, In The Public Sector: Contemporary Readings in 
Accounting and Auditing, Guthrie, J., Parker, L. and D. Shand, (eds), Marrickville: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990, pp.238-244.  
 
Guthrie, J. and L.D. Parker, (1998), “Managerialism and Marketisation, in Financial 
Management change in Australia”, In Global Warning; Debating International 
Developments in New Public Financial Management, O. Olson, J. Guthrie, and C. 
Humphrey, (eds), Oslo: Cappelen Akademisk Forlag, pp. 49-72. 
 
Hall, S., (1988), The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crises of the Left, 
London: Verso. 
 
Hallam R., (1998), “The Politics of Change”, In Local Government Reform in 
Victoria, Galligan, B., (ed), Melbourne: State Library of Victoria. 
 
Haring, J.R., (1979), “Accounting Rules and the Accounting Establishment”, Journal 
of Business, October, pp.507-519. 
 
Harry, G.D., (1991), “Recognition of Assets and Liabilities. Recognition of Revenue 
and Expenses”, Accounting Reform for Local Government, Melbourne: Coopers 
and Lybrand. 
 
Hart, H.L.A., (1991), The Concept of Law, 2ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Heazlewood, T., (1992), “Current Developments in the Australian Standard Setting 
Process (Virtual Reality in Accounting)”, Discussion Paper No. 92-52, University 
of Southampton: Dept. of Accounting and Management Science, October. 
 
Henderson, S. and G. Peirson, (2002), Issues in Financial Accounting, 10ed, NSW: 
Prentice Hall.  
 
Hines, R., (1983), “Economic Consequences of Accounting Standards: A Good 
Reason for a Representative ASRB”, The Chartered Accountant in Australia, July, 
Vol. 54, pp.24-27. 
 
Hood, C., (1997), “Which Contract State? Four Perspectives on Over-Outsourcing for 
Public Services”, Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 56, No.3, 
pp.120-131. 
 
Hope, T. and R. Gray, (1982), “Power and Policy Making: The Development of an R 
& D Standard”, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Winter, pp.531-558. 
 
Hopwood, A., (1984), “Accounting and the pursuit of efficiency.” In The Public 
Sector: Contemporary Readings in Accounting and Auditing, Guthrie, J., Parker, 
L. and D. Shand, (eds), Marrickville: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990, pp.408-
424. 
 
 190
Hoskin, K., (1996), “The ‘awful idea of accountability’: inscribing people into the 
measurement of objects”, In Accountability; power, ethos and the technologies of 
mananging,  Munro, R. and J. Mouritsen, (eds), London: International Thomson 
Business Press. 
 
Howard, J., (1991), “Program Evaluation”, In Decision Making in the Australian 
Government – Program Evaluation, Uhr, J., (ed), Canberra: ANU, pp.122-126. 
 
Huang, S.J. and G. Tower, (1994), “A Power Analysis of the Development of the 
Differential Reporting Statement (SAC1)”, Murdoch University Working Paper, 
pp.1-24. 
 
Hughes, O., (1992), “Public Management or Public Administration?”, Australian 
Journal of Public Administration, 51(3), pp.286-296, In Parker, L. and G. Gould, 
(1999), “Changing public sector accountability; critiquing new directions”, 
Accounting Forum, Vol. 23, No. 2, June, pp.109-135. 
 
Hughes, O. and H. Emy, (1988), Australian Politics: Realities in Conflict, Melbourne: 
Macmillan.  
 
Hurst, G., (1994), Survey of Local Government Submitters to ED50, Unpublished. 
 
Hussey, J. and R. Hussey, (1997), Business Research. A Practical Guide for 
Undergraduate and Graduate Students, Bristol: Macmillan Business.  
 
Indecs Economics, (1986), State of Play 4: The Indecs Economics Special Report, 
Allen and Unwin. 
 
Jackson, P., (1979), Natural Justice, 2ed, London: Northumberland Press. 
  
Jensen, M. and W. Meckling, (1976), “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 
305-360. 
 
Kaplan, A., (1964), The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioural Science, 
Aylesbury: Chandler Publishing.  
 
Kaplan, R., (1983), “Measuring Manufacturing performance: A new challenge for 
management accounting research”, The Accounting Review, October, In The 
Public Sector: Contemporary Readings in Accounting and Auditing, Guthrie, J., 
Parker, L. and D. Shand, (eds), Marrickville: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990, 
pp.408-422. 
 
Karan, R., (1991), “Accounting Standard Setting in Australia: Implications of the 
Peirson Proposals for Reform”, University of Ballarat Working Paper 1. 
  
Karan, R., (2003), “Selective Commercialisation of Public Sector Accounting and Its          
Consequences for Public Accountability”, Australian Accounting Review, Vol.31, 
No.3, pp.15-23, Unpublished supporting paper. 
 
Kelly, L., (1982), “Corporate Lobbying and Changes in Financing or Operating 
Activities in Reaction to FAS No. 8”, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 
Winter, pp.153-173. 
          
 191
Kelly, L., (1985), “Corporate Management Lobbying on FAS No. 8: Some Further 
Evidence”, Journal of Accounting Research, Autumn, pp.6l9-632. 
          
Kelly, J.M., (1992), A Short History of Western Legal Theory, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
 
Lavaggi, R., (1995), “Accountability and the internal market”, Financial 
Accountability and Management, 11(4), pp.283-296.  
 
Lenhart, N.J., (1939), “Review of Truth in Accounting”, The Journal of Accountancy, 
June, pp.395-396. 
 
Ma, R. and R. Mathews, (1993), “Financial Reporting by Government Department: 
ED55 – A Dissenting View”, Australian Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 3, No. 1, 
pp.67-88.  
 
MacArthur, J.B., (1988), “An Analysis of the Content of Corporate Submissions on 
Proposed Accounting Standards in the UK”, Accounting and Business Research, 
Vol. 18, No. 71, pp. 213-226. 
 
MacNeal, K., (1939), Truth In Accounting, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania. 
 
Maloy, N., (1979), Local Government Financial Management, Sydney: Butterworths, 
In Financial Reporting by Local Governments, Discussion Paper No.12, AARF, 
1988. 
 
Maloy, N., (1982), Local Government Finance and Accounts, Sydney: Law Book 
Company.  
 
McGregor, W., (1990), “The Conceptual Framework for General Purpose Financial 
Reporting”, Charter, December, pp.48-51. 
 
Miller, M., (1991), “Shifts in the Regulatory Framework for Corporate Financial 
Reporting”, Australian Accounting Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, November, pp.30-39. 
 
Miller, M., (1995), “The Credibility of Australian Financial Reporting: Are Co-
Regulation Arrangements Working?”, Australian Accounting Review, Vol. 5, No. 
21, pp.3-16. 
 
Mitnick, B.M., (1980), The Political Economy of Regulation, Columbia University 
Press. 
 
Morris, R.D., (1986), “Lobbying on Proposed Accounting Standards”, The Chartered 
Accountant in Australia, March, Vol. 57, pp.46-57. 
 
Mulgan, R., (1997), “The processes of public accountability”, Australian Journal of 
Public Administration, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp.25-36.  
 
New South Wales Parliament Public Accounts Committee, (1983), Report on the 
Accounting and Reporting Requirements for Statutory Authorities, Sydney: 
Government Printing Office. 
 
Normanton, E., (1966), The Accountability and Audit of Governments, New York: 
Manchester University Press. 
 
 192
O’Keefe, T.B. and S.Y. Soloman, (1985), “Do Managers believe the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis?: Additional Evidence”, Accounting and Business Research, Spring, 
pp.67-79. 
          
Olofsson, C. and P. Svalander, (1975), “The Medical Services Change over to a Poor 
Environment”, Sweden: University of Linkoping, In The Public Sector: 
Contemporary Readings in Accounting and Auditing, Guthrie, J., Parker, L. and 
D. Shand, (eds), Marrickville: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990, pp.408-422. 
 
Orchard, L., (1998), “Managerialism, Economic Rationalism and Public Sector 
Reform in Australia: Connections, Divergences, Alternatives”, Australian Journal 
of Public Administration, Vol. 57, March, pp.19-32. 
 
Osborne, D. and T. Gaebler, (1993), Reinventing Government. How the 
Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector, New York: Penguin.          
 
Osborne, R. and B. Van Loon, (1996), Sociology for Beginners, London: Icon Books. 
 
Parker, L. and G. Gould, (1999), “Changing public sector accountability; critiquing 
new directions”,  Accounting Forum, Vol. 23, No. 2, June, pp.109-135. 
 
Patton, J., (1992), “Accountability and governmental financial reporting”, Financial 
Accountability and Management, 8(3), pp.165-180. 
 
Paul, J., (1991), “How will AAS27 affect you?”, Accounting Reform for Local 
Government, Melbourne: Business Law Education, October, pp.3-17. 
 
Puro, M., (1984), “Audit Firm Lobbying Before the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board: An Empirical Study”, Journal of Accounting Research, Autumn 4, pp.624-
646. 
 
Rivett, D. and M. Jones, (1993), “Conceptual framework for general purpose financial 
reporting”, CPA Programme Core 1, Module 3, Geelong: Deakin University, 
p.m3.8. 
 
Roberts, J. and R. Scapens, (1985), “Accounting systems and systems of 
accountability-understanding accounting practices in their organisational 
contexts”, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 10(4), pp. 443-456. 
 
Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration, [RCAGA] (1976), 
Report of Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration, Canberra: 
Australian Government Printing Service. 
 
Russell, E.W., (1982), “Legislative Framework for the Implementation of the 
Recommendations of the Public Bodies Review Committee”, In Victoria, 
Parliament: Public Bodies Review Committee, Sixth Report to the Parliament, 
October. 
 
Russell, E.W., (1991), The Future of the Public Sector, Melbourne: Public Sector 
Management Institute, Monash University, pp.1-18. 
 
Ryan, C., (1999), “Australian Public Sector Financial Reporting: A Case of 
Cooperative Policy Formulation”, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 
Journal, Vol.12, No. 5, pp.561-582. 
 
 193
Ryan, C., Dunstan, K. and T. Stanley, (2000), “Local Government Accounting 
Standard Setting in Australia: Did Constituents Participate?”, Financial 
Accountability and Management, Vol. 16, No. 4, November, pp.373-396. 
 
Sanderson Beck, (na), “Thoreau’s Civil Disobedience”, 
http:/www.san.beck.org/WP16-Thoreau.hmml 
 
Shand, D.A., (1989), “Public Sector Accounting Standards – Progress on 
Implementation in Australia”, In The Public Sector: Contemporary Readings in 
Accounting and Auditing, Guthrie, J., Parker, L. and D. Shand, (eds), Marrickville: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990, pp.139-154. 
 
Simmonds, K., (1983), “Strategic Management Accounting”, In Fanning, D. 
Handbook of Management Accounting, London: Gower Press, In The Public 
Sector: Contemporary Readings in Accounting and Auditing, Guthrie, J., Parker, 
L. and D. Shand, (eds), Marrickville: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990, pp.408-
422. 
 
Sims, M., (1994), “Will ED57 Improve Accounting Standard Setting in Australia?”, 
Charles Sturt University Working Paper. 
 
Sinclair, A., (1995), “The chameleon of accountability: forms and discourses”, 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 20(2/3), pp.219-237. 
 
South Australia Auditor-General, (2003), Electricity Business Disposal Process in 
South Australia, Supplementary Report of the Auditor-General, South Australia: 
Government Printer. 
 
Sutcliffe, P., Micallef, F. and L. Parker, (1991), Financial Reporting by Government 
Departments, AARF Discussion Paper No 16, In Ma, R. and R. Mathews, (1992), 
“Financial Reporting by Government Departments: ED55 – A dissenting view”, 
Australian Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp.67-88. 
 
Sutton, T.G., (1984), “Lobbying of Accounting Standard: Setting Bodies in the UK 
and the USA - A Downsian Analysis”, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
No.1, pp.81-95. 
          
Stigler, G.J., (1971), “The Theory of Economic Regulation”, Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science, Spring, pp.3-21. 
   
Solomons, D., (1978), “The Politicization of Accounting”, Journal of Accountancy, 
November, Vol. 146, pp.65-72. 
 
Schwartz, H., (1994), “Small Sates in Big Trouble: State Reorganisation in Australia, 
Denmark, New Zealand and Sweden in the 1980s”, World Politics, 46, pp.527-
555, In Orchard, L., (1998), “Managerialism, Economic Rationalism and Public 
Sector Reform in Australia: Connections, Divergences, Alternatives”, Australian 
Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 57, March, pp.19-32. 
 
Thynne, I. and J. Goldring, (1987), Accountability and Control: Government Officials 
and the Exercise of Power, Sydney: Law Book Company. 
 
Time. Inc. (na). “Margaret Thatcher”, Time 100 Polls, 
http:/www.time.com/time/time100/leaders/profile/thatcher.html 
 
 194
Tomlinson, J.E., (1985), “Improving Public Sector Accounting in Australia”, Public 
Fund Digest, pp. 88-89. 
 
Tower, G., and M. Kelly, (1989), “The Financial Accounting Standard Setting 
Process: An Agency Theory Perspective”, Massey University Discussion Paper, 
No. 94, June. 
 
Tutticci, I., Dunstan, K. and S. Holmes, (1994), “Respondent Lobbying in the 
Australian Accounting Standard Setting Process: ED49. A Case Study”, 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Vol. 7, pp.86-104. 
 
Twining, W., (1986), Theories of Evidence: Bentham and Wigmore, London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicholson. 
 
Uhr, J., (1993), “Redesigning Accountability”, Australian Quarterly, 65, Winter, 
pp.1-16. 
 
Valauskas, E.J., (1998), “A Review of Privatisation”, International Federation of 
Library Associations and Institutions, [IFLA] 64th IFLA General Conference. 
http:/www.ifla.org/IV/ifla64/188-139e.htm 
 
Walker, R.G., [1], (1987), “Australia’s ASRB. A Case Study of Political Activity and 
Regulatory Capture”, Journal of Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 17, No. 
67, Summer, pp. 269-286. 
 
Walker, R.G., [2], (1989), “Should there be common standards for the Public and 
Private Sectors”, In The Public Sector: Contemporary Readings in Accounting 
and Auditing, Guthrie, J., Parker, L. and D. Shand, (eds), Marrickville: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1990, pp. 244-263. 
 
Watts, R.L. and J.L. Zimmerman, (1981), “Auditors and the Determination of 
Accounting Standards”, University of Rochester Working Paper. 
 
Watts, R.L. and J.L. Zimmerman, (1986), Positive Accounting Theory, New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall International. 
 
West, (1998), West’s Encyclopaedia of American Law, Minneapolis. 
 
Williams, D.J., (1981), “Policy Analysis and Performance Review – Efficiency, 
Effectiveness and Productivity”, LGA Local Government Administration, 19(I) 
Feb-Mar.  
 
Wines, G., (1991), The Conceptual Framework and Accounting Standards: Seeds of 
Conflict?, Geelong: Deakin University, March.  
 
Wiltshire, K., (1987), Privatisation: The British Experience - An Australian 
Perspective, Melbourne: Longman Cheshire Pty Ltd.  
 
Wyatt, A., (1989), “Who should get Government Accounting Standards?”, Journal of 
Accountancy, March, pp. 65-70. 
 
Young, J.J., (2003), “Constructing, persuading and silencing: the rhetoric of 
accounting standards”, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 28, No.6, 
pp.621-638. 
 
